mcp: enforce operation security levels

This commit is contained in:
a.tolmachev
2026-05-03 19:26:38 +00:00
parent 076cead491
commit 34d345158f
3 changed files with 205 additions and 52 deletions
+3 -47
View File
@@ -2,55 +2,9 @@
## Current
### `feat/private-token-service-seam`
Status: in_progress
Goal:
- подготовить public codebase к private реализации короткоживущих и одноразовых токенов.
Main code areas:
- `crates/crank-core/src/auth.rs`
- `crates/crank-core/src/agent.rs`
- `apps/admin-api/src/app.rs`
- `apps/admin-api/src/service.rs`
- `apps/mcp-server/src/app.rs`
- `docs/agent-auth-model.md`
- `docs/admin-api.md`
- `docs/mcp-interface.md`
Implementation slices:
1. Определить stable contracts для:
- `POST /mcp-auth/v1/token`
- `POST /mcp-auth/v1/token/one-time`
2. Ввести abstraction для token verification в `mcp-server`.
3. Подготовить capability-gated UI/API surface без private implementation в Community.
4. Отделить Community `standard` flow от commercial `elevated/strict`.
DoD:
- public contracts зафиксированы и тестируемы;
- Community продолжает работать без private token service;
- premium auth paths не размазываются по Community logic.
Verification:
- contract tests for auth payload shapes;
- unit tests for credential-kind enforcement;
- docs sync check.
Progress:
- done:
- stable DTO и Community stub endpoints для `POST /mcp-auth/v1/token` и `POST /mcp-auth/v1/token/one-time`
- structured `403 forbidden` contract с `edition`, `machine_access_mode` и `upgrade_required`
- verification seam в `mcp-server` для bearer-token credentials без private Community implementation
- capability-gated `API Keys` surface показывает Community static-key flow и честно помечает commercial token modes как edition-locked
- pending:
- final separation of Community `standard` flow from commercial `elevated/strict`
## Planned
### `feat/frontend-commercial-polish`
Status: ready
Status: in_progress
Goal:
- закрыть оставшиеся UI/UX дефекты, мешающие коммерческой демонстрации и продажной версии продукта.
@@ -92,6 +46,8 @@ Verification:
- manual mobile checks at 375px width;
- EN/RU copy audit.
## Planned
### `feat/open-core-repo-boundary`
Status: ready
+61 -5
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@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ use axum::{
use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
use crank_core::{
AsyncJobHandle, AsyncJobId, AuthProfile, InvocationLevel, InvocationLog, InvocationLogId,
InvocationSource, InvocationStatus, JobStatus, PlatformApiKeyScope, SecretId, StreamSession,
StreamSessionId, StreamStatus,
InvocationSource, InvocationStatus, JobStatus, OperationSecurityLevel, PlatformApiKeyScope,
SecretId, StreamSession, StreamSessionId, StreamStatus,
};
use crank_registry::{
CreateAsyncJobRequest, CreateInvocationLogRequest, CreateStreamSessionRequest,
@@ -325,9 +325,12 @@ async fn mcp_post(
Some("tools/call") => PlatformApiKeyScope::Write,
_ => PlatformApiKeyScope::Read,
};
if let Err(status) = require_machine_access(&state, &path, &headers, required_scope).await {
return with_request_id_header(status.into_response(), &transport_request_id);
}
let credential = match require_machine_access(&state, &path, &headers, required_scope).await {
Ok(credential) => credential,
Err(status) => {
return with_request_id_header(status.into_response(), &transport_request_id);
}
};
let response = match method_name(&message) {
Some("initialize") if is_request(&message) => {
@@ -417,6 +420,7 @@ async fn mcp_post(
&session,
&message,
response_mode,
&credential,
resolved,
arguments,
&transport_request_id,
@@ -470,10 +474,31 @@ async fn handle_tool_call(
session: &SessionState,
message: &Value,
response_mode: ResponseMode,
credential: &VerifiedMachineCredential,
resolved: ResolvedToolCall,
arguments: Value,
transport_request_id: &str,
) -> Response {
if !credential_allows_security_level(credential, resolved.tool.operation.security_level) {
return tool_error_response(
message,
response_mode,
&session.protocol_version,
"machine_access_insufficient",
format!(
"machine access mode {} does not satisfy {} operation security",
serialize_machine_access_mode(credential.machine_access_mode),
serialize_security_level(resolved.tool.operation.security_level),
),
Some(json!({
"machine_access_mode": credential.machine_access_mode,
"credential_security_level": credential.max_security_level,
"required_security_level": resolved.tool.operation.security_level,
"upgrade_required": true,
})),
);
}
match resolved.kind {
GeneratedToolKind::Base => {
handle_base_tool_call(
@@ -1979,6 +2004,37 @@ fn allows_scope(scopes: &[PlatformApiKeyScope], required_scope: PlatformApiKeySc
}
}
fn credential_allows_security_level(
credential: &VerifiedMachineCredential,
required_level: OperationSecurityLevel,
) -> bool {
security_level_rank(credential.max_security_level) >= security_level_rank(required_level)
}
fn security_level_rank(level: OperationSecurityLevel) -> u8 {
match level {
OperationSecurityLevel::Standard => 0,
OperationSecurityLevel::Elevated => 1,
OperationSecurityLevel::Strict => 2,
}
}
fn serialize_security_level(level: OperationSecurityLevel) -> &'static str {
match level {
OperationSecurityLevel::Standard => "standard",
OperationSecurityLevel::Elevated => "elevated",
OperationSecurityLevel::Strict => "strict",
}
}
fn serialize_machine_access_mode(mode: crank_core::MachineAccessMode) -> &'static str {
match mode {
crank_core::MachineAccessMode::StaticAgentKey => "static_agent_key",
crank_core::MachineAccessMode::ShortLivedToken => "short_lived_token",
crank_core::MachineAccessMode::OneTimeToken => "one_time_token",
}
}
fn validate_origin(
allowed_origins: &AllowedOrigins,
headers: &HeaderMap,
+141
View File
@@ -1588,6 +1588,147 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(response.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn rejects_elevated_operation_with_static_agent_key() {
let registry = test_registry().await;
let upstream_base_url = spawn_upstream_server().await;
let mut operation = test_operation(&upstream_base_url, "crm_elevated_static");
operation.security_level = crank_core::OperationSecurityLevel::Elevated;
registry
.create_operation(&test_workspace_id(), &operation, Some("alice"))
.await
.unwrap();
registry
.publish_operation(PublishRequest {
workspace_id: &test_workspace_id(),
operation_id: &operation.id,
version: 1,
published_at: &OffsetDateTime::parse("2026-03-26T10:00:00Z", &Rfc3339).unwrap(),
published_by: Some("alice"),
})
.await
.unwrap();
publish_agent_for_operation(&registry, &operation, "sales-elevated-static").await;
let api_key = create_platform_api_key(
&registry,
"sales-elevated-static",
"mcp-elevated-static",
&[PlatformApiKeyScope::Read, PlatformApiKeyScope::Write],
)
.await;
let base_url = spawn_mcp_server(build_test_app(
registry,
Duration::from_millis(0),
Some("https://crank.example.com".to_owned()),
))
.await;
let client = reqwest::Client::new();
let mcp_url = agent_mcp_url(&base_url, "sales-elevated-static");
let initialized_session = initialize_session(&client, &mcp_url, &api_key).await;
let call_result = post_jsonrpc(
&client,
&mcp_url,
&api_key,
Some(&initialized_session),
json!({
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "crm_elevated_static",
"arguments": {
"email": "alice@example.com"
}
}
}),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(call_result["result"]["isError"], json!(true));
assert_eq!(
call_result["result"]["structuredContent"]["error"]["code"],
"machine_access_insufficient"
);
assert_eq!(
call_result["result"]["structuredContent"]["error"]["context"]["machine_access_mode"],
"static_agent_key"
);
assert_eq!(
call_result["result"]["structuredContent"]["error"]["context"]["required_security_level"],
"elevated"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn allows_elevated_operation_with_verified_short_lived_token() {
let registry = test_registry().await;
let upstream_base_url = spawn_upstream_server().await;
let mut operation = test_operation(&upstream_base_url, "crm_elevated_token");
operation.security_level = crank_core::OperationSecurityLevel::Elevated;
registry
.create_operation(&test_workspace_id(), &operation, Some("alice"))
.await
.unwrap();
registry
.publish_operation(PublishRequest {
workspace_id: &test_workspace_id(),
operation_id: &operation.id,
version: 1,
published_at: &OffsetDateTime::parse("2026-03-26T10:00:00Z", &Rfc3339).unwrap(),
published_by: Some("alice"),
})
.await
.unwrap();
publish_agent_for_operation(&registry, &operation, "sales-elevated-token").await;
let verifier = Arc::new(StubMachineCredentialVerifier {
token: "issued_token_elevated".to_owned(),
credential: VerifiedMachineCredential {
machine_access_mode: crank_core::MachineAccessMode::ShortLivedToken,
max_security_level: crank_core::OperationSecurityLevel::Elevated,
scopes: vec![PlatformApiKeyScope::Read, PlatformApiKeyScope::Write],
},
});
let base_url = spawn_mcp_server(build_test_app_with_store(
registry,
Duration::from_millis(0),
Some("https://crank.example.com".to_owned()),
RequestRateLimitConfig::new(10_000, 10_000).unwrap(),
std::sync::Arc::new(InMemorySessionStore::default()),
verifier,
))
.await;
let client = reqwest::Client::new();
let mcp_url = agent_mcp_url(&base_url, "sales-elevated-token");
let initialized_session =
initialize_session(&client, &mcp_url, "issued_token_elevated").await;
let call_result = post_jsonrpc(
&client,
&mcp_url,
"issued_token_elevated",
Some(&initialized_session),
json!({
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "crm_elevated_token",
"arguments": {
"email": "alice@example.com"
}
}
}),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(call_result["result"]["isError"], json!(false));
assert_eq!(call_result["result"]["structuredContent"]["id"], "lead_123");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn exposes_and_runs_session_tool_family_via_mcp() {
let registry = test_registry().await;