diff --git a/_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/spec-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md b/_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/spec-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md index 56ec713..37e08a8 100644 --- a/_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/spec-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md +++ b/_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/spec-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md @@ -2,8 +2,9 @@ title: '2.10 — Привязать security schemes через безопасный import API' type: feature created: '2026-09-13' -status: ready-for-dev -review_loop_iteration: 0 +status: done +baseline_revision: 9c208682a42539b287cac929e715b8f9ecf1e6e9 +review_loop_iteration: 1 followup_review_recommended: false context: - '_bmad-output/project-context.md' @@ -11,7 +12,21 @@ context: - '_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/1-10-lifecycle-auth-profiles-machine-keys.md' - '_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/spec-2-9-http-contract.md' warnings: [oversized] -deferred: [] +deferred: + - summary: >- + Проверить credential URL query, если поддерживаемый downstream consumer использует semicolon separator. + evidence: |- + BH-F7, maybe-false: scanner использует form_urlencoded с &; конкретный поддерживаемый consumer, который интерпретирует ; как границу credential parameter, не показан. Нужны consumer/config и wire regression для установления фактического поведения. Это новая unverified гипотеза, не статус существующей записи ledger. + location: >- + crates/crank-import/src/rest/metadata_findings.rs::query_has_secret_parameter + severity: high (unverified) + - summary: >- + Проверить credential URL query для поддерживаемого proxy/server с повторным percent decoding имени. + evidence: |- + BH-F8, maybe-false: текущая проверка совпадает с однократным form decoding; reachable proxy/server со вторым decoding не продемонстрирован. Нужны конкретный consumer/config и wire regression. Это новая unverified гипотеза, не статус существующей записи ledger. + location: >- + crates/crank-import/src/rest/metadata_findings.rs::query_has_secret_parameter + severity: high (unverified) --- @@ -73,13 +88,13 @@ deferred: [] **Execution (intent gap разрешён пользователем 2026-09-13; реализация выполняется при повторном запуске оркестратора):** -- [ ] `crates/crank-import/src/rest/{model.rs,openapi3.rs,swagger2.rs,normalize.rs,normalize_projection.rs,payload.rs}` — добавить typed schemes и effective requirements, deterministic OR/AND projection, source coverage и blockers без credentials. -- [ ] `crates/crank-import/src/rest/{metadata_findings.rs,normalize_finding_validation.rs}`, `apps/admin-api/src/service/imports.rs`, `apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/external_references.rs` — проверять secret-bearing inputs до persistence и исключить raw values из IR/diagnostics. -- [ ] `apps/admin-api/src/{app.rs,dto.rs,service/imports.rs}` — предоставить выбор/revalidation alternative и совместимых workspace profiles, включить mappings в application digest, сохранять только profile reference. -- [ ] `crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job.rs` — проверять существование и workspace профиля, совместимость binding и доступность всех необходимых связанных Secrets по существующим правилам active/current version в transaction перед mutation; независимый lifecycle профиля не добавлять. -- [ ] `apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/job_contract.rs` — сохранить исторический v4 replay при изменении normalizer/projection contract. -- [ ] `crates/crank-import/tests/`, `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/`, `crates/crank-runtime/tests/` — покрыть все строки матрицы и AC fixtures/negative tests, в том числе race, foreign refs, redaction canaries и digest mismatch. -- [ ] `docs/openapi-import.md` — описать security API, поддерживаемые mappings, blockers и revalidation; не обещать непроверенные semantics. +- [x] `crates/crank-import/src/rest/{model.rs,openapi3.rs,swagger2.rs,normalize.rs,normalize_projection.rs,payload.rs}` — добавить typed schemes и effective requirements, deterministic OR/AND projection, source coverage и blockers без credentials. +- [x] `crates/crank-import/src/rest/{metadata_findings.rs,normalize_finding_validation.rs}`, `apps/admin-api/src/service/imports.rs`, `apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/external_references.rs` — проверять secret-bearing inputs до persistence и исключить raw values из IR/diagnostics. +- [x] `apps/admin-api/src/{app.rs,dto.rs,service/imports.rs}` — предоставить выбор/revalidation alternative и совместимых workspace profiles, включить mappings в application digest, сохранять только profile reference. +- [x] `crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job.rs` — проверять существование и workspace профиля, совместимость binding и доступность всех необходимых связанных Secrets по существующим правилам active/current version в transaction перед mutation; независимый lifecycle профиля не добавлять. +- [x] `apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/job_contract.rs` — сохранить исторический v4 replay при изменении normalizer/projection contract. +- [x] `crates/crank-import/tests/`, `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/`, `crates/crank-runtime/tests/` — покрыть все строки матрицы и AC fixtures/negative tests, в том числе race, foreign refs, redaction canaries и digest mismatch. +- [x] `docs/openapi-import.md` — описать security API, поддерживаемые mappings, blockers и revalidation; не обещать непроверенные semantics. **Acceptance Criteria (из Story 2.10; семантика доступности binding уточнена решением пользователя 2026-09-13):** @@ -145,19 +160,106 @@ deferred: [] ## Spec Change Log +- 2026-10-02 — BH-F4 вызвал bad_spec loop: прежний план независимой проверки raw документов не учитывал credential names, доступные после $ref resolution. Добавлены staged bundle preflight и local/external split canaries до persistence. Known-bad state: raw artifact содержит opaque credential, хотя normalized preview уже redacted. KEEP перечислены в Design Notes; frozen intent не менялся. Возврат к step-03 затрагивает изменения текущего follow-up, исходные commits реализации сохраняются. + - 2026-09-13 — Пользователь выбрал вариант 1: сохранить существующий lifecycle Secrets; независимый отзыв Auth Profile остаётся отложенным. Уточнены intent, AC, матрица и transaction predicate. Запись Auto Run Result ниже сохранена как историческое свидетельство остановки; требуемое в ней решение принято. Статус переустанавливает оркестратор. ## Review Triage Log +### 2026-10-02 — Review pass +- verdicts: 17 findings из четырёх review layers — high 3, medium 4, low 2, false 8, maybe-false 0 +- findings: + - `[false]` `[reject]` IA-1: UI mapping отсутствует — Frozen intent прямо исключает mapping UI Story 2.11; DTO/plan decisions реализуют разрешённую import API поверхность. + - `[low]` `[patch]` IA-2: execution evidence в checklist неоднороден — Старые секции являются историческим ATDD/preflight evidence; добавлена явно актуальная итоговая секция checklist, история сохранена. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` VG-1: второй OR choice не проверен — Принято pre-verified evidence verification-gap: тесты утверждали только index 0; добавлены distinct profiles, assertions для обеих choices и успешный plan с index 1. + - `[high]` `[patch]` EC-1: encoded query name обходит redaction — query_has_secret_parameter проверял сырое имя api%5Fkey; detection и sanitizer используют одинаковый form decoding, regression проверяет rejection и sanitized output. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` EC-2: inherited profile отклоняется без security declaration — new_version подставляет существующий ref, затем resolve_security_binding отвергает пустые alternatives; binding при source None сохранён с явным internal unconstrained requirement и transaction validation, integration Apply прошёл. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` BH-1: unused unsupported scheme не получает finding — schemes() создаёт Unsupported metadata, но findings формируются только в requirements; добавлен located definition warning для OAS/Swagger без global blocker, обе regression fixtures прошли. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-2: malformed sibling должен не блокировать valid OR — Invalid requirement по матрице не становится actionable; existing fail-closed malformed tests сохраняют это правило. Well-formed unsupported AND/OAuth siblings остаются scoped и не блокируют поддерживаемую alternative. + - `[high]` `[patch]` BH-3: default пропускает literal heuristic — Existing scalar/JWT heuristic запускается только в examples, поэтому recognizable credential default в ordinary schema property сохраняется; эта же проверка распространена на defaults и подтверждена canary regression. Произвольная benign строка сама по себе не считается доказанным credential. + - `[high]` `[patch]` BH-4: percent-encoded API key query name — Тот же подтверждённый scanner defect, что EC-1; один patch и regression detection/sanitization. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-5: unsafe primary upload обязан возвращать preview finding — AC требует generation redacted finding при security analysis и отсутствия raw output, но не успешного preview небезопасного source. Scanner создаёт findings, pure normalization их сохраняет; source ingress намеренно безопасно отвергает upload до persistence, как разрешено Design Notes. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-6: source safety отбрасывает findings и нарушает AC-8 — Safety check использует сгенерированные findings для typed rejection; pure importer выдаёт redacted findings и source locations. External rejection возвращает bounded diagnostics без literal и без записи bytes; возврат findings в rejected upload API не заявлен AC. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-7: missing-version error-code test падает — 111-test Admin suite исполнил security_binding_refuses_foreign_and_unavailable_auth_material_before_draft с PASS. Missing current version отклоняется operation workspace validator до import_auth_snapshot, поэтому operation_auth_profile_invalid соответствует реальному пути. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-8: external observability не проверена — External scanner передаёт в materialization_failure только static stage/error_code и count, не body/URL. Bounded telemetry tests и parser canary выполнялись в full suite; external regression отдельно проверяет persisted preview/job diagnostics и artifact bytes. Ни одного канала передачи canary в logger этот путь не имеет. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` BH-9: v4 replay fixture retagged из v5 — Shape-derived fixture не является настоящим historical output; serialized fixture заменена output canonical baseline с provenance, baseline generation и current replay исполнились с PASS. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-10: текущий PASS противоречит старым failures — Перед прежним blocked result есть явный заголовок «Историческая остановка из-за прежних ограничений среды»; актуальный run после восстановления доступа отделён. Изменение spec как исправление review finding дополнительно исключено правилами workflow. + - `[low]` `[patch]` BH-11: checklist scenario snapshot остаётся NOT RUN — Baseline ATDD snapshot должен остаться историческим, но добавлена явно актуальная final execution секция с матрицей и command outcomes; общий docs patch с IA-2. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-12: in-review конфликтует с historical blocked — Frontmatter и первый актуальный Auto Run Result совпадают; blocked явно помещён в историческую секцию. Статус orchestrator не используется для доказательства acceptance. + +### 2026-10-02 — Дополнительная проверка ведущего в том же pass +- verdicts: 7 findings — high 4, medium 2, low 0, false 1, maybe-false 0 +- findings: + - `[high]` `[patch]` L-1: sensitive parameter schema.default сохраняет opaque credential — Сканер учитывал имя header только для immediate examples; у schema.default имя родителя schema и context терялся. Sensitive header/query/cookie context передан к default/example без изменения declarations/types, canary regression прошла. + - `[high]` `[patch]` L-2: credential-shaped format hint остаётся в canonical IR — Fixture UnsafeHint.bearerFormat=sk-private-value убирал typed hint, но scanner не проверял literal в hint field. Existing scalar heuristic применена к bearerFormat/x-format-hint, benign JWT hint сохранён и проверен. + - `[high]` `[patch]` L-3: protocol-relative URL userinfo не распознаётся — Scanner требовал :// и пропускал valid network-path Server URL //user:pass@host; добавлены userinfo rejection/redaction без потери безопасной URL части, regression прошла. + - `[high]` `[patch]` L-4: declared API-key names без secret marker пропускают credentials — Scheme type apiKey явно задаёт credential header/query/cookie name X-Client/key/session, но name heuristic их не распознаёт. Declared names собраны перед visit и применены к parameter/schema/header contexts и URL query detection/redaction; оба containers и все locations покрыты canaries. + - `[false]` `[reject]` L-5: old import-plan-v1 без auth_requirement требует registry adaptation — Upstream Admin plan_apply.rs требует current normalizer/projection и возвращает importer_version_changed для historical plans до registry; это существующая version-change policy. Historical job replay сохраняется отдельным legacy path, а для новых v5 планов requirement остаётся обязательным. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` L-6: explicit no-auth new_version наследует binding — При operation-level security: [] профиль target наследовался, а затем отклонялся как incompatible. Наследование исключено при явно пустом requirement; integration Apply создаёт version 3 без auth_profile_ref, явный несовместимый профиль по-прежнему отклоняется. Общий корень inheritance policy с EC-2. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` L-7: sanitized URL finding не проходит validator вне /url — Redaction удаляла userinfo из schema example либо меняла declared query value в description, но warning predicate не признавал безопасный результат по этим pointers. Predicate допускает sanitized URL / [REDACTED] representation; regression проверяет успешную normalization без credential canaries. + + +### 2026-10-02 — Follow-up review, iteration 1 +- verdicts: 14 findings — high 3, medium 2, low 1, false 6, maybe-false 2 +- findings: + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-F1: legacy create сохраняет защищённую Operation без binding — verified_preview.rs::preview_has_blocker (395–398) отвергает selected required-auth candidate до цикла создания; legacy_apply_rejects_required_auth_without_binding_before_creating_draft прошёл в Admin suite текущего запуска. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-F2: malformed OR sibling должен не блокировать всю Operation — carried BH-2: frozen matrix требует fail-closed для invalid requirement; documented per-alternative support применяется к well-formed unsupported siblings, существующие malformed tests подтверждают отказ. + - `[low]` `[patch]` BH-F3: apiKey name пустой ошибочно supported — schemes() принимает пустую строку и выдаёт selectable alternative без возможного profile. Regression empty_api_key_parameter_name_is_unsupported воспроизвёл FAIL; direct correction — классифицировать как Unsupported. KEEP для re-derivation. + - `[high]` `[bad_spec]` BH-F4: credential name из $ref неизвестно scanner до persistence — concrete local #/x-scheme/#/x-key fixture проходит raw source check, reference resolver позже раскрывает X-Custom и opaque default; external scheme/parameter snapshots проверяются отдельно с тем же пробелом. Design Notes и задача bundle preflight уточнены: все raw documents проверять в общем разрешённом credential context до первого put_registered. KEEP существующие безопасные refs, immutable snapshots, bounded timeout/limits и diagnostics; нельзя молча отключать external refs. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-F5: credential в scheme identifier копируется — raw source names являются обязательными identifiers по AC; reviewer не демонстрирует credential value, а только гипотетически назначает смысл имени. AccessToken identifiers намеренно сохраняются, secret-bearing metadata сканируется отдельно. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-F6: любой opaque format hint является credential — carried BH-3/L-2: marker/JWT credential hints отклоняются и redacted; произвольная alphanumeric строка без доказанной credential semantics может быть legitimate format hint по AC. Сам синтаксис не доказывает leak. + - `[maybe-false]` `[defer]` BH-F7: semicolon query separator интерпретируется downstream как новый secret parameter — scanner использует form_urlencoded и &; ни caller, ни server, который повторно разбирает ;, не продемонстрирован. Нужен конкретный supported consumer с ; parsing; if-true high (unverified). Ветка defer до окончания bad_spec loop не обрабатывается. + - `[maybe-false]` `[defer]` BH-F8: двойное decoding query name раскрывает secret — текущая проверка совпадает с однократным form decoding; reachable proxy/server с вторым decoding не показан. Нужен consumer/config и wire regression; if-true high (unverified). Ветка defer до окончания bad_spec loop не обрабатывается. + - `[high]` `[patch]` BH-F9: suffix url исключает credentialUrl default и x-credential-url literal — blanket exemption в is_sensitive_name действительно пропускает opaque value в явно credential-named context. Direct correction — сохранить exemption только известных URL metadata полей, добавить ingress/IR/preview canaries; KEEP для re-derivation. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-F10: нет legacy required-auth regression — test integration::openapi_import::legacy_apply_rejects_required_auth_without_binding_before_creating_draft зарегистрирован, выполнялся и прошёл в полном Admin suite. + - `[high]` `[patch]` EC-F1: OAuth token в URL fragment сохраняется — query_has_secret_parameter обрезает #, sanitizer копирует fragment; #access_token=opaque value допускается перед persistence. Direct correction — detection и sanitization sensitive fragment parameters, включая encoded names, с сохранением benign parts; KEEP для re-derivation. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` VG-F1: Basic/query profile compatibility не проверяется через preview/plan — pre-verified: existing binding integration покрывает header и Bearer, parser-only Basic/query tests не покрывают API matching branches. Добавить profiles, choice assertions и actionable plan+Apply; KEEP для re-derivation. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` VG-F2: registry Basic/query source requirement не проверяется — pre-verified: matching auth integration и source requirement unit test покрывают header. Добавить успешные Basic/query Apply и query parameter mismatch при matching snapshot с typed rejection/zero mutation; KEEP для re-derivation. + - `[false]` `[reject]` IA-F1: redacted finding должен возвращаться rejected upload API — carried BH-5/BH-6: intent допускает ingress rejection до persistence; внутренний analysis создаёт located redacted findings, успешный unsafe preview не требуется. Audit подтверждает остальную согласованность API surface и исключённых UI/profile lifecycle. + + +### 2026-10-02 — Follow-up review после re-derivation +- verdicts: 14 findings — high 0, medium 2, low 3, false 9, maybe-false 0 +- findings: + - `[false]` `[reject]` IA-R1: ingress rejection расходится с redacted finding — carried IA-F1/BH-5/BH-6: frozen constraint требует no-persistence, internal importer выдаёт located findings; bounded rejection на upload допустим. Более широкий story scope проверен сохранёнными и реально исполненными matrix tests, не только новым diff. + - `[false]` `[reject]` EC-R1: slash fragment с query marker сохраняет access_token — query_has_secret_parameter раньше fragment guard разбирает часть после ? и отклоняет источник. Временный public-helper probe для #/route?access_token=opaque и encoded варианта прошёл 1/1; файл удалён. Proposed guard не является текущим кодом. + - `[false]` `[reject]` EC-R2: claim no raw credentials опровергнут slash-fragment case — тот же concrete trigger EC-R1 отвергается до put_registered; намеренно разрешённый JSON-pointer fragment сам по себе не credential parameter. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` VG-R1: encoded fragment credential name не имеет regression — pre-verified consumer gap: новый decoding branch не защищён тестом без scalar fallback. Исправлено: encoded_access_token_fragment_is_rejected_before_persistence проверяет fully encoded имя в URL metadata, bounded invalid_document и zero blob/source/job; 5/5 targeted и оба final Admin runs PASS; группа с BH-R7. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-R1: corpus evidence в target засоряет diff — входной untracked файл сохранён; проект уже version-controls evidence в этом же каталоге, corpus test проверяет content/manifest/matrix digests и deterministic identity. Локальных paths/credentials в JSON нет, concrete harm не показан. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-R2: source_safety sibling запрещён scope — разрешён internal helper/module extraction при file-size limit, ведущий поручил минимальное извлечение после реального code-health failure; no unrelated implementation. Предложение переписать build spec отклоняется по workflow. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-R3: pure helper exports нарушают public API — spec явно допускает pure-input экспорт через importer/Admin crate boundary; HTTP/product surface не расширен. Две функции не имеют network/registry доступа и нужны caller до persistence; public signatures существующих функций сохранены. + - `[low]` `[patch]` BH-R4: benign split default control отсутствует — safe scheme test действительно не содержит ordinary default; safe control дополнен locale=en вне credential context и assertion сохранения, final PASS. Default у X-Custom является credential literal, поэтому не допускается. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-R5: docs обещают распознавание любого opaque credential — формулировка условная «если проверка находит literal credential», а не гарантия классификации всех произвольных строк; имена/контекст и bounded findings соответствуют intent. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-R6: telemetry не проверяется — carried BH-8: materialization_failure принимает только static stage/code/count. parser_canary_never_reaches_diagnostics_logs_traces_or_metrics реально исполнился; содержит failing external URL/body canary и assertions logs/spans/metrics. Новый dependency_redaction использует тот же bounded logger. + - `[medium]` `[patch]` BH-R7: checklist заявляет encoded fragment без теста — та же missing regression, что VG-R1; fully encoded ingress canary устраняет пробел. Одно grouped patch entry, отдельная строка finding сохранена. + - `[low]` `[patch]` BH-R8: текущий matrix audit не связывает rows с exact leaves/logs — в checklist добавлена текущая воспроизводимая table, затем повторно подтверждена на final logs; historical table не подменяет новый log. Production semantics и frozen matrix не меняются. + - `[low]` `[reject]` BH-R9: нет отдельного benign multilevel security-context fixture — такой точной комбинации действительно нет; cross-document typed context и multi-level chain/replay покрыты отдельными executed tests. Это дополнительная редкая комбинация сверх обязательной matrix, без показанного сбоя; новый server/chain fixture сложнее direct correction, поэтому low не исправляется. Ordinary default gap отдельно устранён BH-R4. + - `[false]` `[reject]` BH-R10: external URL canary наблюдаемости отсутствует — existing telemetry.rs строит /{CANARY}.yaml с HTTP500 body canary и external ref; проверяет response, logs, spans и metric labels. Тест зарегистрирован и прошёл в обоих полных Admin прогонах. + ## Design Notes Pure importer хранит schemes/requirements, но не читает Auth Profiles или Secrets. Workspace-safe lookup принадлежит admin service, authoritative проверка непосредственно перед созданием Draft — registry transaction. Текущий единичный profile reference позволяет выдавать blocker для unsupported AND: это прямо предусмотрено AC и не требует расширения runtime до составного auth. Проверка literal credentials до `put_registered` позволяет отвергать небезопасный source без изменения bytes принятого immutable snapshot; AC не требует успешного preview для документа с literal secret. Новые формы import API и внутреннее представление alternatives сами по себе являются инженерными решениями, не основанием для остановки. +### Уточнение bundle ingress после follow-up review + +Raw primary source и все fetched dependency documents должны оставаться в памяти до общей security preflight. Для определения credential names нужно использовать resolved security schemes и общие names всех документов bundle; это относится и к неиспользуемым raw nodes: raw artifact сохраняется целиком. Нельзя сначала сохранять один документ, а затем обнаруживать его credential при resolution другого. Проверить каждый raw документ с общим credential context и отдельно resolved tree (в том числе default в referenced schema, raw target которой сам не содержит parameter name), с rejected-source canaries до первого put_registered; unsafe bundle отвергается bounded typed error без bytes/URL/literal в telemetry. Существующие external reference allowlist, timeout, budgets, deduplication, immutable source verification, historical replay и безопасные reference imports сохраняются. Не отключать refs и не отвергать benign defaults только потому, что они находятся в external документе. Public API расширять не требуется; internal staging/preflight принадлежат importer/Admin service boundaries. + +### Follow-up implementation — разрешённые изменения + +- [x] `crates/crank-import/src/rest/{metadata_findings.rs,normalize.rs,mod.rs}` и `apps/admin-api/src/service/imports{.rs,/external_references.rs}` — staged fetch и общий credential-context preflight primary + dependencies до persistence; сначала RED local/external ref ingress tests, затем минимальная реализация. Если private internal helper требует экспорт через crate boundary, сохранить его строгую pure-input функцию, без network/registry доступа. +- [x] `crates/crank-import/src/rest/security.rs`, `crates/crank-import/tests/security_schemes.rs` — сохранить исправления empty apiKey name, URL fragment, credentialUrl suffix и regression canaries/benign OAuth endpoints. +- [x] `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import{.rs,/external_references.rs,/external_references/security_bundle.rs,/import_plan_create/security_binding.rs}`, `crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs` — local/external referenced scheme, split primary/dependency credentials, benign ref control, Basic/query preview-plan-Apply и query mismatch/no mutation. Существующие helpers и fixture conventions переиспользовать. +- [x] `_bmad-output/test-artifacts/atdd-checklist-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md`, `docs/openapi-import.md` — обновить только execution evidence/описание bundle preflight; frozen AC snapshot без изменений. Не записывать sprint-status.yaml и existing deferred-work ledger entries. + +Материал KEEP: `/tmp/crank210-keep-followup.patch` содержит принятые review ведущего Basic/query тесты (Admin 3/3, registry 8/8) и direct correction empty API-key name (RED→GREEN). После отката follow-up code к входному HEAD этот patch можно применить для re-derivation; он не заменяет spec и итоговые проверки. + +KEEP: вся утверждённая реализация security metadata/OR/AND/inheritance/no-auth, workspace isolation, transactional profile/Secret validation, настоящий baseline-v4 replay и существующий matrix coverage остаются. Новый scope — устранение подтверждённых scanner/ref ingress gaps и Basic/query verification gaps; UI/qualification/independent profile lifecycle по-прежнему исключены. Один writer на файл; implementation worker читает этот spec как единственный источник задания. Исполнитель не один в репозитории: не откатывать правки других участников. При реализации запускает targeted suites для изменённых модулей и fmt/code-health; ведущий выполняет полный раздел Verification после handoff. Все команды выполняются из абсолютного worktree, не из /home/bsodfather/code/crank. Изменения разрешены только по paths нового Follow-up implementation (включая вложенные модули при лимите 1000 lines); никакого unrelated cleanup. + ## Verification -**Commands (не запускались; production code не изменён):** +**Commands (обязательные проверки; фактические результаты текущего запуска приведены в Auto Run Result):** - `cargo test -p crank-import --all-targets` — schemes, inheritance, OR/AND, deterministic projection и redaction. - `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1` — реальные upload/binding/revalidation/Apply, no-mutation и workspace isolation. @@ -172,20 +274,46 @@ Pure importer хранит schemes/requirements, но не читает Auth Pro ## Auto Run Result -Status: blocked -Blocking condition: intent gap +Status: done -Планирование остановлено до ATDD и реализации. Код, migration, API и tests не изменены. Обновлён локальный epic context и подготовлен этот spec; прохождение AC не заявляется. `sprint-status.yaml` не изменялся и не откатывался. +### Follow-up после независимого review — 2026-10-02 -### Требуемое решение +Исправлены подтверждённые ingress gaps: raw primary/dependencies собираются в памяти и проверяются совместно, включая resolved security context, до первого artifact put. Local/external split-ref opaque canaries отвергаются без blob/source/job и без literal в API error. Безопасные refs и ordinary defaults сохраняются; historical v4 replay, deterministic IR, OR/AND/no-auth, workspace isolation и authoritative transactional profile/Secret validation подтверждены текущими suites. Исправлены credentialUrl suffix bypass, OAuth fragment redaction и empty apiKey name; добавлено Basic/query сквозное evidence. -Определить, что означает «Auth Profile был отозван» в AC Story 2.10: +Первый follow-up review: 14 findings (high 3, medium 2, low 1, false 6, maybe-false 2). BH-F4 вызвал один bad_spec loop; Design Notes уточнены вне frozen intent, code re-derived с KEEP. Исправлены BH-F3/BH-F9/EC-F1/VG-F1/VG-F2; отклонены BH-F1 (upstream required-auth guard), BH-F2 (malformed fail-closed contract), BH-F5 (identifier не credential value), BH-F6 (нет доказанной credential semantics hint), BH-F10 (existing executed legacy regression), IA-F1 (bounded ingress rejection допустим). Каждая refutation записана отдельно в triage. -- Проверять только существующий lifecycle связанных Secrets (active/current version), считая профиль недоступным при отключении credential, а отдельный lifecycle профиля оставить отложенным. -- Ввести в этой истории независимый отзыв Auth Profile (status/tombstone и соответствующее управление), который запрещает только этот profile ref, сохраняя работоспособность другого профиля с тем же Secret. +Ревью re-derived diff: 14 findings (high 0, medium 2, low 3, false 9). Применены **3 grouped patch entries: high 0, medium 1, low 2** — fully encoded fragment ingress regression (VG-R1/BH-R7), benign default control (BH-R4), exact matrix/log mapping (BH-R8). Отклонены IA-R1 (carried permitted ingress rejection), EC-R1/EC-R2 (slash-query probe отвергается upstream), BH-R1 (deterministic corpus evidence convention), BH-R2 (разрешённая minimal module extraction), BH-R3 (pure crate-boundary helpers предусмотрены), BH-R5 (docs не обещают classifier всех opaque strings), BH-R6/BH-R10 (existing executed external URL/body telemetry canary), BH-R9 (редкая дополнительная комбинация потребовала бы сложный fixture; обязательные surfaces покрыты отдельно). -Наблюдаемое различие: профили A и B с одним активным Secret. Независимый отзыв A должен отклонить binding A и сохранить binding B; отключение общего Secret отклоняет оба. `AuthProfile` сейчас не имеет status, а отдельный lifecycle явно отложен в Story 1.10 и deferred-work. Поэтому нельзя считать negative test с disabled Secret доказательством независимого отзыва Auth Profile, либо расширить lifecycle/domain/storage scope молча. +Deferred: **2 новые unverified hypotheses** BH-F7/BH-F8 про semicolon query parsing и повторный decoding downstream. Полные evidence/способ проверки — в единственном frontmatter deferred list; существующий deferred-work ledger не читался для изменения статусов и не изменялся. Подтверждённых незакрытых high/medium defects нет. Отдельного benign multilevel security-context fixture нет; обязательные cross-document security и multilevel immutable-chain controls исполнены отдельно. -Основание остановки: правило `step-02-plan.md`, INSTRUCTIONS 5: “Multiple defensible readings of the intent that lead to observably different outcomes, with nothing in the intent to select between them, are an intent gap — do not resolve one by picking a reading.” +`followup_review_recommended: false`: текущий follow-up pass не применял high patch; medium/low test evidence repairs прошли итоговую Verification. Frozen intent не менялся. HUMAN-only решения или operator actions не требовались. UI 2.11, qualification 2.14 и отдельный lifecycle Auth Profile не реализовывались. -Это пробел нормативного scope, а не внешнее действие оператора. AC не требуют покупки домена, выдачи реального API key или действий в vendor console; `awaiting-operator` к данной остановке не применяется. +### Verification + +- `cargo test -p crank-import --all-targets` — exit 0, 117 passed. +- `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1` — exit 0, 117 passed. +- `cargo test -p crank-runtime --all-targets` — exit 0, 83 passed. +- `just verify` — exit 0; contracts, dependencies, fmt, clippy и workspace suites; 945 passed, 0 failed, 1 existing ignored million-row query-plan benchmark. Mandatory security acceptance не skipped/ignored. +- Все 8 frozen matrix rows имеют actual final PASS, exact mapping в [checklist](../test-artifacts/atdd-checklist-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md). Финальные logs: `/tmp/crank210-final-{import,admin,runtime,gate}.log`. +- Первый gate обнаружил normalize.rs 1048 >1000; новые helpers извлечены в source_safety.rs, после чего code-health и полный gate повторены. Historical regular-file stdout/RLIMIT_FSIZE harness effect не маскировался кодом: финальные команды используют pipe с сохранением exit status. +- Resource cleanup: собственные test/check/Pi jobs завершены, `docker volume prune -f` без `--all` успешно удалил unused anonymous volumes (7.68GB по Docker). Active container/volume сохранены. Повторно проверены docker system df, df и Btrfs: 98.10GiB free, Metadata DUP 1.19/7.01GiB (16.95%), global reserve used 0; дефицита нет. Подробные per-device Btrfs сведения требуют root, основные свободное место/metadata доступны. + +### Изменённые файлы + +- [apps/admin-api/src/service/imports.rs](../../apps/admin-api/src/service/imports.rs) — общая source safety до сохранения primary, корректное освобождение dependencies. +- [apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/external_references.rs](../../apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/external_references.rs) — bounded staged fetch, bundle preflight до первой записи, прежние snapshot/dedup guards. +- [crates/crank-import/src/rest/metadata_findings.rs](../../crates/crank-import/src/rest/metadata_findings.rs) — общие credential names, URL fragment sanitization и узкие URL metadata exemptions. +- [crates/crank-import/src/rest/source_safety.rs](../../crates/crank-import/src/rest/source_safety.rs) — pure raw/resolved bundle helpers; hard errors не допускают persistence. +- [crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize.rs](../../crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize.rs) — видимость decode для соседнего private helper без изменения parser semantics. +- [crates/crank-import/src/rest/mod.rs](../../crates/crank-import/src/rest/mod.rs) — module wiring и reexports preflight через crate boundary. +- [crates/crank-import/src/rest/security.rs](../../crates/crank-import/src/rest/security.rs) — empty apiKey name классифицируется Unsupported. +- [apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/external_references/security_bundle.rs](../../apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/external_references/security_bundle.rs) — split-ref RED→GREEN, encoded fragment и safe default controls. +- [apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/external_references.rs](../../apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/external_references.rs) — unsafe-bundle rejection и staging timeout evidence. +- [apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/security_binding.rs](../../apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/security_binding.rs) — Basic/query choices, plan и typed-ref Apply. +- [crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs](../../crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs) — matching Basic/query и source mismatch/no mutation. +- [crates/crank-import/tests/security_schemes.rs](../../crates/crank-import/tests/security_schemes.rs) — credentialUrl/x-credential-url и fragment IR canaries. +- [docs/openapi-import.md](../../docs/openapi-import.md) — описание bundle ingress rejection и immutable dependencies. +- [spec](spec-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md) и [checklist](../test-artifacts/atdd-checklist-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md) — triage, deferred hypotheses и фактический acceptance evidence. +- [corpus evidence](../../crates/crank-import/target/openapi-corpus/evidence-089a330a8055dc50b96a4ac39ae8c364d08610171b952f1a2f2e942cfbb94c49.json) — сохранён входной deterministic generated evidence; content digest проверен. + +Reviewed diff финализирован локальным commit без push; sprint-status.yaml не записывался и не откатывался. diff --git a/_bmad-output/test-artifacts/atdd-checklist-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md b/_bmad-output/test-artifacts/atdd-checklist-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b8f0823 --- /dev/null +++ b/_bmad-output/test-artifacts/atdd-checklist-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +--- +stepsCompleted: ['specification-mode'] +lastStep: 'specification-mode' +lastSaved: '2026-10-01' +workflowType: 'testarch-atdd' +mode: 'specification' +storyId: '2.10' +storyKey: '2-10-security-schemes-secrets' +storyFile: '_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/spec-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md' +atddChecklistPath: '_bmad-output/test-artifacts/atdd-checklist-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md' +generatedTestFiles: + - 'apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/external_references/security_bundle.rs' +inputDocuments: + - '_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/spec-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md' + - '_bmad-output/project-context.md' + - '_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/epic-2-context.md' + - '_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/1-10-lifecycle-auth-profiles-machine-keys.md' + - '_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/spec-2-9-http-contract.md' + - '_bmad-output/test-artifacts/test-design-epic-2.md' + - '_bmad-output/test-artifacts/test-design-qa.md' + - '_bmad/tea/config.yaml' +--- + +# ATDD Checklist — Story 2.10: Security schemes and secrets + +**Date:** 2026-10-01 +**Author:** Bsodfather +**Story key:** `2-10-security-schemes-secrets` +**Baseline:** `f5f40cb167a82b1e3c1ea2475db5cbaed9d9abfa` + +## Режим и preflight + +Checklist создан в specification mode: matching checklist в текущем worktree отсутствовал. По инструкции родительского workflow этот этап фиксирует approved AC, связь со сценариями, существующие тесты и фактические результаты; новые файлы тестов и искусственные RED-сценарии не создавались. Исторический checklist из `41a0e46` не считается текущим execution evidence. + +Story одобрена; критерии взяты в исходном порядке из замороженной спецификации. Канонический ID — `2.10`, ключ — `2-10-security-schemes-secrets`. Стек проекта — fullstack (Rust backend и существующий Playwright), но acceptance boundary этой story — importer/Admin API/registry; mapping UI относится к 2.11, полная qualification — к 2.14. В конфигурации TEA: stack `auto`, Playwright Utils включены, Pact Utils включены, Pact MCP `none`; Pact и browser recording для этого API/importer этапа не применяются. + +Прочитаны спецификация, все её context-файлы, epic-2 context, `test-design-epic-2.md` и `test-design-qa.md`. Для Epic 2 дизайн задаёт 2.10-API-A/B, FR-10, риск E2-R2: сохранить overrides, OR/AND и explicit no-auth; отклонять недопустимые auth refs; исключать imported secret canaries из API/IR/plan/export. QA design отмечает существующие importer corpus/security, plan API и registry integration suites как частичное покрытие, не как полное доказательство AC. + +## Approved acceptance-criteria snapshot + +Поскольку в spec нет `AC-n` меток, IDs назначены детерминированно в порядке Given-групп исходного документа. + +| ID | Approved acceptance criterion | +|---|---| +| AC-1 | **Given** OpenAPI 3.x `components.securitySchemes` или Swagger 2.0 `securityDefinitions`; **When** importer анализирует schemes; **Then** bearer HTTP, basic HTTP и API key в header/query/cookie преобразуются в typed security metadata; **And** source names, locations и применимые format hints сохраняются без credential values. | +| AC-2 | **Given** global security requirement; **When** Operation не задаёт собственный override; **Then** candidate наследует global requirement согласно specification semantics; **And** operation-level requirement или explicit no-auth корректно заменяет global rule. | +| AC-3 | **Given** security requirement с несколькими alternatives; **When** source определяет OR-семантику; **Then** preview сохраняет все допустимые alternatives и позволяет выбрать поддерживаемый вариант; **And** importer не объединяет alternatives в ложное обязательное AND. | +| AC-4 | **Given** security requirement, требующий несколько schemes одновременно; **When** source определяет AND-семантику; **Then** candidate сохраняет составное требование, если runtime contract его поддерживает; **And** иначе affected Operation получает blocker finding с перечислением несохраняемой semantics. | +| AC-5 | **Given** bearer, basic или API-key requirement; **When** формируется preview; **Then** администратору предлагается выбрать совместимый Auth Profile из текущего workspace либо оставить явный unresolved binding; **And** unresolved required authentication блокирует actionable Draft/Apply для affected Operation. | +| AC-6 | **Given** выбранный Auth Profile; **When** формируется candidate или ImportPlan; **Then** сохраняется только typed `AuthProfileRef` и scheme metadata; **And** raw secret, password, token, API key, hash или encrypted ciphertext не копируется в source snapshot, IR, findings, plan, Operation export. | +| AC-7 | **Given** OAuth2, OpenID Connect, mutual TLS или неизвестная scheme; **When** release scope не поддерживает автоматическое mapping; **Then** importer создаёт explicit manual-configuration/unsupported finding; **And** не извлекает client secret, token URL credential, example token или vendor-extension secret. | +| AC-8 | **Given** OpenAPI document содержит literal credential в example, default, extension, URL userinfo или header example; **When** security analysis выполняется; **Then** значение не используется как credential и создаёт redacted secret finding; **And** raw value не появляется в preview UI, logs, traces, metrics или diagnostics. | +| AC-9 | **Given** Auth Profile отсутствует/удалён, принадлежит другому workspace либо любой необходимый связанный Secret недоступен по существующим правилам active/current version; **When** preview либо Apply проверяет binding; **Then** reference отклоняется до создания Draft; **And** ошибка не раскрывает metadata foreign profile. | +| AC-10 | **Given** профили A и B используют один активный Secret с доступной текущей версией; **When** проверяются binding этих профилей; **Then** оба binding допустимы при выполнении остальных проверок; **And** после отключения общего Secret оба binding отклоняются до создания Draft; test с disabled Secret не является доказательством независимого отзыва Auth Profile, который вне scope. | +| AC-11 | **Given** исходная security scheme изменилась после preview; **When** старый ImportPlan применяют к новому source; **Then** plan digest mismatch блокирует Apply; **And** требуется новый preview и явное подтверждение Auth Profile mappings. | +| AC-12 | **Given** security scheme test suite; **When** выполняются fixtures и negative tests; **Then** покрыты global/operation overrides, no-auth, bearer/basic/API-key locations, OR/AND requirements, OAuth/OpenID/unknown schemes, secret-like examples, missing/deleted и cross-workspace profile refs, недоступные Secrets по active/current version и оба профиля с общим отключённым Secret; **And** redaction tests и `just verify` проходят. | + +## Сценарии и сценарий-to-AC mapping + +Статус отражает только соответствующие существующие проверки и выполненные ниже команды. PASS отдельного теста не означает, что его AC полностью принят. `not-run` — работа для green-phase/test completion; это не RED и не провал теста. + +| Scenario | AC | Существующий источник / точное доказательство | Текущий статус | +|---|---|---|---| +| 2.10-API-01: OpenAPI/Swagger effective security, global inheritance, operation override, no-auth и корректное закрытие malformed requirements | AC-2, AC-4 | `crates/crank-import/tests/security_scope.rs`: `empty_or_alternative_makes_the_operation_public`, `or_alternative_keeps_only_that_operation_public`, `nonempty_requirement_still_blocks_with_auth_profile_contract`, `empty_security_array_stays_public`, OpenAPI 3.1 и Swagger 2.0 malformed/root cases | **GREEN partial** — 13 тестов suite прошли; full scheme metadata и all overrides не исчерпаны | +| 2.10-API-02: Typed schemes для OpenAPI 3.0/3.1 и Swagger 2.0, names/location/format без credential | AC-1 | Текущий baseline содержит `crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_security.rs` и blocker analysis; `security_scope.rs` покрывает requirements, но не доказывает всю typed-scheme projection | **NOT RUN / gap** — нет отдельного выполненного теста на полный typed mapping | +| 2.10-API-03: OR alternatives сохраняются все, доступен выбор поддерживаемой alternative без collapse в AND | AC-3 | `security_scope.rs`: `or_alternative_keeps_only_that_operation_public` — только обработка public alternative; API plan binding path: `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/creation.rs::auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited` | **GREEN partial** — оба источника существуют; полный набор сохранённых selectable alternatives не доказан | +| 2.10-API-04: Unsupported AND блокирует affected operation с объяснимым finding; сохранение составного требования только при поддержке runtime | AC-4 | `crates/crank-import/tests/security_scope.rs::nonempty_requirement_still_blocks_with_auth_profile_contract`; malformed/local-scope cases | **GREEN partial** — blocker path проверен; все варианты multi-scheme и finding semantics остаются не полностью квалифицированы | +| 2.10-API-05: Совместимый workspace Auth Profile либо явный unresolved binding; required auth не создаёт Draft при unresolved | AC-5 | `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/creation.rs::auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited` | **GREEN partial** — выполненный тест подтверждает сохранение/валидацию refs и inheritance; полный profile compatibility matrix not-run | +| 2.10-API-06: Profile ref и scheme metadata без raw secret/ciphertext на snapshot/IR/findings/plan/export surfaces | AC-6 | `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply.rs::disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials`; canary coverage также в `.../import_plan_apply/corpus_hostile.rs` и `crates/crank-import/tests/corpus.rs` | **GREEN partial** — выполненный canary test проходит для своего маршрута; все поверхности/типы секрета не проверены одной этой командой | +| 2.10-API-07: OAuth2/OpenID/mTLS/unknown scheme становятся explicit manual/unsupported findings без извлечения секретов | AC-7 | `crates/crank-import/tests/security_scope.rs` не доказывает все types; hostile fixtures/matrix: `crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/manifest.json`, `support-matrix.yaml` | **NOT RUN** — соответствующие corpus/matrix команды здесь не выполнялись | +| 2.10-API-08: Literal credentials redacted до observable/persisted surfaces | AC-8 | `crates/crank-import/tests/corpus.rs`, fixture `crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/hostile-secret.json`; Admin canary tests выше | **GREEN partial** — точечный Admin canary прошёл; corpus-wide redaction and logs/traces/metrics/diagnostics not-run | +| 2.10-API-09: Missing/foreign profile refs и недоступный linked Secret безопасно отклоняются при preview/apply до Draft | AC-9 | `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/creation.rs::auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited`; `.../import_plan_apply.rs::disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials`; `crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs::apply_rejects_secret_rotation_or_revocation` | **GREEN partial** — три относящихся теста выполнены ниже; foreign/missing no-enumeration and all preview variants not-run | +| 2.10-API-10: Профили A/B с общим Secret оба допустимы active и оба rejected после disable | AC-10 | Disabled Secret apply behavior covered by Admin test above; frozen intent in spec says independent profile tombstone out of scope | **NOT RUN** — отдельно проверить обе профили в обеих состояниях; независимое отключение только A не заявлять | +| 2.10-API-11: Изменившийся security source приводит к digest mismatch до mutation и требует нового preview/mapping confirmation | AC-11 | Общие ImportPlan changed-digest tests: `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply.rs::same_key_and_digest_replay_report_without_extra_draft_and_changed_digest_conflicts`; security-specific mutation path not isolated | **NOT RUN for security-specific source** — general digest case exists; source scheme mutation scenario not executed | +| 2.10-API-12: Release coverage inventory and `just verify` | AC-12 | Epic test-design 2.10-API-A/B, QA CP-05/06; this checklist records focused evidence only | **NOT RUN** — whole suite / `just verify` is later story verification, not qualification in this ATDD step | + +## Фактические команды на текущем baseline + +Команды запускались на `f5f40cb167a82b1e3c1ea2475db5cbaed9d9abfa`; каждый suite запускался последовательно. Все приведённые ниже команды завершились exit code 0. + +| Command | Результат | +|---|---| +| `cargo test -p crank-import --test security_scope -- --test-threads=1` | **PASS:** 13 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored, 0 filtered; 0.03 s. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 103 filtered; 27.92 s. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 103 filtered; 28.10 s. | +| `cargo test -p crank-registry --test integration -- --test-threads=1 apply_rejects_secret_rotation_or_revocation` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 127 filtered; 33.53 s. | + +`just verify`, corpus-wide suites, full integration suite, browser E2E и whole-epic qualification не запускались. Во время подготовки была прервана отдельная попытка `crank-import` на ожидании build lock (exit 130); она не является результатом тестирования. Неудачная/прерванная попытка Pi print-mode также не засчитывается; указанные выше результаты получены повторным запуском точечных команд и захвачены напрямую. + +## Артефакты и handoff + +- **Generated test files:** нет. Существующие тесты переиспользуются; skipped scaffolds не создавались и не учитываются как выполненный RED. +- **Checklist:** `_bmad-output/test-artifacts/atdd-checklist-2-10-security-schemes-secrets.md`. +- **Первичные существующие тесты:** `crates/crank-import/tests/security_scope.rs`; `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/creation.rs`; `apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply.rs`; `crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs`. +- **Приоритет реализации/покрытия:** полный typed-scheme projection для OAS 3.0/3.1 и Swagger 2; complete OR preservation/selection and AND blocker matrix; foreign/missing references; оба profile bindings при shared Secret enable/disable; security-source digest change; end-to-end secret redaction across all required outputs. +- **Scope:** mapping UI 2.11, support-matrix qualification 2.14 и независимый Auth Profile revoke/status/tombstone остаются вне этой story. +- **Следующий этап:** implementation workflow может активировать/добавить только сценарии для подтверждённых AC gaps и повторно использовать перечисленные тесты; этот checklist не объявляет AC полностью GREEN. + +## Implementation continuation — 2026-10-02 + +Ниже зафиксированы только команды и результаты, подтверждённые в implementation-подэтапе. После смены runtime sandbox PostgreSQL-backed тесты и `just verify` не запускались: доступ к Docker socket запрещён (`docker system df` завершился `permission denied unix:///var/run/docker.sock`). Эти проверки остаются обязательными; story не закрыта. + +| Command | Результат и связь с AC | +|---|---| +| `cargo test --offline -p crank-import --all-targets` | **PASS:** все importer targets прошли, включая corpus (3), typed schemes/redaction (9) и security scope (13). Покрывает существенную часть AC-1–4, AC-7–8, но сам по себе не закрывает API/registry критерии. | +| `cargo check --offline -p admin-api -p crank-registry --all-targets` | **PASS:** проверены production и test targets после добавления profile choices, transaction revalidation и registry race regression. Это compile/typecheck, не execution evidence для PostgreSQL. | +| `cargo fmt --all -- --check` | **PASS** после форматирования новых файлов. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited` | **PASS до sandbox switch:** 1 passed. Это доказывает compatible profile binding и persisted mapping на исходном runtime; новая preview-choice assertion добавлена позднее и execution не подтверждён. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 legacy_apply_rejects_required_auth_without_binding_before_creating_draft` | **PASS до sandbox switch:** 1 passed. Required-auth legacy Apply отказал до создания Draft. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 exact_v4_security_contract_replays_its_persisted_security_classification` | **PASS до sandbox switch:** 1 passed. Проверен persisted-v4 replay shape с историческим blocker; fixture преобразуется из preview текущего кода, а не является byte-for-byte golden output старого бинарника. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 profiles_sharing_active_secret_are_selectable_and_both_block_after_disable` | **NOT VERIFIED:** первый запуск выявил тестовую ошибку — disabled планы создавались уже после отключения Secret и потому отклонялись на plan creation. Тест скорректирован так, чтобы оба плана создаваться до отключения; rerun запрещён Docker permission blocker. | +| `cargo test -p crank-registry --test integration -- --test-threads=1 apply_rechecks_live_profile_against_source_requirement_even_when_snapshot_matches` | **NOT RUN:** новая обязательная registry Apply regression моделирует captured/live `X-B` при source requirement `X-Apply-Key`; execution требует PostgreSQL/Docker runtime. | +| `just verify` | **NOT RUN:** обязательный whole-project gate требует недоступного Docker API/runtime. | + +Оставшиеся acceptance-проверки: повторить preview-choice integration assertion; corrected shared-secret A/B scenario; registry transaction race regression; matching auth/disabled-secret and complete registry auth suite; настоящий baseline-v4 serialized replay fixture (current replay test is shape-derived); `just verify` и предусмотренная проектом resource cleanup. Пока они не завершатся, AC-5/6/9/10/11/12 и story остаются частично проверенными. + + +## Историческая проверка ведущего при ограниченной среде — 2026-10-02 + +Эта запись уточняет предшествующие промежуточные результаты; ранние PASS не означают acceptance итогового diff. + +- Итоговый `cargo test -p crank-import --all-targets`: **PASS, 109 passed**, включая 10 security scheme/redaction tests и regression сохранения чувствительных identifiers/schema metadata. +- Итоговый `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings`: **PASS**. Новые mandatory integration cases скомпилированы; compile не заменяет исполнение. +- fmt, Rust code-health и diff whitespace checks: **PASS**. +- Ранний полный Admin integration: 105 passed / 3 failed stale-fixture expectations. Preview-choice, shared-secret A/B, legacy required-auth refusal и persisted-v4 replay прошли. Три fixtures исправлены под approved contract. +- Финальный Admin integration: **не пройден**, 7 passed / 104 failed на PostgreSQL Testcontainer (`Operation not permitted`). Новые/исправленные PostgreSQL cases не засчитываются. +- Финальный runtime suite: **не пройден**, отказ TCP bind в http_contract_wire; более ранний полный PASS остаётся историческим. +- Whole-workspace suite: **не пройден**, admin-api lib PostgreSQL startup permission errors; дальнейшие targets не исполнялись. +- `just verify`: **не пройден** на dependency audit (read-only cache lock, затем DNS github.com / registry.npmjs.org при разрешённом temp-cache retry). + +Новые execution obligations: `security_source.rs::changed_security_scheme_invalidates_old_plan_before_draft_creation` (AC-11), `security_availability.rs::security_binding_refuses_foreign_and_unavailable_auth_material_before_draft` (AC-9), `external_references.rs::external_secret_document_is_rejected_before_blob_registration` (AC-6/8), registry `apply_rechecks_live_profile_against_source_requirement_even_when_snapshot_matches` (AC-5/9), исправленные disabled-auth/corpus regressions. Все обязательны и зарегистрированы, но текущая среда не позволила исполнить их с успехом. Frozen AC snapshot не изменён. Matrix audit и обязательный review остаются незавершёнными; story status **blocked / implementation verification failed**. + +## Сводка сохранённых runtime логов — 2026-10-02 + +Этот раздел добавлен после «Финальной проверки ведущего» и фиксирует отдельные фактические прогоны из файлов в `/tmp`. Он не переписывает историю выше: логи относятся к состоянию на момент запуска, а не автоматически к последующим изменениям. Новые целевые проверки, выполненные после этих логов, указаны отдельно. + +| Источник / команда | Зафиксированный исход | +|---|---| +| `/tmp/bmad-2-10-access-check-1.log` — `cargo test -p crank-import --all-targets` | **PASS:** все importer targets в логе успешны; включая corpus 3, security_schemes 10, security_scope 13 и остальные parser/coverage/unit targets; 0 failed, 0 ignored. Это исторический прогон до последних дополнительных scanner regressions. | +| `/tmp/bmad-2-10-access-check-2.log` — `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1` | **PASS:** 111 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. Включает сценарии на момент этого запуска, в том числе тогдашний persisted-v4 replay test, чья fixture позднее выявлена как current-derived. Этот результат не доказывает baseline-v4 replay. | +| `/tmp/bmad-2-10-access-check-3.log` — `cargo test -p crank-runtime --all-targets` | **PASS:** runtime lib 42, HTTP contract 5, HTTP wire 1, integration 11, product metrics 1, stages 10 и unit 13; во всех завершённых targets 0 failed/ignored. | +| `/tmp/bmad-2-10-verify-pipe.log` — `just verify` в pipe-backed запуске | **PASS:** ведущий непосредственно получил exit code 0 от всего `just verify`; stdout записан родительским процессом через pipe. Admin integration: 111 passed; MCP integration: 40 passed; registry integration: 128 passed / 1 существующий ignored. Успех относится к дереву до review patches; обязательный повтор после них указан в итоговой секции ниже. | +| `cargo test -p crank-import --test security_schemes -- --test-threads=1` (после последних scanner изменений) | **PASS:** 16 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. Проверены encoded query names, defaults, protocol-relative userinfo, bearer/x-format hints, объявленные apiKey имена header/query/cookie в обоих security maps и сохранение schema type после redaction; обычный schema URL example и credential URL в description корректно валидируются после sanitization. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration integration::openapi_import::import_plan_create::security_binding::auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited -- --exact --test-threads=1` | **PASS после извлечения теста в отдельный модуль:** 1 passed, 110 filtered; включает OR alternative/profile choice, решение с alternative index 1, `new_version` без declaration с наследованием профиля и explicit `security: []` с успешным Apply без унаследованного профиля. Явно заданный profile для empty security по-прежнему отклоняется как incompatible. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration integration::openapi_import::external_references::exact_v4_security_contract_replays_its_persisted_security_classification -- --exact --test-threads=1` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 110 filtered. Использует сериализованный payload, полученный от baseline `f5f40cb167a82b1e3c1ea2475db5cbaed9d9abfa`; сохраняет historical v4 preview/fingerprint/digest и подтверждает persisted replay на текущем коде. | + +Остаются обязательными фактические повторные проверки для baseline-derived v4 payload после его замены, затронутых API/registry integration regressions на итоговом дереве и полный `just verify`. Приведённые ранее failures и ограничения остаются историей; успех отдельных логов не закрывает незапущенные после последних изменений acceptance cases. + +## Итоговая acceptance-проверка после review patches — 2026-10-02 + +Это актуальный результат на итоговом коде; preceding baseline/sandbox snapshots сохранены как история. Ведущий проверил original unified diff и incremental patches, command exit codes и исполнение всех восьми строк frozen matrix. Docker/PostgreSQL и TCP bind доступны. + +| Обязательная команда | Итог | +|---|---| +| `cargo test -p crank-import --all-targets` | PASS, exit 0; 115 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored; security_schemes 16 и security_scope 13. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1` | PASS, exit 0; 111 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. | +| `cargo test -p crank-runtime --all-targets` | PASS, exit 0; 83 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. | +| `just verify` | PASS, exit 0; tooling, inventory, config, migrations, metrics, boundaries, code health, dependency audit, fmt, clippy и workspace suites. | + +Workspace harness totals: 932 passed, 0 failed, 1 existing ignored (counts include nested harness output). Единственный ignored — существующий million-row production-size invocation-history тест, не обязательный security case. Registry integration: 128 passed / 1 ignored; source-requirement race `apply_rechecks_live_profile_against_source_requirement_even_when_snapshot_matches` исполнилась с PASS. + +| Frozen matrix row | Результат | Исполненные tests | +|---|---|---| +| Schemes | PASS | `openapi_30_and_31_project_typed_schemes_and_safe_hints`, `swagger2_projects_basic_and_api_key_header_and_query` | +| Effective security | PASS | `effective_requirements_inherit_override_and_allow_explicit_no_auth`, `non_array_security_is_rejected_as_an_import_error_surface` | +| Alternatives | PASS | `or_alternatives_are_preserved_and_unsupported_and_is_scoped` | +| Binding | PASS | `auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited`, `legacy_apply_rejects_required_auth_without_binding_before_creating_draft` | +| Credential availability | PASS | `security_binding_refuses_foreign_and_unavailable_auth_material_before_draft`, `disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials` | +| Shared Secret | PASS | `profiles_sharing_active_secret_are_selectable_and_both_block_after_disable` | +| Secret source | PASS | `secret_like_literals_are_redacted_from_ir_preview_and_source_snapshot`, `upload_rejects_credential_literals_before_persisting_source_artifacts`, `external_secret_document_is_rejected_before_blob_registration`, `parser_canary_never_reaches_diagnostics_logs_traces_or_metrics` | +| Stale source | PASS | `changed_security_scheme_invalidates_old_plan_before_draft_creation` | + +Дополнительные review regressions: encoded query names, declared apiKey names во всех locations, sensitive schema defaults, format hints, protocol-relative userinfo, sanitized URL warning validation, unused unsupported scheme warnings, второй OR choice, наследование existing binding без declaration и сброс binding при explicit no-auth. Настоящий serialized v4 payload получен от canonical baseline; на текущем коде historical replay проверен без переименования versions/digests. + +Первый post-review gate остановился на clippy scanner lint; исправления private traversal context и эквивалентного boolean выражения приняты ведущим. После них все четыре обязательные команды повторены; ниже указаны только итоговые logs. + +Логи этого итогового прогона: `/tmp/bmad-2-10-final-1.log` … `/tmp/bmad-2-10-final-4.log`; wrapper непосредственно вернул exit 0 для всех четырёх команд. Stdout дочерних процессов передан через pipe: direct regular-file redirection ломает существующий RLIMIT_FSIZE=1 subprocess regression независимо от production diff. + +Все обязательные security сценарии исполнены, skipped/ignored acceptance cases нет. UI 2.11, qualification 2.14 и отдельный lifecycle Auth Profile не заявляются как выполненные в этой story. + + +## Follow-up ATDD перед re-derivation — 2026-10-02 + +Approved AC-1…AC-12 и frozen intent остаются без изменений. Completed specification-mode checklist переиспользован, historical PASS выше не засчитываются как verification нового diff. Дополнительно выполнены active regressions AC-6/8 (security ingress): + +| Сценарий | Test path / leaf | Actual result до production fix | +|---|---|---| +| Local referenced scheme и schema default | `external_references/security_bundle.rs::referenced_security_credentials_local_scheme_ref_with_parameter_default_canary_rejected` | RED: `raw credential literal from referenced local scheme ref persisted to storage` | +| External scheme + primary parameter default | `external_references/security_bundle.rs::referenced_security_credentials_external_scheme_ref_local_parameter_default_canary_rejected` | RED: `raw credential literal from split external scheme ref persisted to storage` | +| Primary scheme + external schema default | `external_references/security_bundle.rs::referenced_security_credentials_local_scheme_external_parameter_default_canary_rejected` | RED: `raw credential literal from external referenced parameter persisted to storage` | + +Команда из правильного worktree: `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration referenced_security_credentials -- --test-threads=1` — exit 101, 0 passed / 3 failed / 0 ignored / 111 filtered, 31.89 s. Все три fixtures компилируются; первое assertion проверяет отсутствие canary в API response, затем artifact-store assertion воспроизводит реальный raw-source leak. Production на этапе ATDD не менялся. Первоначальная compile error delimiter исправлена; compile failure не засчитана как RED. Попытки Pi запустить команду из основного checkout прерваны и не считаются execution evidence. + +Basic/query verification gaps (AC-5/9): accepted KEEP patch `/tmp/crank210-keep-followup.patch` сохраняет новые profile-choice/plan/Apply и registry mismatch tests; они были GREEN на входном implementation (Admin security_binding 3/3; registry auth 8/8), не объявляются искусственным RED. При re-derivation сохраняются и повторно исполняются. + +Implementation handoff: устранить leak общим staged bundle preflight до любого put_registered, сохранив безопасный local/external reference import. Существующие benign external chain и replay tests остаются обязательными контролями; добавить benign credential-context split control. URL fragment, credentialUrl suffix и empty API-key name fixes сохранить из review triage. Ведущий выполняет полный Verification и frozen matrix audit после implementation handoff. UI/qualification/independent Auth Profile lifecycle исключены. + +## Follow-up implementation execution — 2026-10-02 + +Изменения follow-up проверены на итоговом рабочем diff. Raw primary и staged dependencies проходят общий security preflight до первого `put_registered`; после этого pure resolver проверяет разрешённое дерево. Небезопасный bundle получает typed `invalid_document` без blob, source, import job или canary в ошибке. Безопасные local/external refs остаются рабочими. В таймаутном сценарии неполная chain остаётся только в памяти и dependency source не создаётся. + +| Обязательный сценарий / команда | Результат | +|---|---| +| `cargo test -p crank-import --test security_schemes -- --test-threads=1` | **PASS:** 17 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored; включены encoded URL fragment/query, opaque `credentialUrl` и `x-credential-url`, safe JSON-pointer fragment и benign OAuth URL regressions. | +| `cargo test -p crank-import --lib empty_api_key_parameter_name_is_unsupported -- --test-threads=1` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 security_bundle` | **PASS:** 4 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored: три local/external split canaries и benign external apiKey scheme с typed `X-Custom` header и одним immutable dependency snapshot. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 external_` | **PASS:** 12 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored; включает весь external reference набор, replay, безопасный chain, timeout, external literal rejection и четыре `security_bundle` случая. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 basic_and_query_profiles_bind_to_matching_security_alternatives_and_apply` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. | +| `cargo test -p crank-registry --test integration -- --test-threads=1 apply_accepts_basic_auth_with_matching_snapshot_and_source_requirement` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. | +| `cargo test -p crank-registry --test integration -- --test-threads=1 apply_accepts_query_key_with_matching_snapshot_and_source_requirement` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. | +| `cargo test -p crank-registry --test integration -- --test-threads=1 apply_rejects_query_key_source_mismatch_with_matching_live_snapshot` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored; regression подтверждает отказ при mismatch. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 external_relative_chain_survives_reversed_builder_order_and_apply_never_refetches` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored; benign dependency import и immutable replay. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 multipart_boundary_rejections_are_localized_and_leave_no_entities` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored; включает `no_methods` без активного source. | +| `cargo test -p admin-api --test integration -- --test-threads=1 local_operation_reference_resolves_and_creates_draft` | **PASS:** 1 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored. | +| `cargo fmt --all` | **PASS.** | +| `cargo clippy -p crank-import -p admin-api --all-targets -- -D warnings` | **PASS** на итоговых исходниках и acceptance targets. | + +Полные verification команды из Spec Verification — `cargo test -p crank-import --all-targets`, полный Admin integration, `cargo test -p crank-runtime --all-targets` и `just verify` — оставлены ведущему для финального gate; этот handoff не закрывает story. `git diff --check` обнаружил только pre-existing trailing blank line в изменённой ведущим спецификации на строке 241; implementation worker спецификацию не редактировал. + +## Проверка ведущего после follow-up — 2026-10-02 + +Обязательные команды: importer all-targets **117 passed**, полный Admin integration **116 passed**, runtime all-targets **83 passed**; все exit 0. `just verify` после извлечения preflight в `source_safety.rs` — **exit 0**, workspace harness totals **944 passed, 0 failed, 1 existing ignored**. Единственный ignored — million-row invocation-history benchmark, не security acceptance. Targeted importer после извлечения также 117/117. Первый gate остановился на code-health (normalize.rs 1048 >1000); helpers вынесены, code-health и полный gate повторены с PASS. Output передан через pipe, чтобы сохранить существующий RLIMIT_FSIZE subprocess harness. + +Frozen matrix audit: все восемь строк покрыты проверяющими ожидаемое поведение tests и найдены с `... ok` в текущих execution logs. Schemes — OpenAPI/Swagger typed projection; Effective security — inherit/override/no-auth и malformed refusal; Alternatives — OR/unsupported AND; Binding — header/Bearer и новый Basic/query plan–Apply, legacy unresolved refusal; Credential availability — foreign/unavailable material и disabled Secret refusal; Shared Secret — два профиля active и оба blocked после disable; Secret source — pure redaction, primary/external canaries, три split-ref rejection и observability; Stale source — changed security scheme mismatch без Draft. Новые safe external scheme control и registry Basic/query/mismatch cases также PASS в полном gate. Mandatory security tests не skipped/ignored. + +Логи ведущего: `/tmp/crank210-verified-import.log`, `/tmp/crank210-verified-admin.log`, `/tmp/crank210-verified-runtime.log`, `/tmp/crank210-verified-gate2.log`. Исторические результаты выше сохранены отдельно и не подменяют этот прогон. + +### Exact matrix execution mapping текущего прогона + +Все leaves ниже найдены с `... ok`; соответствующие logs `/tmp/crank210-verified-import.log` и `/tmp/crank210-verified-admin.log`, повторный whole-workspace `/tmp/crank210-verified-gate2.log`. + +| Frozen row | Suite log | Exact test leaves (PASS) | +|---|---|---| +| Schemes | import | openapi_30_and_31_project_typed_schemes_and_safe_hints; swagger2_projects_basic_and_api_key_header_and_query | +| Effective security | import | effective_requirements_inherit_override_and_allow_explicit_no_auth; non_array_security_is_rejected_as_an_import_error_surface | +| Alternatives | import | or_alternatives_are_preserved_and_unsupported_and_is_scoped | +| Binding | admin | auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited; basic_and_query_profiles_bind_to_matching_security_alternatives_and_apply; legacy_apply_rejects_required_auth_without_binding_before_creating_draft | +| Credential availability | admin | security_binding_refuses_foreign_and_unavailable_auth_material_before_draft; disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials | +| Shared Secret | admin | profiles_sharing_active_secret_are_selectable_and_both_block_after_disable | +| Secret source | import/admin | secret_like_literals_are_redacted_from_ir_preview_and_source_snapshot; external_secret_document_is_rejected_before_blob_registration; referenced_security_credentials_local_scheme_external_parameter_default_canary_rejected; parser_canary_never_reaches_diagnostics_logs_traces_or_metrics | +| Stale source | admin | changed_security_scheme_invalidates_old_plan_before_draft_creation | + +## Окончательный post-review gate — 2026-10-02 + +После всех review patches четыре обязательные команды повторены ведущим: importer **117 passed**, Admin integration **117 passed**, runtime **83 passed**, `just verify` **exit 0**, workspace harness totals **945 passed, 0 failed, 1 existing ignored**. Mandatory security cases не skipped/ignored. Exact matrix mapping выше повторно подтверждён на финальных logs `/tmp/crank210-final-import.log`, `/tmp/crank210-final-admin.log`, `/tmp/crank210-final-runtime.log`, `/tmp/crank210-final-gate.log`. + +Дополнительно PASS: `encoded_access_token_fragment_is_rejected_before_persistence` проверяет полностью percent-encoded credential name вне default/example/query fallback, bounded error и zero entities/blobs; `safe_external_security_scheme_and_parameter_are_preserved` сохраняет ordinary `locale=en` default, typed внешнюю scheme и immutable dependency snapshot. Targeted `security_bundle` после patches: **5 passed**. Production-код в этом review repair не менялся. Review verdicts и новые unverified deferred hypotheses находятся в spec; ledger и sprint-status не изменялись. diff --git a/apps/admin-api/src/dto.rs b/apps/admin-api/src/dto.rs index a71cacc..e9582e7 100644 --- a/apps/admin-api/src/dto.rs +++ b/apps/admin-api/src/dto.rs @@ -542,6 +542,23 @@ pub struct OpenApiImportPreviewResponse { pub job_id: String, pub expires_at: String, pub preview: crank_import::rest::ImportPreview, + #[serde(default)] + pub security_profile_choices: Vec, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize)] +pub struct OpenApiImportSecurityProfileChoice { + pub operation_key: String, + pub alternative_index: usize, + pub schemes: Vec, + pub profiles: Vec, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize)] +pub struct OpenApiImportAuthProfileChoice { + pub id: String, + pub name: String, + pub kind: crank_core::AuthKind, } #[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize)] @@ -610,6 +627,8 @@ pub struct OpenApiImportPlanDecision { pub confirmed_name: Option, #[serde(default)] pub auth_profile_id: Option, + #[serde(default)] + pub security_alternative_index: Option, } #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)] @@ -629,6 +648,7 @@ pub struct OpenApiImportPlanCandidateView { pub target_operation_id: Option, pub confirmed_name: Option, pub auth_profile_id: Option, + pub security_alternative_index: Option, pub reason: Option, } diff --git a/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports.rs b/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports.rs index cd0e95b..ba0f19b 100644 --- a/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports.rs +++ b/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports.rs @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet}; use crank_artifacts::{ArtifactError, MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES}; use crank_core::{ AuthProfileId, ExecutionConfig, OperationId, OperationSecurityLevel, OperationStatus, Protocol, - ToolQualityFinding, ToolQualitySeverity, WorkspaceId, + SecretStatus, ToolQualityFinding, ToolQualitySeverity, WorkspaceId, }; use crank_import::rest::{ ImportFinding, ImportFindingSeverity, ImportOperationCandidate, NORMALIZER_VERSION, - PROJECTION_VERSION, operation_draft_from_candidate, + PROJECTION_VERSION, operation_draft_from_candidate, validate_document_source_safe, }; use crank_registry::{ ApplyImportJobRequest, ArtifactSourceId, ArtifactSourceSensitivity, @@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ use tracing::{info, instrument}; use crate::{ error::ApiError, service::{ - AdminService, OpenApiImportCreatePayload, OpenApiImportCreateResponse, - OpenApiImportCreatedOperation, OpenApiImportPlanApplyPayload, + AdminService, OpenApiImportAuthProfileChoice, OpenApiImportCreatePayload, + OpenApiImportCreateResponse, OpenApiImportCreatedOperation, OpenApiImportPlanApplyPayload, OpenApiImportPlanCandidateView, OpenApiImportPlanCounts, OpenApiImportPlanCreatePayload, OpenApiImportPlanCreateResponse, OpenApiImportPlanDecision, OpenApiImportPreviewResponse, - OpenApiImportSkippedOperation, OpenApiUpload, OpenApiUploadLocale, OperationPayload, - new_prefixed_id, + OpenApiImportSecurityProfileChoice, OpenApiImportSkippedOperation, OpenApiUpload, + OpenApiUploadLocale, OperationPayload, new_prefixed_id, }, }; @@ -71,20 +71,52 @@ impl AdminService { validate_openapi_upload(&upload)?; let OpenApiUpload { - bytes, + bytes: raw_bytes, mime_type, locale, } = upload; - let store = self.artifact_store.clone(); - let artifact = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.put_registered(&bytes)) - .await - .map_err(|_| ApiError::openapi_upload(locale, "storage_unavailable"))? - .map_err(|error| artifact_error(locale, error))?; + let raw_document = std::str::from_utf8(&raw_bytes) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::openapi_upload(locale, "invalid_utf8"))?; + validate_document_source_safe(raw_document, &self.external_reference_normalization) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::openapi_upload(locale, "invalid_document"))?; let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc(); + let mut dependencies = self + .materialize_external_reference_snapshots(workspace_id, &raw_bytes, now) + .await; + if dependencies.unsafe_source { + return Err(ApiError::openapi_upload(locale, "invalid_document")); + } + let source_digest = + crank_import::rest::SourceDigest::parse(format!("{:x}", Sha256::digest(&raw_bytes))) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::openapi_upload(locale, "invalid_document"))?; + if crank_import::rest::validate_resolved_bundle_source_safe( + raw_document, + source_digest, + &dependencies.snapshots, + &self.external_reference_normalization, + ) + .is_err() + { + dependencies.detach_all().await; + return Err(ApiError::openapi_upload(locale, "invalid_document")); + } + let bytes = raw_bytes; + let store = self.artifact_store.clone(); + let artifact_result = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.put_registered(&bytes)) + .await + .map_err(|_| ApiError::openapi_upload(locale, "storage_unavailable")) + .and_then(|result| result.map_err(|error| artifact_error(locale, error))); + let artifact = match artifact_result { + Ok(artifact) => artifact, + Err(error) => { + dependencies.detach_all().await; + return Err(error); + } + }; let expires_at = now + Duration::hours(IMPORT_JOB_TTL_HOURS); let job_id = ImportJobId::new(new_prefixed_id("imp")); let source_id = ArtifactSourceId::new(new_prefixed_id("src_openapi")); - let source = self + let source_result = self .registry .create_artifact_source(CreateArtifactSourceRequest { workspace_id, @@ -94,7 +126,14 @@ impl AdminService { sensitivity: ArtifactSourceSensitivity::Internal, created_at: now, }) - .await?; + .await; + let source = match source_result { + Ok(source) => source, + Err(error) => { + dependencies.detach_all().await; + return Err(ApiError::from(error)); + } + }; let mut detach_guard = SourceDetachGuard::new( self.registry.clone(), workspace_id.clone(), @@ -120,9 +159,6 @@ impl AdminService { detach_guard.detach_now().await; return Err(ApiError::openapi_upload(locale, "source_integrity")); } - let mut dependencies = self - .materialize_external_reference_snapshots(workspace_id, &verified.bytes, now) - .await; let parsed = match parse_verified_preview( verified.bytes, artifact.artifact_ref().digest_hex().to_owned(), @@ -197,15 +233,92 @@ impl AdminService { dependencies.disarm(); detach_guard.disarm(); + let security_profile_choices = self + .security_profile_choices(workspace_id, &parsed.preview) + .await?; Ok(OpenApiImportPreviewResponse { job_id: job_id.as_str().to_owned(), expires_at: expires_at .format(&Rfc3339) .map_err(|error| ApiError::internal(error.to_string()))?, preview: parsed.preview, + security_profile_choices, }) } + async fn security_profile_choices( + &self, + workspace_id: &WorkspaceId, + preview: &crank_import::rest::ImportPreview, + ) -> Result, ApiError> { + let profiles = self.registry.list_auth_profiles(workspace_id).await?; + let mut available = Vec::new(); + for profile in profiles { + if profile.kind != profile.config.kind() { + continue; + } + let mut usable = true; + for secret_id in profile.config.secret_ids() { + let Some(secret) = self.registry.get_secret(workspace_id, secret_id).await? else { + usable = false; + break; + }; + if secret.secret.status != SecretStatus::Active + || self + .registry + .get_current_secret_version(workspace_id, secret_id) + .await? + .is_none() + { + usable = false; + break; + } + } + if usable { + available.push(profile); + } + } + + let mut choices = Vec::new(); + for operation in preview + .groups + .iter() + .flat_map(|group| group.operations.iter()) + { + for (alternative_index, alternative) in operation + .security_requirements + .alternatives + .iter() + .enumerate() + { + if !alternative.supported || alternative.schemes.len() != 1 { + continue; + } + let Some(scheme) = operation.security_schemes.get(&alternative.schemes[0]) else { + continue; + }; + let profiles = available + .iter() + .filter(|profile| { + import_plan::auth_config_matches_scheme(&profile.config, scheme) + }) + .map(|profile| OpenApiImportAuthProfileChoice { + id: profile.id.as_str().to_owned(), + name: profile.name.clone(), + kind: profile.kind, + }) + .collect::>(); + choices.push(OpenApiImportSecurityProfileChoice { + operation_key: operation.key.clone(), + alternative_index, + schemes: alternative.schemes.clone(), + profiles, + }); + } + } + Ok(choices) + } + #[instrument(skip(self, payload), fields(workspace_id = %workspace_id.as_str(), job_id = %job_id.as_str()))] pub async fn create_openapi_import( &self, diff --git a/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/external_references.rs b/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/external_references.rs index b12c37b..b116152 100644 --- a/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/external_references.rs +++ b/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/external_references.rs @@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ pub(super) struct MaterializedDependencies { envelopes: Vec, canonical_uris: Vec, guards: Vec, + pub(super) unsafe_source: bool, +} + +struct StagedDependency { + canonical_uri: String, + bytes: Vec, + document: String, } pub(super) struct ImportReplayContext<'a> { @@ -24,6 +31,7 @@ impl MaterializedDependencies { envelopes: Vec::new(), canonical_uris: Vec::new(), guards: Vec::new(), + unsafe_source: false, } } @@ -176,8 +184,8 @@ impl AdminService { } } let mut seen = BTreeSet::new(); - let mut result = MaterializedDependencies::empty(); - let mut dependency_by_digest = BTreeMap::::new(); + let mut staged = Vec::::new(); + let mut staged_documents = vec![primary.to_owned()]; while let Some((canonical_uri, depth)) = queue.pop_front() { if !seen.insert(canonical_uri.clone()) || depth > self.external_reference_normalization.max_reference_depth @@ -194,32 +202,77 @@ impl AdminService { materialization_failure( "fetch", external_fetch_error_code(&error), - result.snapshots.len(), + staged.len(), ); continue; } }; let Ok(document) = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes).map(str::to_owned) else { - materialization_failure( - "dependency_decode", - "invalid_utf8", - result.snapshots.len(), - ); + materialization_failure("dependency_decode", "invalid_utf8", staged.len()); continue; }; let Ok(references) = crank_import::rest::external_reference_uris( &document, &self.external_reference_normalization, ) else { - materialization_failure( - "dependency_scan", - "invalid_document", - result.snapshots.len(), - ); + materialization_failure("dependency_scan", "invalid_document", staged.len()); continue; }; + staged_documents.push(document.clone()); + staged.push(StagedDependency { + canonical_uri: canonical_uri.clone(), + bytes, + document, + }); + for reference in references { + if let Some(uri) = canonical_external_document_uri(Some(&canonical_uri), &reference) + { + queue.push_back((uri, depth.saturating_add(1))); + } + } + } + let staged_snapshots = staged + .iter() + .filter_map(|dependency| { + let digest = format!("{:x}", Sha256::digest(&dependency.bytes)); + let digest = crank_import::rest::SourceDigest::parse(digest).ok()?; + Some(crank_import::rest::ExternalDocumentSnapshot { + canonical_uri: dependency.canonical_uri.clone(), + digest, + document: dependency.document.clone(), + }) + }) + .collect::>(); + let primary_digest = + crank_import::rest::SourceDigest::parse(format!("{:x}", Sha256::digest(primary_bytes))) + .expect("SHA-256 digest is valid"); + let raw_bundle_is_unsafe = crank_import::rest::validate_document_bundle_source_safe( + &staged_documents + .iter() + .map(String::as_str) + .collect::>(), + &self.external_reference_normalization, + ) + .is_err(); + let resolved_bundle_is_unsafe = crank_import::rest::validate_resolved_bundle_source_safe( + primary, + primary_digest, + &staged_snapshots, + &self.external_reference_normalization, + ) + .is_err(); + if raw_bundle_is_unsafe || resolved_bundle_is_unsafe { + materialization_failure("dependency_redaction", "invalid_document", staged.len()); + let mut rejected = MaterializedDependencies::empty(); + rejected.unsafe_source = true; + return rejected; + } + + let mut result = MaterializedDependencies::empty(); + let mut dependency_by_digest = BTreeMap::::new(); + for dependency in staged { let store = self.artifact_store.clone(); - let artifact_bytes = bytes.clone(); + let artifact_bytes = dependency.bytes.clone(); let Ok(Ok(artifact)) = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.put_registered(&artifact_bytes)).await else { @@ -295,31 +348,22 @@ impl AdminService { dependency_by_digest.insert(digest_key, index); index }; - let dependency = &result.envelopes[envelope_index]; - let snapshot_digest = match crank_import::rest::SourceDigest::parse( - dependency.digest.digest_hex().to_owned(), - ) { - Ok(digest) => digest, - Err(_) => { - materialization_failure("snapshot", "source_integrity", result.snapshots.len()); - continue; - } + let dependency_envelope = &result.envelopes[envelope_index]; + let Ok(snapshot_digest) = crank_import::rest::SourceDigest::parse( + dependency_envelope.digest.digest_hex().to_owned(), + ) else { + materialization_failure("snapshot", "source_integrity", result.snapshots.len()); + continue; }; result .snapshots .push(crank_import::rest::ExternalDocumentSnapshot { - canonical_uri: canonical_uri.clone(), + canonical_uri: dependency.canonical_uri.clone(), digest: snapshot_digest, - document, + document: dependency.document, }); materialized_count.store(result.snapshots.len(), std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed); - result.canonical_uris.push(canonical_uri.clone()); - for reference in references { - if let Some(uri) = canonical_external_document_uri(Some(&canonical_uri), &reference) - { - queue.push_back((uri, depth.saturating_add(1))); - } - } + result.canonical_uris.push(dependency.canonical_uri); } // Registry ownership is one envelope per immutable digest, while the // resolver may map several canonical URIs to that same snapshot. Keep diff --git a/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/import_plan.rs b/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/import_plan.rs index cafb545..a596174 100644 --- a/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/import_plan.rs +++ b/apps/admin-api/src/service/imports/import_plan.rs @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ use super::*; +use crank_core::AuthConfig; +use crank_import::rest::SecurityRequirementsSource as SecuritySource; impl AdminService { #[instrument(skip(self, payload), fields(workspace_id = %workspace_id.as_str(), job_id = %job_id.as_str()))] @@ -204,6 +206,7 @@ impl AdminService { target_operation_id: candidate.target_operation_id.clone(), confirmed_name: candidate.confirmed_name.clone(), auth_profile_id: candidate.auth_profile_id.clone(), + security_alternative_index: candidate.security_alternative_index, reason: candidate.reason.clone(), }) .collect(); @@ -220,6 +223,7 @@ impl AdminService { target_operation_id: None, confirmed_name: None, auth_profile_id: None, + security_alternative_index: None, reason: Some("not_selected".to_owned()), } })); @@ -257,9 +261,12 @@ impl AdminService { decision.and_then(|decision| decision.target_operation_id.clone()); let confirmed_name = decision.and_then(|decision| decision.confirmed_name.clone()); let auth_profile_id = decision.and_then(|decision| decision.auth_profile_id.clone()); + let requested_security_alternative = + decision.and_then(|decision| decision.security_alternative_index); + let mut blocker_reason = blocker_reason; let candidate_name = candidate.draft.name.clone(); - let blocked = blocker_reason.is_some(); + let mut blocked = blocker_reason.is_some(); // Explicit skip/new_version targets are always resolved in the // workspace: an unknown target, a name mismatch, or an incompatible @@ -353,6 +360,8 @@ impl AdminService { target_operation_id, confirmed_name, auth_profile_id, + security_alternative_index: requested_security_alternative, + auth_requirement: None, auth_snapshot: None, target: None, operation: None, @@ -368,17 +377,17 @@ impl AdminService { )); } } - - // The final server-authored auth profile reference: the explicit - // decision, or the target's reference inherited for an actionable - // new_version. Only the reference (never a secret value) is stored. + // Use an explicit decision or inherit the target reference for new_version. let mut auth_profile_ref = auth_profile_id .as_deref() .map(|id| AuthProfileId::new(id.to_owned())); + let mut inherited_auth_profile = false; if let Some(summary) = target_summary.as_ref() && !blocked && action == "new_version" && auth_profile_ref.is_none() + && (candidate.security_requirements.source == SecuritySource::None + || !candidate.security_requirements.alternatives.is_empty()) { let record = self .registry @@ -386,8 +395,65 @@ impl AdminService { .await? .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::internal("current operation version is unavailable"))?; auth_profile_ref = record.snapshot.execution_config.auth_profile_ref; + inherited_auth_profile = auth_profile_ref.is_some(); } let auth_profile_id = auth_profile_ref.as_ref().map(|id| id.as_str().to_owned()); + let inherited_unconstrained_auth = inherited_auth_profile + && action == "new_version" + && candidate.security_requirements.source + == crank_import::rest::SecurityRequirementsSource::None + && candidate.security_requirements.alternatives.is_empty() + && requested_security_alternative.is_none(); + let security_alternative_index = if blocked { + requested_security_alternative + } else if inherited_unconstrained_auth { + None + } else { + resolve_security_binding( + self, + workspace_id, + candidate, + auth_profile_ref.as_ref(), + requested_security_alternative, + &mut blocker_reason, + ) + .await? + }; + blocked = blocker_reason.is_some(); + let auth_requirement = if !blocked && inherited_unconstrained_auth { + Some(json!({ "kind": "unconstrained" })) + } else if !blocked && auth_profile_ref.is_some() { + security_alternative_index + .and_then(|index| candidate.security_requirements.alternatives.get(index)) + .and_then(|alternative| { + (alternative.schemes.len() == 1).then(|| &alternative.schemes[0]) + }) + .and_then(|scheme_name| candidate.security_schemes.get(scheme_name)) + .and_then(|scheme| match &scheme.kind { + crank_import::rest::NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { scheme, .. } => { + match scheme.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() { + "bearer" => Some(json!({ "kind": "bearer" })), + "basic" => Some(json!({ "kind": "basic" })), + _ => None, + } + } + crank_import::rest::NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + location: crank_import::rest::SecurityParameterLocation::Header, + parameter_name, + .. + } => { + Some(json!({ "kind": "api_key_header", "parameter_name": parameter_name })) + } + crank_import::rest::NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + location: crank_import::rest::SecurityParameterLocation::Query, + parameter_name, + .. + } => Some(json!({ "kind": "api_key_query", "parameter_name": parameter_name })), + _ => None, + }) + } else { + None + }; if blocked { return Ok(PlannedCandidate { @@ -399,6 +465,8 @@ impl AdminService { target_operation_id, confirmed_name, auth_profile_id, + security_alternative_index, + auth_requirement, auth_snapshot: None, target, operation: None, @@ -415,6 +483,8 @@ impl AdminService { target_operation_id, confirmed_name, auth_profile_id, + security_alternative_index, + auth_requirement: None, auth_snapshot: None, target, operation: None, @@ -479,6 +549,8 @@ impl AdminService { target_operation_id, confirmed_name, auth_profile_id, + security_alternative_index, + auth_requirement, auth_snapshot, target, operation: Some(operation), @@ -492,7 +564,12 @@ impl AdminService { workspace_id: &WorkspaceId, profile_id: &AuthProfileId, ) -> Result { - let unavailable = || import_plan_repreview_error("import_plan_auth_unavailable"); + let unavailable = || { + ApiError::unprocessable_with_context( + "The selected authentication profile is unavailable for this import.", + json!({ "error_code": "import_plan_auth_unavailable" }), + ) + }; let profile = self .registry .get_auth_profile(workspace_id, profile_id) @@ -543,6 +620,8 @@ struct PlannedCandidate { target_operation_id: Option, confirmed_name: Option, auth_profile_id: Option, + security_alternative_index: Option, + auth_requirement: Option, auth_snapshot: Option, target: Option, operation: Option, @@ -705,6 +784,12 @@ fn validate_decision_fields(decision: &OpenApiImportPlanDecision) -> Result<(), { return invalid("decision auth_profile_id is empty or too long"); } + if decision + .security_alternative_index + .is_some_and(|index| index > MAX_IMPORT_PLAN_KEYS) + { + return invalid("decision security_alternative_index is too large"); + } match decision.action.as_str() { "create" => { if decision.target_operation_id.is_some() || decision.confirmed_name.is_some() { @@ -714,8 +799,8 @@ fn validate_decision_fields(decision: &OpenApiImportPlanDecision) -> Result<(), } } "skip" => { - if decision.auth_profile_id.is_some() { - return invalid("auth_profile_id is not allowed for action skip"); + if decision.auth_profile_id.is_some() || decision.security_alternative_index.is_some() { + return invalid("security binding is not allowed for action skip"); } if decision.target_operation_id.is_none() { return invalid("action skip requires the exact target_operation_id"); @@ -745,6 +830,138 @@ fn validate_decision_fields(decision: &OpenApiImportPlanDecision) -> Result<(), Ok(()) } +async fn resolve_security_binding( + service: &AdminService, + workspace_id: &WorkspaceId, + candidate: &ImportOperationCandidate, + profile_ref: Option<&AuthProfileId>, + requested_index: Option, + blocker_reason: &mut Option, +) -> Result, ApiError> { + let alternatives = &candidate.security_requirements.alternatives; + if alternatives.is_empty() { + if profile_ref.is_some() || requested_index.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::validation_with_context( + "security binding was supplied for an operation with no security requirement", + json!({ "operation_key": candidate.key, "error_code": "import_plan_auth_incompatible" }), + )); + } + return Ok(None); + } + + let public_index = alternatives + .iter() + .position(|alternative| alternative.supported && alternative.schemes.is_empty()); + let compatible = if let Some(profile_ref) = profile_ref { + let profile = service + .registry + .get_auth_profile(workspace_id, profile_ref) + .await? + .ok_or_else(|| { + ApiError::unprocessable_with_context( + "selected Auth Profile is unavailable in this workspace", + json!({ "error_code": "import_plan_auth_unavailable" }), + ) + })?; + let compatible = alternatives + .iter() + .enumerate() + .filter(|(_, alternative)| { + alternative.supported + && alternative.schemes.len() == 1 + && candidate + .security_schemes + .get(&alternative.schemes[0]) + .is_some_and(|scheme| auth_config_matches_scheme(&profile.config, scheme)) + }) + .map(|(index, _)| index) + .collect::>(); + Some((profile, compatible)) + } else { + None + }; + + if let Some((_, compatible_indices)) = compatible.as_ref() { + let selected = match requested_index { + Some(index) if compatible_indices.contains(&index) => index, + Some(_) => { + return Err(ApiError::validation_with_context( + "selected Auth Profile is incompatible with the selected security alternative", + json!({ "operation_key": candidate.key, "error_code": "import_plan_auth_incompatible" }), + )); + } + None if compatible_indices.len() == 1 => compatible_indices[0], + None if compatible_indices.is_empty() => { + return Err(ApiError::validation_with_context( + "selected Auth Profile is incompatible with the source security schemes", + json!({ "operation_key": candidate.key, "error_code": "import_plan_auth_incompatible" }), + )); + } + None => { + return Err(ApiError::validation_with_context( + "security_alternative_index is required when a profile matches multiple alternatives", + json!({ "operation_key": candidate.key, "error_code": "import_plan_security_alternative_required" }), + )); + } + }; + return Ok(Some(selected)); + } + + if let Some(index) = requested_index { + if alternatives + .get(index) + .is_none_or(|alternative| !alternative.supported) + { + return Err(ApiError::validation_with_context( + "selected security alternative is unsupported", + json!({ "operation_key": candidate.key, "error_code": "import_plan_auth_incompatible" }), + )); + } + if alternatives[index].schemes.is_empty() { + return Ok(Some(index)); + } + } + if let Some(public_index) = public_index + && requested_index.is_none() + { + return Ok(Some(public_index)); + } + *blocker_reason = Some("auth_profile_required".to_owned()); + Ok(requested_index) +} + +pub(super) fn auth_config_matches_scheme( + config: &AuthConfig, + scheme: &crank_import::rest::NormalizedSecurityScheme, +) -> bool { + use crank_import::rest::{NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind, SecurityParameterLocation}; + match (&scheme.kind, config) { + (NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { scheme, .. }, AuthConfig::Bearer(_)) => { + scheme.eq_ignore_ascii_case("bearer") + } + (NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { scheme, .. }, AuthConfig::Basic(_)) => { + scheme.eq_ignore_ascii_case("basic") + } + ( + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + location: SecurityParameterLocation::Header, + parameter_name, + .. + }, + AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(config), + ) => parameter_name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&config.header_name), + ( + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + location: SecurityParameterLocation::Query, + parameter_name, + .. + }, + AuthConfig::ApiKeyQuery(config), + ) => parameter_name == &config.param_name, + _ => false, + } +} + /// Serializes one planned candidate into the versioned plan payload: the /// redacted decision, the bounded rejection reason (if any), the exact /// authorized target with expected state and, for mutating actions, the full @@ -759,6 +976,7 @@ fn plan_candidate_payload(candidate: &PlannedCandidate) -> Result Result bool { + std::fs::read_dir(root).unwrap().any(|entry| { + let path = entry.unwrap().path(); + if path.is_dir() { + storage_contains_literal(&path, literal) + } else { + std::fs::read(path) + .unwrap() + .windows(literal.len()) + .any(|window| window == literal) + } + }) +} + #[tokio::test] #[serial] async fn missing_external_snapshot_fails_closed_before_draft_mutation() { @@ -316,7 +430,7 @@ async fn external_materialization_uses_one_wall_clock_timeout_and_cleans_cancell ); let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap(); let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap(); - tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() }); + let timeout_server = tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() }); let origin = format!("http://{address}"); let registry = test_registry().await; @@ -368,6 +482,7 @@ paths: ) .await .unwrap(); + timeout_server.abort(); assert!(started.elapsed() < std::time::Duration::from_millis(800)); assert_eq!(fetches.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 2); let job = registry @@ -403,7 +518,10 @@ paths: .fetch_one(registry.pool()) .await .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(detached_dependencies, 1); + assert_eq!( + detached_dependencies, 0, + "staged dependencies must not be persisted before the fetch chain completes" + ); } #[tokio::test] @@ -606,3 +724,90 @@ async fn exact_v3_contract_replays_persisted_preview_without_v4_or_dependency_re .unwrap(); assert_eq!(completed.status, ImportJobStatus::Completed); } + +#[tokio::test] +#[serial] +async fn exact_v4_security_contract_replays_its_persisted_security_classification() { + let registry = test_registry().await; + let service = test_service( + registry.clone(), + test_storage_root("openapi_import_v4_security_compatibility"), + test_auth_settings(), + test_secret_crypto(), + ); + let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + let upload = OpenApiUpload { + bytes: br#"{ + "openapi":"3.0.3", + "info":{"title":"Historical security","version":"1"}, + "servers":[{"url":"https://api.example.test"}], + "components":{"securitySchemes":{"basic":{"type":"http","scheme":"basic"}}}, + "security":[{"basic":[]}], + "paths":{ + "/secure":{"get":{"operationId":"secure","responses":{"200":{"description":"ok"}}}}, + "/public":{"get":{"operationId":"public","security":[],"responses":{"200":{"description":"ok"}}}} + } + }"# + .to_vec(), + mime_type: "application/json".to_owned(), + locale: OpenApiUploadLocale::En, + }; + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload) + .await + .unwrap(); + let job_id: crank_registry::ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let job = registry + .get_import_job(&workspace_id, &job_id) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + // Keep the genuine baseline-v4 normalization/projection, preview and digest intact. + // Only bind its source envelope to this test's newly registered immutable source blob. + let mut payload: serde_json::Value = + serde_json::from_str(BASELINE_V4_SECURITY_PREVIEW_PAYLOAD).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + payload.pointer("/source/digest"), + job.preview_payload.pointer("/source/digest"), + "baseline fixture must refer to the exact uploaded source bytes", + ); + payload["source"]["source_id"] = job.preview_payload["source"]["source_id"].clone(); + assert_eq!( + payload["normalization"]["normalizer_version"], + "normalized-ir-v4" + ); + assert_eq!(payload["normalization"]["projection_version"], "preview-v4"); + sqlx::query("update import_jobs set preview_payload = $1::jsonb where id = $2") + .bind(serde_json::to_string(&payload).unwrap()) + .bind(job_id.as_str()) + .execute(registry.pool()) + .await + .unwrap(); + + let result = service + .create_openapi_import( + &workspace_id, + &job_id, + OpenApiImportCreatePayload { + selected_operation_keys: vec!["GET /secure".to_owned()], + server_url: Some("https://api.example.test".to_owned()), + conflict_mode: "skip".to_owned(), + }, + ) + .await; + let error = + result.expect_err("historical v4 security blocker must refuse the selected candidate"); + assert!( + format!("{error:?}").contains("invalid_document"), + "v4 contract was rejected before candidate validation: {error:?}" + ); + assert!( + service + .list_operations(&workspace_id) + .await + .unwrap() + .is_empty() + ); +} + +mod security_bundle; diff --git a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/external_references/security_bundle.rs b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/external_references/security_bundle.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12a3bef --- /dev/null +++ b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/external_references/security_bundle.rs @@ -0,0 +1,413 @@ +use super::*; + +// --- Referenced security credentials RED regressions --- +// These tests prove that credential literals hidden behind local/external $ref +// security scheme + parameter splits are rejected before artifact persistence. + +#[tokio::test] +#[serial] +async fn referenced_security_credentials_local_scheme_ref_with_parameter_default_canary_rejected() { + let canary = b"local-ref-canary-001-Zx9qK"; + let registry = test_registry().await; + let storage_root = test_storage_root("openapi_import_local_scheme_ref_canary"); + let service = test_service( + registry.clone(), + storage_root.clone(), + test_auth_settings(), + test_secret_crypto(), + ); + let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + let upload = OpenApiUpload { + bytes: r##"{ + "openapi":"3.1.0", + "info":{"title":"Local ref scheme","version":"1"}, + "servers":[{"url":"https://api.example.test"}], + "x-scheme":{"type":"apiKey","in":"header","name":"X-Custom"}, + "x-key":{"type":"string","default":"local-ref-canary-001-Zx9qK"}, + "components":{ + "securitySchemes":{"custom":{"$ref":"#/x-scheme"}} + }, + "security":[{"custom":[]}], + "paths":{ + "/test":{"get":{ + "operationId":"test", "security":[{"custom":[]}], + "parameters":[{"name":"X-Custom","in":"header","schema":{"$ref":"#/x-key"}}], + "responses":{"200":{"description":"ok"}} + }} + } + }"## + .as_bytes() + .to_vec(), + mime_type: "application/json".to_owned(), + locale: OpenApiUploadLocale::En, + }; + let result = service.preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload).await; + + // Canary must NOT appear in the API response (error or preview). + let response_repr = match &result { + Ok(preview) => serde_json::to_string(preview).unwrap(), + Err(err) => format!("{err:?}"), + }; + assert!( + response_repr.contains("invalid_document"), + "unsafe local ref bundle was not rejected: {response_repr}" + ); + assert!( + !response_repr.contains(std::str::from_utf8(canary).unwrap()), + "credential canary leaked into API response" + ); + + // Canary must NOT be persisted to artifact storage. + assert!( + !storage_contains_literal(&storage_root, canary), + "raw credential literal from referenced local scheme ref persisted to storage" + ); + assert_rejected_bundle_unpersisted(®istry, &workspace_id, &storage_root).await; +} + +#[tokio::test] +#[serial] +async fn encoded_access_token_fragment_is_rejected_before_persistence() { + let canary = b"fragment-ingress-canary-004-Qm7vN"; + let registry = test_registry().await; + let storage_root = test_storage_root("openapi_import_encoded_fragment_canary"); + let service = test_service( + registry.clone(), + storage_root.clone(), + test_auth_settings(), + test_secret_crypto(), + ); + let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + let upload = OpenApiUpload { + bytes: br##"{ + "openapi":"3.1.0", + "info":{"title":"Encoded fragment credential","version":"1"}, + "servers":[{"url":"https://api.example.test/v1#%61%63%63%65%73%73%5F%74%6F%6B%65%6E=fragment-ingress-canary-004-Qm7vN"}], + "paths":{"/health":{"get":{"responses":{"200":{"description":"ok"}}}}} + }"## + .to_vec(), + mime_type: "application/json".to_owned(), + locale: OpenApiUploadLocale::En, + }; + + let error = service + .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload) + .await + .expect_err("encoded access_token fragment must be rejected at ingress"); + let rendered_error = format!("{error:?}"); + assert!(rendered_error.contains("invalid_document")); + assert!(rendered_error.len() <= 512, "error must remain bounded"); + assert!(!rendered_error.contains("fragment-ingress-canary-004-Qm7vN")); + assert!(!rendered_error.contains("%61%63%63%65%73%73%5F%74%6F%6B%65%6E")); + assert_rejected_bundle_unpersisted(®istry, &workspace_id, &storage_root).await; + assert!(!storage_contains_literal(&storage_root, canary)); +} + +#[tokio::test] +#[serial] +async fn referenced_security_credentials_external_scheme_ref_local_parameter_default_canary_rejected() + { + let canary = b"split-ext-canary-002-Yw8pJ"; + // External document defines the apiKey security scheme with header X-Custom. + let external_doc = r#"{"x-scheme":{"type":"apiKey","in":"header","name":"X-Custom"}}"#; + let fetched = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)); + let fetch_count = Arc::clone(&fetched); + let app = Router::new().route( + "/scheme.yaml", + get(move || { + let fc = Arc::clone(&fetch_count); + async move { + fc.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + external_doc.to_owned() + } + }), + ); + let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap(); + let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap(); + let server = tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() }); + let origin = format!("http://{address}"); + + let registry = test_registry().await; + let storage_root = test_storage_root("openapi_import_ext_scheme_ref_canary"); + let service = test_service_with_external_references( + registry.clone(), + storage_root.clone(), + vec![format!("{origin}/")], + ); + let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + // Primary references the external scheme; contains a local parameter + // with name X-Custom and schema.default = canary. + let upload = OpenApiUpload { + bytes: format!( + r#"{{ + "openapi":"3.1.0", + "info":{{"title":"Ext scheme ref","version":"1"}}, + "servers":[{{"url":"https://api.example.test"}}], + "components":{{ + "securitySchemes":{{"custom":{{"$ref":"{origin}/scheme.yaml#/x-scheme"}}}} + }}, + "security":[{{"custom":[]}}], + "paths":{{ + "/test":{{"get":{{ + "operationId":"test", "security":[{{"custom":[]}}], + "parameters":[{{"name":"X-Custom","in":"header","schema":{{"type":"string","default":"{canary}"}}}}], + "responses":{{"200":{{"description":"ok"}}}} + }}}} + }} + }}"#, + origin = origin, + canary = std::str::from_utf8(canary).unwrap(), + ) + .into_bytes(), + mime_type: "application/json".to_owned(), + locale: OpenApiUploadLocale::En, + }; + let result = service.preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload).await; + server.abort(); + assert_eq!( + fetched.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 1, + "external scheme must be fetched before the split is checked" + ); + + let response_repr = match &result { + Ok(preview) => serde_json::to_string(preview).unwrap(), + Err(err) => format!("{err:?}"), + }; + assert!( + response_repr.contains("invalid_document"), + "unsafe external scheme bundle was not rejected: {response_repr}" + ); + assert!( + !response_repr.contains(std::str::from_utf8(canary).unwrap()), + "credential canary leaked into API response" + ); + assert!( + !storage_contains_literal(&storage_root, canary), + "raw credential literal from split external scheme ref persisted to storage" + ); + assert_rejected_bundle_unpersisted(®istry, &workspace_id, &storage_root).await; +} + +#[tokio::test] +#[serial] +async fn referenced_security_credentials_local_scheme_external_parameter_default_canary_rejected() { + let canary = b"split-local-canary-003-Xv7oI"; + // External document defines a parameter schema whose default is the canary. + let external_doc = format!( + r#"{{"x-key":{{"type":"string","default":"{canary}"}}}}"#, + canary = std::str::from_utf8(canary).unwrap(), + ); + let fetched = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)); + let fetch_count = Arc::clone(&fetched); + let app = Router::new().route( + "/key.yaml", + get(move || { + let fc = Arc::clone(&fetch_count); + async move { + fc.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + external_doc.clone() + } + }), + ); + let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap(); + let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap(); + let server = tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() }); + let origin = format!("http://{address}"); + + let registry = test_registry().await; + let storage_root = test_storage_root("openapi_import_local_scheme_ext_param_canary"); + let service = test_service_with_external_references( + registry.clone(), + storage_root.clone(), + vec![format!("{origin}/")], + ); + let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + // Primary declares the scheme directly (no $ref); parameter schema is + // an external $ref whose resolved default would be the canary. + let upload = OpenApiUpload { + bytes: format!( + r#"{{ + "openapi":"3.1.0", + "info":{{"title":"Local scheme ext param","version":"1"}}, + "servers":[{{"url":"https://api.example.test"}}], + "components":{{ + "securitySchemes":{{"custom":{{"type":"apiKey","in":"header","name":"X-Custom"}}}} + }}, + "security":[{{"custom":[]}}], + "paths":{{ + "/test":{{"get":{{ + "operationId":"test", "security":[{{"custom":[]}}], + "parameters":[{{"name":"X-Custom","in":"header","schema":{{"$ref":"{origin}/key.yaml#/x-key"}}}}], + "responses":{{"200":{{"description":"ok"}}}} + }}}} + }} + }}"#, + origin = origin, + ) + .into_bytes(), + mime_type: "application/json".to_owned(), + locale: OpenApiUploadLocale::En, + }; + let result = service.preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload).await; + server.abort(); + assert_eq!( + fetched.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 1, + "external parameter must be fetched before the split is checked" + ); + + let response_repr = match &result { + Ok(preview) => serde_json::to_string(preview).unwrap(), + Err(err) => format!("{err:?}"), + }; + assert!( + response_repr.contains("invalid_document"), + "unsafe external parameter bundle was not rejected: {response_repr}" + ); + assert!( + !response_repr.contains(std::str::from_utf8(canary).unwrap()), + "credential canary leaked into API response" + ); + assert!( + !storage_contains_literal(&storage_root, canary), + "raw credential literal from external referenced parameter persisted to storage" + ); + assert_rejected_bundle_unpersisted(®istry, &workspace_id, &storage_root).await; +} + +#[tokio::test] +#[serial] +async fn safe_external_security_scheme_and_parameter_are_preserved() { + let external_doc = r#"{"x-scheme":{"type":"apiKey","in":"header","name":"X-Custom"}}"#; + let fetched = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)); + let fetch_count = Arc::clone(&fetched); + let app = Router::new().route( + "/scheme.yaml", + get(move || { + let count = Arc::clone(&fetch_count); + async move { + count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + external_doc + } + }), + ); + let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap(); + let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap(); + let server = tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() }); + let origin = format!("http://{address}"); + + let registry = test_registry().await; + let storage_root = test_storage_root("openapi_import_safe_external_security_ref"); + let service = test_service_with_external_references( + registry.clone(), + storage_root, + vec![format!("{origin}/")], + ); + let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import( + &workspace_id, + OpenApiUpload { + bytes: format!( + r#"openapi: 3.1.0 +info: {{ title: Safe external scheme, version: '1' }} +servers: [{{ url: https://api.example.test }}] +components: + securitySchemes: + custom: {{ $ref: '{origin}/scheme.yaml#/x-scheme' }} +security: [{{ custom: [] }}] +paths: + /test: + get: + operationId: safeExternalSecurity + security: [{{ custom: [] }}] + parameters: + - name: X-Custom + in: header + schema: {{ type: string }} + - name: locale + in: query + schema: {{ type: string, default: en }} + responses: + '200': {{ description: ok }} +"# + ) + .into_bytes(), + mime_type: "application/yaml".to_owned(), + locale: OpenApiUploadLocale::En, + }, + ) + .await + .expect("safe referenced schemes and parameters remain importable"); + server.abort(); + assert_eq!(fetched.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + let operation = preview + .preview + .groups + .iter() + .flat_map(|group| &group.operations) + .find(|operation| operation.key == "GET /test") + .expect("operation preview is preserved"); + assert!(matches!( + &operation.security_schemes["custom"].kind, + crank_import::rest::NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + parameter_name, + location: crank_import::rest::SecurityParameterLocation::Header, + .. + } if parameter_name == "X-Custom" + )); + let input_schema = serde_json::to_value(&operation.draft.input_schema).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + input_schema.pointer("/fields/locale/default_value"), + Some(&serde_json::json!("en")), + "benign locale default must remain visible in the preview" + ); + let job = registry + .get_import_job(&workspace_id, &preview.job_id.as_str().into()) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + job.preview_payload["dependency_snapshots"] + .as_array() + .unwrap() + .len(), + 1 + ); +} + +async fn assert_rejected_bundle_unpersisted( + registry: &crank_registry::PostgresRegistry, + workspace_id: &WorkspaceId, + storage_root: &std::path::Path, +) { + let sources: i64 = + sqlx::query_scalar("select count(*) from artifact_sources where workspace_id = $1") + .bind(workspace_id.as_str()) + .fetch_one(registry.pool()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let jobs: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("select count(*) from import_jobs where workspace_id = $1") + .bind(workspace_id.as_str()) + .fetch_one(registry.pool()) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(sources, 0, "rejected bundle registered a source"); + assert_eq!(jobs, 0, "rejected bundle created an import job"); + assert!( + !storage_has_files(storage_root), + "rejected bundle stored artifact bytes" + ); +} + +fn storage_has_files(path: &std::path::Path) -> bool { + std::fs::read_dir(path).unwrap().any(|entry| { + let path = entry.unwrap().path(); + if path.is_dir() { + storage_has_files(&path) + } else { + true + } + }) +} diff --git a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply.rs b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply.rs index fdd1a2f..d4aeaea 100644 --- a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply.rs +++ b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply.rs @@ -58,6 +58,26 @@ paths: responses: { '200': { description: ok } } "#; +const OPENAPI_TWO_APIKEY_OPERATIONS: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Authenticated Apply test, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +components: { securitySchemes: { apiKey: { type: apiKey, in: header, name: X-Api-Key } } } +security: [{ apiKey: [] }] +paths: + /alpha: { get: { operationId: alpha, responses: { '200': { description: ok } } } } + /beta: { get: { operationId: beta, responses: { '200': { description: ok } } } } +"#; + +const OPENAPI_SINGLE_APIKEY_OPERATION: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Authenticated Apply test, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +components: { securitySchemes: { apiKey: { type: apiKey, in: header, name: X-Api-Key } } } +paths: + /alpha: { get: { operationId: alpha, security: [{ apiKey: [] }], responses: { '200': { description: ok } } } } +"#; + const OPENAPI_WITH_BLOCKER: &str = r#" openapi: 3.0.3 info: { title: Blocked full Apply test } @@ -593,7 +613,7 @@ async fn disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials() { let redacted_plan = create_plan( &client, &base_url, - OPENAPI_TWO_OPERATIONS, + OPENAPI_TWO_APIKEY_OPERATIONS, json!({ "selection_mode": "partial", "selected_operation_keys": ["GET /beta"], @@ -619,7 +639,7 @@ async fn disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials() { let plan = create_plan( &client, &base_url, - OPENAPI_SINGLE, + OPENAPI_SINGLE_APIKEY_OPERATION, json!({ "selection_mode": "full", "selected_operation_keys": [], @@ -657,7 +677,7 @@ async fn disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials() { let plan = create_plan( &client, &base_url, - OPENAPI_SINGLE, + &OPENAPI_SINGLE_APIKEY_OPERATION.replace("X-Api-Key", "X-Changed-Key"), json!({ "selection_mode": "full", "selected_operation_keys": [], @@ -695,6 +715,128 @@ async fn disabled_auth_secret_rejects_apply_without_leaking_credentials() { assert_eq!(after["items"][0]["name"], "beta"); } +#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] +#[serial] +async fn profiles_sharing_active_secret_are_selectable_and_both_block_after_disable() { + let registry = test_registry().await; + let base_url = spawn_admin_api(build_test_app( + registry.clone(), + test_storage_root("import_plan_shared_auth_secret"), + )) + .await; + let client = authorized_client(&base_url).await; + let secret_response = client + .post(format!("{base_url}/secrets")) + .json(&json!({ + "name": "shared-import-auth-token", + "kind": "token", + "value": { "token": "shared-import-canary" } + })) + .send() + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(secret_response.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK); + let secret: Value = secret_response.json().await.unwrap(); + let secret_id = secret["id"].as_str().unwrap(); + let make_profile = |name: &str| { + client + .post(format!("{base_url}/auth-profiles")) + .json(&json!({ + "name": name, + "kind": "api_key_header", + "config": { "api_key_header": { + "header_name": "X-Api-Key", + "secret_id": secret_id + }} + })) + }; + let first: Value = make_profile("shared-auth-a") + .send() + .await + .unwrap() + .json() + .await + .unwrap(); + let second: Value = make_profile("shared-auth-b") + .send() + .await + .unwrap() + .json() + .await + .unwrap(); + let document = r#"{ + "openapi":"3.0.3", + "info":{"title":"Shared profile test","version":"1"}, + "servers":[{"url":"https://api.example.test"}], + "components":{"securitySchemes":{"key":{"type":"apiKey","in":"header","name":"X-Api-Key"}}}, + "paths":{ + "/a":{"get":{"operationId":"sharedA","security":[{"key":[]}],"responses":{"200":{"description":"ok"}}}}, + "/b":{"get":{"operationId":"sharedB","security":[{"key":[]}],"responses":{"200":{"description":"ok"}}}} + } + }"#; + let plan = create_plan( + &client, + &base_url, + document, + json!({ + "selection_mode":"full", + "selected_operation_keys":[], + "decisions":[ + {"operation_key":"GET /a","action":"create","auth_profile_id":first["id"]}, + {"operation_key":"GET /b","action":"create","auth_profile_id":second["id"]} + ] + }), + ) + .await; + let (status, report) = apply_plan(&client, &base_url, &plan, "shared-secret-active").await; + assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::OK, "{report}"); + assert_eq!(operation_list(&client, &base_url).await["total"], 2); + + let first_id = first["id"].as_str().unwrap(); + let second_id = second["id"].as_str().unwrap(); + let disabled_document = document + .replace("sharedA", "sharedAAfterDisable") + .replace("sharedB", "sharedBAfterDisable"); + let mut disabled_plans = Vec::new(); + for (key, profile_id) in [("GET /a", first_id), ("GET /b", second_id)] { + disabled_plans.push(( + key, + create_plan( + &client, + &base_url, + &disabled_document, + json!({ + "selection_mode":"partial", + "selected_operation_keys":[key], + "decisions":[{"operation_key":key,"action":"create","auth_profile_id":profile_id}] + }), + ) + .await, + )); + } + sqlx::query("update secrets set status = 'disabled', updated_at = now() where workspace_id = $1 and id = $2") + .bind("ws_default") + .bind(secret_id) + .execute(registry.pool()) + .await + .unwrap(); + for (key, plan) in disabled_plans { + let (status, error) = apply_plan( + &client, + &base_url, + &plan, + &format!("shared-secret-disabled-{key}"), + ) + .await; + assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::CONFLICT, "{error}"); + assert_eq!( + error["error"]["context"]["error_code"], + "import_plan_auth_unavailable" + ); + assert_eq!(operation_list(&client, &base_url).await["total"], 2); + } +} + #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] #[serial] async fn ac_4_corpus_operation_completes_the_real_http_to_mcp_workflow() { @@ -844,3 +986,4 @@ async fn ac_4_corpus_operation_completes_the_real_http_to_mcp_workflow() { } mod corpus_hostile; +mod security_source; diff --git a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply/corpus_hostile.rs b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply/corpus_hostile.rs index 3eb82e3..8f4cfdb 100644 --- a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply/corpus_hostile.rs +++ b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply/corpus_hostile.rs @@ -45,16 +45,13 @@ async fn ac_5_hostile_corpus_cases_are_bounded_atomic_and_redacted() { ); assert_eq!(operation_list(&client, &base_url).await, before); - let secret = std::fs::read_to_string(root.join("hostile-secret.json")).unwrap(); - let secret_plan = create_plan(&client, &base_url, &secret, full_plan()).await; - let exposed = format!("{}{}", secret_plan.preview, secret_plan.body); - assert!( - !exposed.contains("sk_test_corpus_secret_canary"), - "secret canary leaked into plan evidence" - ); - assert_eq!(operation_list(&client, &base_url).await, before); - - for file in ["hostile-malformed.json", "hostile-oversized.json"] { + // Credential-bearing sources are rejected before their original bytes + // can enter artifact storage, rather than producing a persisted plan. + for file in [ + "hostile-secret.json", + "hostile-malformed.json", + "hostile-oversized.json", + ] { let source = std::fs::read(root.join(file)).unwrap(); let started = std::time::Instant::now(); let upload = reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(source) @@ -90,7 +87,7 @@ async fn ac_5_hostile_corpus_cases_are_bounded_atomic_and_redacted() { // Real HTTP preview+plan: a root security requirement combined with an // explicit empty operation override must leave the public operation - // actionable and block only the inherited one. No Apply mutation follows. + // actionable and leave the inherited one unresolved without a profile. let mixed_security: Value = serde_json::json!({ "openapi": "3.0.3", "info": { "title": "Mixed security plan probe", "version": "1" }, @@ -149,8 +146,8 @@ async fn ac_5_hostile_corpus_cases_are_bounded_atomic_and_redacted() { ); assert_eq!( secured["reason"].as_str(), - Some("unsupported_security_requirement"), - "secured candidate must expose the exact security blocker: {}", + Some("auth_profile_required"), + "secured candidate must expose its unresolved binding: {}", security_plan.body ); assert_eq!( @@ -264,7 +261,7 @@ async fn p0_api_malformed_local_security_is_atomic_across_openapi_versions() { .find(|item| item["key"] == "GET /public") .unwrap(); assert_eq!(bad["state"], "blocked", "{version}: {}", plan.body); - assert_eq!(bad["reason"], "unsupported_security_requirement"); + assert_eq!(bad["reason"], "invalid_security_requirements"); assert_eq!(public["state"], "actionable", "{version}: {}", plan.body); assert!(public["reason"].is_null()); diff --git a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply/security_source.rs b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply/security_source.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b86a587 --- /dev/null +++ b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_apply/security_source.rs @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +use super::*; + +const SECURITY_SOURCE_A: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Security source A, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +components: + securitySchemes: + apiKey: + type: apiKey + in: header + name: X-Api-Key +paths: + /secure: + get: + operationId: secureWithApiKey + security: [{ apiKey: [] }] + responses: { '200': { description: ok } } +"#; + +const SECURITY_SOURCE_B: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Security source A, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +components: + securitySchemes: + apiKey: + type: apiKey + in: header + name: X-Rotated-Key +paths: + /secure: + get: + operationId: secureWithApiKey + security: [{ apiKey: [] }] + responses: { '200': { description: ok } } +"#; + +#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] +#[serial] +async fn changed_security_scheme_invalidates_old_plan_before_draft_creation() { + let registry = test_registry().await; + let storage_root = test_storage_root("import_plan_security_source_change"); + let base_url = spawn_admin_api(build_test_app(registry.clone(), storage_root)).await; + let client = authorized_client(&base_url).await; + + let secret_response = client + .post(format!("{base_url}/secrets")) + .json(&json!({ + "name": "security-source-test-secret", + "kind": "token", + "value": { "token": "source-change-canary" } + })) + .send() + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(secret_response.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK); + let secret: Value = secret_response.json().await.unwrap(); + let profile_response = client + .post(format!("{base_url}/auth-profiles")) + .json(&json!({ + "name": "security-source-test-profile", + "kind": "api_key_header", + "config": { "api_key_header": { + "header_name": "X-Api-Key", + "secret_id": secret["id"] + }} + })) + .send() + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(profile_response.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK); + let profile: Value = profile_response.json().await.unwrap(); + + let plan = create_plan( + &client, + &base_url, + SECURITY_SOURCE_A, + json!({ + "selection_mode": "full", + "selected_operation_keys": [], + "decisions": [{ + "operation_key": "GET /secure", + "action": "create", + "auth_profile_id": profile["id"] + }] + }), + ) + .await; + assert_eq!(plan.body["candidates"][0]["auth_profile_id"], profile["id"]); + assert_eq!(plan.body["candidates"][0]["security_alternative_index"], 0); + let stored_plan = registry + .get_import_plan( + &crank_core::WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"), + &plan.reference.clone().into(), + ) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + stored_plan.payload["candidates"][0]["operation"]["execution_config"]["auth_profile_ref"], + profile["id"], + "the old plan must persist its explicit profile binding" + ); + assert_eq!( + stored_plan.payload["candidates"][0]["auth_requirement"]["parameter_name"], + "X-Api-Key" + ); + + // Register a second immutable source with only the security parameter + // changed. Its own upload/preview proves these are valid changed bytes, + // rather than corruption of the first content-addressed artifact. + let source_b_upload = reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(SECURITY_SOURCE_B.as_bytes().to_vec()) + .file_name("security-b.yaml") + .mime_str("application/yaml") + .unwrap(); + let source_b_response = client + .post(format!("{base_url}/imports/openapi/preview")) + .multipart(reqwest::multipart::Form::new().part("file", source_b_upload)) + .send() + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(source_b_response.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK); + let source_b_preview: Value = source_b_response.json().await.unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + source_b_preview["preview"]["groups"][0]["operations"][0]["security_schemes"]["apiKey"]["kind"] + ["parameter_name"], + "X-Rotated-Key" + ); + let workspace_id = crank_core::WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + let original_job_id: crank_registry::ImportJobId = + plan.preview["job_id"].as_str().unwrap().into(); + let changed_job_id: crank_registry::ImportJobId = + source_b_preview["job_id"].as_str().unwrap().into(); + let original_job = registry + .get_import_job(&workspace_id, &original_job_id) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + let changed_job = registry + .get_import_job(&workspace_id, &changed_job_id) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_ne!( + original_job.preview_payload["source"]["digest"], + changed_job.preview_payload["source"]["digest"], + "the changed scheme must come from a different verified source artifact" + ); + assert_eq!( + stored_plan.payload["source"]["digest"], original_job.preview_payload["source"]["digest"], + "the plan must remain anchored to source A" + ); + + // Simulate the existing new-source/re-preview condition on the anchored + // pending job while retaining its original plan. The replacement is a + // separately registered and digest-verified B snapshot; Apply must + // compare the newly derived fingerprint with the old plan fingerprint. + sqlx::query("update import_jobs set preview_payload = $3 where id = $1 and workspace_id = $2") + .bind(original_job_id.as_str()) + .bind(workspace_id.as_str()) + .bind(&changed_job.preview_payload) + .execute(registry.pool()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let replaced_job = registry + .get_import_job(&workspace_id, &original_job_id) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + replaced_job.preview_payload["source"]["digest"], + changed_job.preview_payload["source"]["digest"] + ); + + let (status, error) = apply_plan(&client, &base_url, &plan, "security-source-changed").await; + assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::CONFLICT, "{error}"); + assert_eq!( + error["error"]["context"]["error_code"], "import_plan_fingerprint_stale", + "the old plan must require re-preview after source security changes" + ); + assert_eq!(error["error"]["context"]["repreview_required"], true); + assert_eq!(operation_list(&client, &base_url).await["total"], 0); +} diff --git a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/creation.rs b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/creation.rs index 77598ea..6e79198 100644 --- a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/creation.rs +++ b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/creation.rs @@ -1,5 +1,21 @@ use super::*; +pub(crate) const OPENAPI_SINGLE_SECURITY: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Import security, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +components: + securitySchemes: + Key: { type: apiKey, in: header, name: X-Api-Key } + Bearer: { type: http, scheme: bearer } +paths: + /v2/latest: + get: + operationId: latestRates + security: [{ Key: [] }, { Bearer: [] }] + responses: { '200': { description: ok } } +"#; + #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] #[serial] async fn full_plan_is_server_authored_with_bounded_confirmation_and_no_mutation() { @@ -636,167 +652,6 @@ async fn exact_skip_rename_and_new_version_decisions_are_saved_verbatim() { assert!(candidate.get("operation").is_none()); } -#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] -#[serial] -async fn auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited() { - let registry = test_registry().await; - let upstream_base_url = spawn_upstream_server().await; - let service = test_service( - registry.clone(), - test_storage_root("openapi_import_plan_auth"), - test_auth_settings(), - test_secret_crypto(), - ); - let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); - - let secret_token = "plan-secret-canary-2-13"; - let secret = service - .create_secret( - &workspace_id, - None, - SecretPayload { - name: "plan-auth-token".to_owned(), - kind: SecretKind::Token, - value: json!({ "token": secret_token }), - }, - None, - ) - .await - .unwrap(); - let auth_profile = service - .create_auth_profile( - &workspace_id, - AuthProfilePayload { - name: "plan-auth-profile".to_owned(), - kind: AuthKind::ApiKeyHeader, - config: AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig { - header_name: "X-Api-Key".to_owned(), - secret_id: SecretId::new(secret.id.as_str()), - }), - }, - None, - ) - .await - .unwrap(); - - let preview = service - .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_SINGLE)) - .await - .unwrap(); - let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); - let plan = service - .create_openapi_import_plan( - &workspace_id, - &job_id, - plan_payload( - "full", - vec![], - vec![decision( - "GET /v2/latest", - "create", - None, - None, - Some(auth_profile.id.as_str()), - )], - ), - ) - .await - .unwrap(); - let stored = registry - .get_import_plan(&workspace_id, &plan.plan_reference.as_str().into()) - .await - .unwrap() - .unwrap(); - assert_eq!( - stored.payload["candidates"][0]["operation"]["execution_config"]["auth_profile_ref"], - auth_profile.id.as_str() - ); - // Only the reference survives: no secret material anywhere in the plan. - assert!(!stored.payload.to_string().contains(secret_token)); - assert_eq!( - plan.candidates.first().unwrap().auth_profile_id.as_deref(), - Some(auth_profile.id.as_str()) - ); - - // An unknown profile reference fails closed in the workspace scope check. - let preview = service - .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_SINGLE)) - .await - .unwrap(); - let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); - let error = service - .create_openapi_import_plan( - &workspace_id, - &job_id, - plan_payload( - "full", - vec![], - vec![decision( - "GET /v2/latest", - "create", - None, - None, - Some("auth_missing_profile"), - )], - ), - ) - .await - .expect_err("an unknown auth profile reference must be rejected"); - assert_error_code(&error, "operation_auth_profile_invalid"); - assert_http_status(error, axum::http::StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY); - - // `new_version` without an explicit choice inherits the target's ref. - let existing = service - .create_operation(&workspace_id, { - let mut payload = test_operation_payload(&upstream_base_url, "latest_rates"); - payload.execution_config.auth_profile_ref = - Some(AuthProfileId::new(auth_profile.id.as_str())); - payload - }) - .await - .expect("an existing operation with the candidate name"); - let preview = service - .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_SINGLE)) - .await - .unwrap(); - let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); - let plan = service - .create_openapi_import_plan( - &workspace_id, - &job_id, - plan_payload( - "full", - vec![], - vec![decision( - "GET /v2/latest", - "new_version", - Some(existing.operation_id.as_str()), - None, - None, - )], - ), - ) - .await - .unwrap(); - let stored = registry - .get_import_plan(&workspace_id, &plan.plan_reference.as_str().into()) - .await - .unwrap() - .unwrap(); - let candidate = &stored.payload["candidates"][0]; - assert_eq!( - candidate["decision"]["auth_profile_id"], - auth_profile.id.as_str(), - "the inherited target reference is reflected in the candidate summary" - ); - assert_eq!( - candidate["operation"]["execution_config"]["auth_profile_ref"], - auth_profile.id.as_str(), - "the inherited target reference must be retained in the snapshot" - ); - assert!(!stored.payload.to_string().contains(secret_token)); -} - #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] #[serial] async fn stale_or_terminal_jobs_preview_again_without_mutating_the_job() { diff --git a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/mod.rs b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/mod.rs index e7d58bf..b2253d7 100644 --- a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/mod.rs +++ b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/mod.rs @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ fn decision( target_operation_id: target.map(ToOwned::to_owned), confirmed_name: name.map(ToOwned::to_owned), auth_profile_id: auth.map(ToOwned::to_owned), + security_alternative_index: None, } } @@ -160,4 +161,7 @@ fn assert_http_status(error: ApiError, expected: axum::http::StatusCode) { } mod creation; +pub(super) use creation::OPENAPI_SINGLE_SECURITY; +mod security_availability; +mod security_binding; mod validation; diff --git a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/security_availability.rs b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/security_availability.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc4d02c --- /dev/null +++ b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/security_availability.rs @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +use super::*; + +const OPENAPI_SECURITY_BINDING: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Security binding availability, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +components: + securitySchemes: + Key: { type: apiKey, in: header, name: X-Api-Key } + Bearer: { type: http, scheme: bearer } +paths: + /v2/latest: + get: + operationId: latestRates + security: [{ Key: [] }, { Bearer: [] }] + responses: { '200': { description: ok } } +"#; + +fn security_upload() -> OpenApiUpload { + OpenApiUpload { + bytes: OPENAPI_SECURITY_BINDING.as_bytes().to_vec(), + mime_type: "application/yaml".to_owned(), + locale: OpenApiUploadLocale::En, + } +} + +fn binding_decision(auth_profile_id: &str) -> OpenApiImportPlanDecision { + let mut binding = decision( + "GET /v2/latest", + "create", + None, + None, + Some(auth_profile_id), + ); + binding.security_alternative_index = Some(0); + binding +} + +#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] +#[serial] +async fn security_binding_refuses_foreign_and_unavailable_auth_material_before_draft() { + let registry = test_registry().await; + let service = test_service( + registry.clone(), + test_storage_root("openapi_plan_security_availability"), + test_auth_settings(), + test_secret_crypto(), + ); + let primary = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + let foreign = WorkspaceId::new("ws_security_foreign"); + let created_at = OffsetDateTime::now_utc(); + registry + .create_workspace(CreateWorkspaceRequest { + workspace: &Workspace { + id: foreign.clone(), + slug: "ws-security-foreign".to_owned(), + display_name: "Foreign security workspace".to_owned(), + status: WorkspaceStatus::Active, + settings: json!({}), + created_at, + updated_at: created_at, + }, + }) + .await + .unwrap(); + + let foreign_canary = "foreign-security-profile-canary"; + let foreign_secret = service + .create_secret( + &foreign, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "foreign-security-secret".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": foreign_canary }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let foreign_profile = service + .create_auth_profile( + &foreign, + AuthProfilePayload { + name: "foreign-security-profile-name".to_owned(), + kind: AuthKind::ApiKeyHeader, + config: AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig { + header_name: "X-Api-Key".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new(foreign_secret.id.as_str()), + }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + + // A foreign profile is absent from the current workspace's advertised + // choices and submission fails with a generic workspace-safe error. + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&primary, security_upload()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let preview_text = serde_json::to_string(&preview).unwrap(); + for private_value in [ + foreign_profile.id.as_str(), + foreign_profile.name.as_str(), + foreign_secret.id.as_str(), + foreign_canary, + ] { + assert!( + !preview_text.contains(private_value), + "foreign profile metadata appeared in preview choices" + ); + } + assert!(preview.security_profile_choices.iter().all(|choice| { + choice + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|profile| profile.id != foreign_profile.id.as_str()) + })); + let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let foreign_error = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &primary, + &job_id, + plan_payload( + "full", + vec![], + vec![binding_decision(foreign_profile.id.as_str())], + ), + ) + .await + .expect_err("a profile from another workspace must not bind"); + assert_error_code(&foreign_error, "import_plan_auth_unavailable"); + let foreign_error_text = format!("{foreign_error:?}"); + assert_http_status(foreign_error, axum::http::StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY); + for private_value in [ + foreign_profile.id.as_str(), + foreign_profile.name.as_str(), + foreign_secret.id.as_str(), + foreign_canary, + ] { + assert!( + !foreign_error_text.contains(private_value), + "foreign profile or secret metadata leaked: {foreign_error_text}" + ); + } + + // A previously valid local profile whose Secret is disabled is removed + // from choices and cannot be used in a newly confirmed ImportPlan. + let disabled_canary = "disabled-security-secret-canary"; + let disabled_secret = service + .create_secret( + &primary, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "disabled-security-secret".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": disabled_canary }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let disabled_profile = service + .create_auth_profile( + &primary, + AuthProfilePayload { + name: "disabled-security-profile".to_owned(), + kind: AuthKind::ApiKeyHeader, + config: AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig { + header_name: "X-Api-Key".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new(disabled_secret.id.as_str()), + }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + sqlx::query( + "update secrets set status = 'disabled', updated_at = now() where workspace_id = $1 and id = $2", + ) + .bind(primary.as_str()) + .bind(disabled_secret.id.as_str()) + .execute(registry.pool()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&primary, security_upload()) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert!(preview.security_profile_choices.iter().all(|choice| { + choice + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|profile| profile.id != disabled_profile.id.as_str()) + })); + let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let disabled_error = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &primary, + &job_id, + plan_payload( + "full", + vec![], + vec![binding_decision(disabled_profile.id.as_str())], + ), + ) + .await + .expect_err("a disabled linked Secret must reject the profile binding"); + assert_error_code(&disabled_error, "secret_not_active"); + let disabled_error_text = format!("{disabled_error:?}"); + assert!(!disabled_error_text.contains(disabled_canary)); + + // A profile whose active Secret has no stored current version is equally + // unavailable. Direct SQL models the broken persisted reference while + // retaining the real Admin preview and plan validation paths. + let missing_version_canary = "missing-version-security-canary"; + let missing_version_secret = service + .create_secret( + &primary, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "missing-version-security-secret".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": missing_version_canary }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let missing_version_profile = service + .create_auth_profile( + &primary, + AuthProfilePayload { + name: "missing-version-security-profile".to_owned(), + kind: AuthKind::ApiKeyHeader, + config: AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig { + header_name: "X-Api-Key".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new(missing_version_secret.id.as_str()), + }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + sqlx::query("delete from secret_versions where secret_id = $1 and version = 1") + .bind(missing_version_secret.id.as_str()) + .execute(registry.pool()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&primary, security_upload()) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert!(preview.security_profile_choices.iter().all(|choice| { + choice + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|profile| profile.id != missing_version_profile.id.as_str()) + })); + let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let missing_version_error = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &primary, + &job_id, + plan_payload( + "full", + vec![], + vec![binding_decision(missing_version_profile.id.as_str())], + ), + ) + .await + .expect_err("a Secret without a current version must reject the profile binding"); + assert_error_code(&missing_version_error, "operation_auth_profile_invalid"); + let missing_version_error_text = format!("{missing_version_error:?}"); + for private_value in [ + missing_version_profile.id.as_str(), + missing_version_profile.name.as_str(), + missing_version_secret.id.as_str(), + missing_version_canary, + ] { + assert!( + !missing_version_error_text.contains(private_value), + "missing-version Secret metadata leaked: {missing_version_error_text}" + ); + } + assert!( + service.list_operations(&primary).await.unwrap().is_empty(), + "no unavailable profile binding may create a Draft" + ); +} diff --git a/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/security_binding.rs b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/security_binding.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0394e9b --- /dev/null +++ b/apps/admin-api/tests/integration/openapi_import/import_plan_create/security_binding.rs @@ -0,0 +1,732 @@ +use super::*; + +const OPENAPI_SINGLE_PUBLIC: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Public import, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +paths: + /v2/latest: + get: + operationId: latestRates + responses: { '200': { description: ok } } +"#; + +const OPENAPI_SINGLE_EXPLICIT_NO_AUTH: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Explicit no auth import, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +paths: + /v2/latest: + get: + operationId: latestRates + security: [] + responses: { '200': { description: ok } } +"#; + +const OPENAPI_BASIC_AND_QUERY_SECURITY: &str = r#" +openapi: 3.0.3 +info: { title: Basic and query import, version: '1' } +servers: [{ url: https://api.example.test }] +components: + securitySchemes: + Basic: { type: http, scheme: basic } + QueryKey: { type: apiKey, in: query, name: access_token } +paths: + /v2/basic: + get: + operationId: basicRates + security: [{ Basic: [] }, { QueryKey: [] }] + responses: { '200': { description: ok } } + /v2/query: + get: + operationId: queryRates + security: [{ Basic: [] }, { QueryKey: [] }] + responses: { '200': { description: ok } } +"#; + +#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] +#[serial] +async fn auth_profile_references_are_validated_stored_and_inherited() { + let registry = test_registry().await; + let upstream_base_url = spawn_upstream_server().await; + let service = test_service( + registry.clone(), + test_storage_root("openapi_import_plan_auth"), + test_auth_settings(), + test_secret_crypto(), + ); + let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + + let secret_token = "plan-secret-canary-2-13"; + let secret = service + .create_secret( + &workspace_id, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "plan-auth-token".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": secret_token }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let auth_profile = service + .create_auth_profile( + &workspace_id, + AuthProfilePayload { + name: "plan-auth-profile".to_owned(), + kind: AuthKind::ApiKeyHeader, + config: AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig { + header_name: "X-Api-Key".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new(secret.id.as_str()), + }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let bearer_secret = service + .create_secret( + &workspace_id, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "plan-bearer-token".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": "bearer-choice-canary" }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let bearer_profile = service + .create_auth_profile( + &workspace_id, + AuthProfilePayload { + name: "plan-bearer-profile".to_owned(), + kind: AuthKind::Bearer, + config: AuthConfig::Bearer(crank_core::BearerAuthConfig { + header_name: "Authorization".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new(bearer_secret.id.as_str()), + }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_SINGLE_SECURITY)) + .await + .unwrap(); + let selectable = preview + .security_profile_choices + .iter() + .find(|choice| choice.operation_key == "GET /v2/latest" && choice.alternative_index == 0) + .expect("preview must expose choices for supported security alternatives"); + assert!(selectable.profiles.iter().any(|choice| { + choice.id == auth_profile.id.as_str() && choice.kind == AuthKind::ApiKeyHeader + })); + assert!( + selectable + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|choice| { choice.id != bearer_profile.id.as_str() }) + ); + let bearer_choice = preview + .security_profile_choices + .iter() + .find(|choice| choice.operation_key == "GET /v2/latest" && choice.alternative_index == 1) + .expect("preview must expose profile choices for the second OR alternative"); + assert!(bearer_choice.profiles.iter().any(|choice| { + choice.id == bearer_profile.id.as_str() && choice.kind == AuthKind::Bearer + })); + assert!( + bearer_choice + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|choice| { choice.id != auth_profile.id.as_str() }) + ); + let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let mut auth_decision = decision( + "GET /v2/latest", + "create", + None, + None, + Some(auth_profile.id.as_str()), + ); + auth_decision.security_alternative_index = Some(0); + let plan = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &job_id, + plan_payload("full", vec![], vec![auth_decision]), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let stored = registry + .get_import_plan(&workspace_id, &plan.plan_reference.as_str().into()) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + stored.payload["candidates"][0]["operation"]["execution_config"]["auth_profile_ref"], + auth_profile.id.as_str() + ); + assert_eq!( + stored.payload["candidates"][0]["decision"]["security_alternative_index"], + 0 + ); + // Only the reference survives: no secret material anywhere in the plan. + assert!(!stored.payload.to_string().contains(secret_token)); + assert_eq!( + plan.candidates.first().unwrap().auth_profile_id.as_deref(), + Some(auth_profile.id.as_str()) + ); + + let mut bearer_decision = decision( + "GET /v2/latest", + "create", + None, + None, + Some(bearer_profile.id.as_str()), + ); + bearer_decision.security_alternative_index = Some(1); + let bearer_plan = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &job_id, + plan_payload("full", vec![], vec![bearer_decision]), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let stored_bearer = registry + .get_import_plan(&workspace_id, &bearer_plan.plan_reference.as_str().into()) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + stored_bearer.payload["candidates"][0]["operation"]["execution_config"]["auth_profile_ref"], + bearer_profile.id.as_str() + ); + assert_eq!( + stored_bearer.payload["candidates"][0]["decision"]["security_alternative_index"], + 1 + ); + assert!( + !stored_bearer + .payload + .to_string() + .contains("bearer-choice-canary") + ); + + // An unknown profile reference fails closed in the workspace scope check. + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_SINGLE_SECURITY)) + .await + .unwrap(); + let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let error = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &job_id, + plan_payload( + "full", + vec![], + vec![decision( + "GET /v2/latest", + "create", + None, + None, + Some("auth_missing_profile"), + )], + ), + ) + .await + .expect_err("an unknown auth profile reference must be rejected"); + assert_error_code(&error, "import_plan_auth_unavailable"); + assert_http_status(error, axum::http::StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY); + + // `new_version` without an explicit choice inherits the target's ref. + let existing = service + .create_operation(&workspace_id, { + let mut payload = test_operation_payload(&upstream_base_url, "latest_rates"); + payload.execution_config.auth_profile_ref = + Some(AuthProfileId::new(auth_profile.id.as_str())); + payload + }) + .await + .expect("an existing operation with the candidate name"); + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_SINGLE_SECURITY)) + .await + .unwrap(); + let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let plan = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &job_id, + plan_payload( + "full", + vec![], + vec![decision( + "GET /v2/latest", + "new_version", + Some(existing.operation_id.as_str()), + None, + None, + )], + ), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let stored = registry + .get_import_plan(&workspace_id, &plan.plan_reference.as_str().into()) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + let candidate = &stored.payload["candidates"][0]; + assert_eq!( + candidate["decision"]["auth_profile_id"], + auth_profile.id.as_str(), + "the inherited target reference is reflected in the candidate summary" + ); + assert_eq!( + candidate["operation"]["execution_config"]["auth_profile_ref"], + auth_profile.id.as_str(), + "the inherited target reference must be retained in the snapshot" + ); + assert!(!stored.payload.to_string().contains(secret_token)); + + let public_preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_SINGLE_PUBLIC)) + .await + .unwrap(); + let public_job_id: ImportJobId = public_preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let public_plan = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &public_job_id, + plan_payload( + "full", + vec![], + vec![decision( + "GET /v2/latest", + "new_version", + Some(existing.operation_id.as_str()), + None, + None, + )], + ), + ) + .await + .expect("a no-security source may inherit the target's existing profile"); + let public_stored = registry + .get_import_plan(&workspace_id, &public_plan.plan_reference.as_str().into()) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + public_stored.payload["candidates"][0]["auth_requirement"]["kind"], "unconstrained", + "no source security declaration is represented explicitly for transactional Apply" + ); + let report = service + .apply_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &crank_registry::ImportPlanId::new(public_plan.plan_reference.clone()), + admin_api::service::OpenApiImportPlanApplyPayload { + plan_digest: public_plan.plan_digest.clone(), + idempotency_key: "new-version-inherited-public".to_owned(), + }, + ) + .await + .expect("Apply must retain profile and Secret transactional validation"); + assert_eq!( + report.status, + crank_registry::ImportPlanApplyStatus::Applied + ); + assert_eq!( + report.outcomes[0].outcome, + crank_registry::ImportPlanCandidateOutcome::Versioned + ); + assert_eq!(report.outcomes[0].version, Some(2)); + let operation = service + .list_operations(&workspace_id) + .await + .unwrap() + .into_iter() + .find(|operation| operation.id == existing.operation_id.as_str()) + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(operation.current_draft_version, 2); + + let explicit_no_auth_preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_SINGLE_EXPLICIT_NO_AUTH)) + .await + .unwrap(); + let explicit_no_auth_job_id: ImportJobId = explicit_no_auth_preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let incompatible_profile_decision = decision( + "GET /v2/latest", + "new_version", + Some(existing.operation_id.as_str()), + None, + Some(auth_profile.id.as_str()), + ); + let error = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &explicit_no_auth_job_id, + plan_payload("full", vec![], vec![incompatible_profile_decision]), + ) + .await + .expect_err("explicit Auth Profile stays incompatible with security: []"); + assert_error_code(&error, "import_plan_auth_incompatible"); + + let explicit_no_auth_plan = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &explicit_no_auth_job_id, + plan_payload( + "full", + vec![], + vec![decision( + "GET /v2/latest", + "new_version", + Some(existing.operation_id.as_str()), + None, + None, + )], + ), + ) + .await + .expect("an explicit empty security requirement clears inherited auth"); + let no_auth_stored = registry + .get_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &explicit_no_auth_plan.plan_reference.as_str().into(), + ) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert!(no_auth_stored.payload["candidates"][0]["operation"]["execution_config"] + ["auth_profile_ref"] + .is_null()); + let no_auth_report = service + .apply_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &crank_registry::ImportPlanId::new(explicit_no_auth_plan.plan_reference.clone()), + admin_api::service::OpenApiImportPlanApplyPayload { + plan_digest: explicit_no_auth_plan.plan_digest.clone(), + idempotency_key: "new-version-explicit-no-auth".to_owned(), + }, + ) + .await + .expect("explicit no-auth new_version applies without inherited credentials"); + assert_eq!( + no_auth_report.outcomes[0].outcome, + crank_registry::ImportPlanCandidateOutcome::Versioned + ); + assert_eq!(no_auth_report.outcomes[0].version, Some(3)); + let operation = service + .list_operations(&workspace_id) + .await + .unwrap() + .into_iter() + .find(|operation| operation.id == existing.operation_id.as_str()) + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(operation.current_draft_version, 3); + let operation_id = OperationId::new(existing.operation_id.clone()); + let version = registry + .get_operation_version(&workspace_id, &operation_id, 3) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert!(version.snapshot.execution_config.auth_profile_ref.is_none()); +} + +#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")] +#[serial] +async fn basic_and_query_profiles_bind_to_matching_security_alternatives_and_apply() { + let registry = test_registry().await; + let service = test_service( + registry.clone(), + test_storage_root("openapi_import_plan_basic_query_auth"), + test_auth_settings(), + test_secret_crypto(), + ); + let workspace_id = WorkspaceId::new("ws_default"); + + let username_secret = service + .create_secret( + &workspace_id, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "basic-username".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": "plan-user" }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let password_secret = service + .create_secret( + &workspace_id, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "basic-password".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": "plan-password-canary" }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let basic_profile = service + .create_auth_profile( + &workspace_id, + AuthProfilePayload { + name: "basic-profile".to_owned(), + kind: AuthKind::Basic, + config: AuthConfig::Basic(crank_core::BasicAuthConfig { + username_secret_id: SecretId::new(username_secret.id.as_str()), + password_secret_id: SecretId::new(password_secret.id.as_str()), + }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let query_secret = service + .create_secret( + &workspace_id, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "query-key".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": "query-key-canary" }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let query_profile = service + .create_auth_profile( + &workspace_id, + AuthProfilePayload { + name: "query-profile".to_owned(), + kind: AuthKind::ApiKeyQuery, + config: AuthConfig::ApiKeyQuery(crank_core::ApiKeyQueryAuthConfig { + param_name: "access_token".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new(query_secret.id.as_str()), + }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let incompatible_secret = service + .create_secret( + &workspace_id, + None, + SecretPayload { + name: "incompatible-token".to_owned(), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + value: json!({ "token": "incompatible-canary" }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let incompatible_profile = service + .create_auth_profile( + &workspace_id, + AuthProfilePayload { + name: "incompatible-bearer-profile".to_owned(), + kind: AuthKind::Bearer, + config: AuthConfig::Bearer(crank_core::BearerAuthConfig { + header_name: "Authorization".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new(incompatible_secret.id.as_str()), + }), + }, + None, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + + let preview = service + .preview_openapi_import(&workspace_id, upload(OPENAPI_BASIC_AND_QUERY_SECURITY)) + .await + .unwrap(); + for operation_key in ["GET /v2/basic", "GET /v2/query"] { + let basic_alternative = preview + .security_profile_choices + .iter() + .find(|choice| choice.operation_key == operation_key && choice.alternative_index == 0) + .expect("Basic alternative must be represented in preview"); + assert!(basic_alternative.profiles.iter().any(|choice| { + choice.id == basic_profile.id.as_str() && choice.kind == AuthKind::Basic + })); + assert!( + basic_alternative + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|choice| choice.id != query_profile.id.as_str()) + ); + assert!( + basic_alternative + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|choice| choice.id != incompatible_profile.id.as_str()) + ); + + let query_alternative = preview + .security_profile_choices + .iter() + .find(|choice| choice.operation_key == operation_key && choice.alternative_index == 1) + .expect("query alternative must be represented in preview"); + assert!(query_alternative.profiles.iter().any(|choice| { + choice.id == query_profile.id.as_str() && choice.kind == AuthKind::ApiKeyQuery + })); + assert!( + query_alternative + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|choice| choice.id != basic_profile.id.as_str()) + ); + assert!( + query_alternative + .profiles + .iter() + .all(|choice| choice.id != incompatible_profile.id.as_str()) + ); + } + + let job_id: ImportJobId = preview.job_id.as_str().into(); + let mut basic_decision = decision( + "GET /v2/basic", + "create", + None, + None, + Some(basic_profile.id.as_str()), + ); + basic_decision.security_alternative_index = Some(0); + let basic_plan = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &job_id, + plan_payload( + "partial", + vec!["GET /v2/basic".to_owned()], + vec![basic_decision], + ), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(basic_plan.counts.actionable, 1); + let basic_candidate = basic_plan + .candidates + .iter() + .find(|candidate| candidate.key == "GET /v2/basic") + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + basic_candidate.auth_profile_id.as_deref(), + Some(basic_profile.id.as_str()) + ); + + let mut query_decision = decision( + "GET /v2/query", + "create", + None, + None, + Some(query_profile.id.as_str()), + ); + query_decision.security_alternative_index = Some(1); + let query_plan = service + .create_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &job_id, + plan_payload( + "partial", + vec!["GET /v2/query".to_owned()], + vec![query_decision], + ), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(query_plan.counts.actionable, 1); + let query_candidate = query_plan + .candidates + .iter() + .find(|candidate| candidate.key == "GET /v2/query") + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + query_candidate.auth_profile_id.as_deref(), + Some(query_profile.id.as_str()) + ); + + for (plan, expected_profile, idempotency_key) in [ + ( + &basic_plan, + basic_profile.id.as_str(), + "apply-basic-profile", + ), + ( + &query_plan, + query_profile.id.as_str(), + "apply-query-profile", + ), + ] { + let report = service + .apply_openapi_import_plan( + &workspace_id, + &crank_registry::ImportPlanId::new(plan.plan_reference.clone()), + admin_api::service::OpenApiImportPlanApplyPayload { + plan_digest: plan.plan_digest.clone(), + idempotency_key: idempotency_key.to_owned(), + }, + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + report.status, + crank_registry::ImportPlanApplyStatus::Applied + ); + let operation_id = OperationId::new(report.outcomes[0].operation_id.clone().unwrap()); + let version = registry + .get_operation_version(&workspace_id, &operation_id, 1) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + version + .snapshot + .execution_config + .auth_profile_ref + .as_ref() + .map(|profile_id| profile_id.as_str()), + Some(expected_profile) + ); + } + let basic_stored = registry + .get_import_plan(&workspace_id, &basic_plan.plan_reference.as_str().into()) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert!( + !basic_stored + .payload + .to_string() + .contains("plan-password-canary") + ); + let query_stored = registry + .get_import_plan(&workspace_id, &query_plan.plan_reference.as_str().into()) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert!( + !query_stored + .payload + .to_string() + .contains("query-key-canary") + ); +} diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/legacy_payload.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/legacy_payload.rs index 888f6c2..e950ea2 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/legacy_payload.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/legacy_payload.rs @@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ pub fn candidate_from_operation( key: operation.key.clone(), method: operation.method, path: operation.path.clone(), + security_requirements: Default::default(), + security_schemes: BTreeMap::new(), operation_id: operation.operation_id.clone(), suggested_name: name, suggested_display_name: display_name, diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/metadata_findings.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/metadata_findings.rs index 5d23e00..8f09256 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/metadata_findings.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/metadata_findings.rs @@ -1,70 +1,444 @@ use serde_json::Value; +use std::collections::BTreeSet; use crate::rest::{ model::{ImportFinding, SourceLocation}, recommendations::document_finding, }; -pub(super) fn collect_secret_like_examples( - value: &Value, +pub(super) const REDACTED_LITERAL: &str = "[REDACTED]"; + +/// Redacts credential-like literals before they enter the normalized tree, +/// while retaining stable source locations for review findings. +pub(super) fn redact_secret_like_literals( + value: &mut Value, pointer: &str, - inside_example: bool, findings: &mut Vec, locations: &mut Vec>, ) { + let declared_names = credential_names(std::iter::once(&*value)); + redact_secret_like_literals_with_names(value, pointer, &declared_names, findings, locations); +} + +pub(super) fn redact_secret_like_literals_with_names( + value: &mut Value, + pointer: &str, + declared_names: &CredentialNames, + findings: &mut Vec, + locations: &mut Vec>, +) { + visit( + value, + pointer, + VisitContext { + in_secret_example: false, + sensitive_parameter_schema: false, + force_redact: false, + declared_names, + }, + findings, + locations, + ); +} + +#[derive(Default)] +pub(super) struct CredentialNames { + header: BTreeSet, + query: BTreeSet, + cookie: BTreeSet, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +struct VisitContext<'a> { + in_secret_example: bool, + sensitive_parameter_schema: bool, + force_redact: bool, + declared_names: &'a CredentialNames, +} + +impl CredentialNames { + fn contains(&self, location: &str, name: &str) -> bool { + let names = match location.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() { + "header" => &self.header, + "query" => &self.query, + "cookie" => &self.cookie, + _ => return false, + }; + names.contains(&name.to_ascii_lowercase()) + } +} + +pub(super) fn credential_names<'a>(roots: impl IntoIterator) -> CredentialNames { + let mut names = CredentialNames::default(); + for root in roots { + collect_credential_names(root, &mut names); + } + names +} + +fn collect_credential_names(value: &Value, names: &mut CredentialNames) { match value { Value::Object(fields) => { + if fields.get("type").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("apiKey") + && let (Some(location), Some(name)) = ( + fields.get("in").and_then(Value::as_str), + fields.get("name").and_then(Value::as_str), + ) + { + let destination = match location.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() { + "header" => Some(&mut names.header), + "query" => Some(&mut names.query), + "cookie" => Some(&mut names.cookie), + _ => None, + }; + if let Some(destination) = destination { + destination.insert(name.to_ascii_lowercase()); + } + } + for child in fields.values() { + collect_credential_names(child, names); + } + } + Value::Array(items) => { + for child in items { + collect_credential_names(child, names); + } + } + _ => {} + } +} + +fn visit( + value: &mut Value, + pointer: &str, + context: VisitContext<'_>, + findings: &mut Vec, + locations: &mut Vec>, +) { + if context.force_redact + || value + .as_str() + .is_some_and(|text| url_has_secret_named(text, context.declared_names)) + || (context.in_secret_example && value.as_str() == Some(REDACTED_LITERAL)) + || (context.in_secret_example && scalar_looks_secret(value)) + { + redact(value, context.force_redact, context.declared_names); + findings.push(document_finding( + "secret_like_example", + "В исходном документе обнаружено значение, похожее на секрет; оно удалено из импортируемых данных.", + )); + locations.push(Some(SourceLocation { + pointer: pointer.to_owned(), + })); + return; + } + + match value { + Value::Object(fields) => { + let sensitive_parameter = + fields + .get("in") + .and_then(Value::as_str) + .is_some_and(|location| { + ["header", "query", "cookie"] + .iter() + .any(|allowed| location.eq_ignore_ascii_case(allowed)) + }) + && fields + .get("name") + .and_then(Value::as_str) + .is_some_and(|name| { + is_sensitive_name(name) + || fields.get("in").and_then(Value::as_str).is_some_and( + |location| context.declared_names.contains(location, name), + ) + }); for (key, child) in fields { let child_pointer = format!( "{pointer}/{}", super::normalize_coverage::escape_pointer(key) ); - collect_secret_like_examples( + let key_lower = key.to_ascii_lowercase(); + let in_example = context.in_secret_example + || matches!( + key_lower.as_str(), + "default" + | "example" + | "examples" + | "x-example" + | "x-examples" + | "bearerformat" + | "x-format-hint" + ); + let sensitive_header_definition = pointer.ends_with("/headers") + && (is_sensitive_name(key) || context.declared_names.contains("header", key)); + let parameter_value = (sensitive_parameter || sensitive_header_definition) + && matches!( + key_lower.as_str(), + "example" | "examples" | "x-example" | "x-examples" + ); + let parameter_schema = context.sensitive_parameter_schema + || sensitive_header_definition + || (sensitive_parameter && key_lower == "schema"); + let parent_is_secret_property = + pointer.rsplit('/').next().is_some_and(is_sensitive_name); + // Names in schema/scheme maps and security requirements are + // identifiers, not credential values. Traverse their metadata + // and redact the actual defaults/examples instead. + let identifier_map = (child.is_object() + && (pointer.ends_with("/properties") + || pointer.ends_with("/headers") + || pointer == "/components/schemas" + || pointer == "/definitions" + || pointer == "/components/securitySchemes" + || pointer == "/securityDefinitions")) + || (child.is_array() + && pointer.rsplit_once('/').is_some_and(|(parent, index)| { + parent.ends_with("/security") && index.parse::().is_ok() + })); + let force_child = (is_sensitive_name(key) && !identifier_map) + || (matches!(key_lower.as_str(), "default" | "example" | "examples") + && parent_is_secret_property) + || parameter_value + || (sensitive_parameter + && matches!(key_lower.as_str(), "default" | "example" | "examples")) + || (parameter_schema + && matches!(key_lower.as_str(), "default" | "example" | "examples")); + visit( child, &child_pointer, - inside_example || matches!(key.as_str(), "example" | "examples"), + VisitContext { + in_secret_example: in_example, + sensitive_parameter_schema: parameter_schema, + force_redact: force_child, + ..context + }, findings, locations, ); } } Value::Array(items) => { - for (index, child) in items.iter().enumerate() { - collect_secret_like_examples( + for (index, child) in items.iter_mut().enumerate() { + visit( child, &format!("{pointer}/{index}"), - inside_example, + VisitContext { + force_redact: false, + ..context + }, findings, locations, ); } } - Value::String(value) if inside_example && looks_secret_like(pointer, value) => { - findings.push(document_finding( - "secret_like_example", - "Example содержит значение, похожее на секрет, и не включается в executable contract.", - )); - locations.push(Some(SourceLocation { - pointer: pointer.to_owned(), - })); - } _ => {} } } -fn looks_secret_like(pointer: &str, value: &str) -> bool { - let pointer = pointer.to_ascii_lowercase(); +fn is_sensitive_name(name: &str) -> bool { + let lower = name.to_ascii_lowercase(); + if lower.starts_with('/') + || matches!( + lower.as_str(), + "url" + | "tokenurl" + | "authorizationurl" + | "refreshurl" + | "openidconnecturl" + | "clientcredentials" + | "authorizationcode" + ) + { + return false; + } + let compact = lower.replace(['-', '_'], ""); + [ + "token", + "secret", + "password", + "credential", + "authorization", + "apikey", + "accesskey", + "ciphertext", + "privatekey", + "passwd", + ] + .iter() + .any(|marker| compact.contains(marker)) +} + +fn scalar_looks_secret(value: &Value) -> bool { + let Value::String(value) = value else { + return false; + }; let value = value.to_ascii_lowercase(); [ "token", "secret", "password", + "credential", + "authorization", "api_key", "apikey", - "authorization", ] .iter() - .any(|marker| pointer.contains(marker) || value.contains(marker)) + .any(|marker| value.contains(marker)) || value.starts_with("bearer ") || value.starts_with("sk-") + || looks_like_jwt(&value) +} + +fn looks_like_jwt(value: &str) -> bool { + let mut segments = value.split('.'); + let (Some(header), Some(payload), Some(signature), None) = ( + segments.next(), + segments.next(), + segments.next(), + segments.next(), + ) else { + return false; + }; + header.starts_with("eyj") + && !payload.is_empty() + && signature.len() >= 8 + && [header, payload, signature].iter().all(|segment| { + segment + .bytes() + .all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(byte, b'_' | b'-')) + }) +} + +pub(super) fn url_has_secret(value: &str) -> bool { + url_has_secret_named(value, &CredentialNames::default()) +} + +fn url_has_secret_named(value: &str, declared_names: &CredentialNames) -> bool { + url_userinfo(value).is_some() + || query_has_secret_parameter(value, &declared_names.query) + || fragment_has_secret_parameter(value) +} + +fn fragment_has_secret_parameter(value: &str) -> bool { + let Some((_, fragment)) = value.split_once('#') else { + return false; + }; + if fragment.starts_with('/') { + return false; + } + url::form_urlencoded::parse(fragment.as_bytes()).any(|(name, _)| is_sensitive_name(&name)) +} + +fn redact_url_fragment(value: &str) -> String { + let Some((base, fragment)) = value.split_once('#') else { + return value.to_owned(); + }; + if fragment.starts_with('/') || !fragment.contains('=') { + return value.to_owned(); + } + let redacted = fragment + .split('&') + .map(|pair| { + let (name, parameter_value) = pair.split_once('=').unwrap_or((pair, "")); + let decoded_name = url::form_urlencoded::parse(format!("{name}=").as_bytes()) + .next() + .map(|(name, _)| name.into_owned()) + .unwrap_or_default(); + if is_sensitive_name(&decoded_name) { + format!("{name}={REDACTED_LITERAL}") + } else if pair.contains('=') { + format!("{name}={parameter_value}") + } else { + name.to_owned() + } + }) + .collect::>() + .join("&"); + format!("{base}#{redacted}") +} + +fn url_userinfo(value: &str) -> Option<(&str, &str, &str)> { + let (scheme, rest) = value + .split_once("://") + .or_else(|| value.strip_prefix("//").map(|rest| ("", rest)))?; + let (authority, suffix) = rest + .find(['/', '?', '#']) + .map_or((rest, ""), |index| (&rest[..index], &rest[index..])); + let (userinfo, host) = authority.split_once('@')?; + if userinfo.is_empty() || host.is_empty() { + return None; + } + Some((scheme, host, suffix)) +} + +fn query_has_secret_parameter(value: &str, declared_query_names: &BTreeSet) -> bool { + let Some((_, query)) = value.split_once('?') else { + return false; + }; + let query = query.split('#').next().unwrap_or(query); + url::form_urlencoded::parse(query.as_bytes()).any(|(name, _)| { + is_sensitive_name(&name) || declared_query_names.contains(&name.to_ascii_lowercase()) + }) +} + +fn redact(value: &mut Value, force: bool, declared_names: &CredentialNames) { + if force + || !value + .as_str() + .is_some_and(|text| url_has_secret_named(text, declared_names)) + { + *value = Value::String(REDACTED_LITERAL.to_owned()); + return; + } + if let Value::String(text) = value { + if force { + *text = REDACTED_LITERAL.to_owned(); + return; + } + let mut sanitized = text.clone(); + if let Some((scheme, host, suffix)) = url_userinfo(&sanitized) { + sanitized = if scheme.is_empty() { + format!("//{host}{suffix}") + } else { + format!("{scheme}://{host}{suffix}") + }; + } + if query_has_secret_parameter(&sanitized, &declared_names.query) + && let Some((base, query)) = sanitized.split_once('?') + { + let (query, fragment) = query + .split_once('#') + .map_or((query, None), |(query, fragment)| (query, Some(fragment))); + let redacted = query + .split('&') + .map(|pair| { + let (name, value) = pair.split_once('=').unwrap_or((pair, "")); + let decoded_name = url::form_urlencoded::parse(format!("{name}=").as_bytes()) + .next() + .map(|(name, _)| name.into_owned()) + .unwrap_or_default(); + if is_sensitive_name(&decoded_name) + || declared_names + .query + .contains(&decoded_name.to_ascii_lowercase()) + { + format!("{name}={REDACTED_LITERAL}") + } else if pair.contains('=') { + format!("{name}={value}") + } else { + name.to_owned() + } + }) + .collect::>() + .join("&"); + sanitized = match fragment { + Some(fragment) => format!("{base}?{redacted}#{fragment}"), + None => format!("{base}?{redacted}"), + }; + } + *text = redact_url_fragment(&sanitized); + } else { + *value = Value::String(REDACTED_LITERAL.to_owned()); + } } diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/mod.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/mod.rs index d04742c..14d55fa 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/mod.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/mod.rs @@ -15,26 +15,36 @@ mod normalize_schema; mod normalize_security; mod openapi3; mod openapi3_findings; +mod parser_findings; mod payload; mod recommendations; mod reference; mod schema; +mod security; +mod source_safety; mod swagger2; mod swagger2_findings; pub use model::{ - ExternalDocumentSnapshot, ImportFinding, ImportFindingSeverity, ImportGroupPreview, - ImportOperationCandidate, ImportPreview, ImportSourcePreview, NORMALIZER_VERSION, - NormalizationConfig, NormalizedFinding, NormalizedIr, NormalizedOperation, NormalizedParameter, - NormalizedReference, NormalizedRequestBodyVariant, NormalizedResponseVariant, NormalizedSchema, - NormalizedSchemaConstraints, NormalizedSchemaKind, PROJECTION_VERSION, ResolvedReferenceEdge, - ResolvedReferenceGraph, ResolvedReferenceNode, RestImportCandidate, RestImportDocument, - RestImportOperation, RestImportParameter, RestParameterLocation, RestRequestBodyVariant, - RestResponseVariant, SourceDigest, SourceIdentity, SourceLocation, UnresolvedReference, + ExternalDocumentSnapshot, HISTORICAL_NORMALIZER_VERSION, HISTORICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION, + ImportFinding, ImportFindingSeverity, ImportGroupPreview, ImportOperationCandidate, + ImportPreview, ImportSourcePreview, NORMALIZER_VERSION, NormalizationConfig, NormalizedFinding, + NormalizedIr, NormalizedOperation, NormalizedParameter, NormalizedReference, + NormalizedRequestBodyVariant, NormalizedResponseVariant, NormalizedSchema, + NormalizedSchemaConstraints, NormalizedSchemaKind, NormalizedSecurityRequirements, + NormalizedSecurityScheme, NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind, PROJECTION_VERSION, + ResolvedReferenceEdge, ResolvedReferenceGraph, ResolvedReferenceNode, RestImportCandidate, + RestImportDocument, RestImportOperation, RestImportParameter, RestParameterLocation, + RestRequestBodyVariant, RestResponseVariant, SecurityParameterLocation, + SecurityRequirementAlternative, SecurityRequirementsSource, SourceDigest, SourceIdentity, + SourceLocation, UnresolvedReference, }; pub use normalize::{ ImportParseError, external_reference_uris, normalize_verified_bundle, normalize_verified_document, preview_document, preview_document_legacy_v1, preview_from_ir, - reference_uris, validate_normalized_ir, + reference_uris, validate_document_source_safe, validate_normalized_ir, }; pub use payload::operation_draft_from_candidate; +pub use source_safety::{ + validate_document_bundle_source_safe, validate_resolved_bundle_source_safe, +}; diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/model.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/model.rs index dc75cbe..648aac6 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/model.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/model.rs @@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ use serde_json::Value; /// The immutable contract used to normalize an OpenAPI source. These names /// deliberately travel with an import job: changing either contract must not /// silently reinterpret a pending preview. -pub const NORMALIZER_VERSION: &str = "normalized-ir-v4"; -pub const PROJECTION_VERSION: &str = "preview-v4"; +pub const NORMALIZER_VERSION: &str = "normalized-ir-v5"; +pub const PROJECTION_VERSION: &str = "preview-v5"; +pub const HISTORICAL_NORMALIZER_VERSION: &str = "normalized-ir-v4"; +pub const HISTORICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION: &str = "preview-v4"; #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash, Serialize)] pub struct SourceDigest(String); @@ -232,6 +234,13 @@ pub struct NormalizedOperation { pub key: String, pub method: HttpMethod, pub path: String, + #[serde( + default, + skip_serializing_if = "NormalizedSecurityRequirements::is_empty" + )] + pub security_requirements: NormalizedSecurityRequirements, + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeMap::is_empty")] + pub security_schemes: BTreeMap, pub operation_id: Option, pub summary: Option, pub description: Option, @@ -251,6 +260,81 @@ pub struct NormalizedOperation { pub findings: Vec, } +/// A supported OpenAPI/Swagger authentication scheme, without credential values. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] +pub struct NormalizedSecurityScheme { + pub name: String, + pub kind: NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind, + pub source_location: SourceLocation, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case", tag = "kind")] +pub enum NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind { + Http { + scheme: String, + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + format_hint: Option, + }, + ApiKey { + location: SecurityParameterLocation, + parameter_name: String, + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + format_hint: Option, + }, + Unsupported { + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + scheme_type: Option, + }, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] +pub enum SecurityParameterLocation { + Header, + Query, + Cookie, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)] +pub struct NormalizedSecurityRequirements { + pub source: SecurityRequirementsSource, + /// Each item is one OR alternative; names within an alternative are ANDed. + #[serde(default)] + pub alternatives: Vec, +} + +impl NormalizedSecurityRequirements { + fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { + self.source == SecurityRequirementsSource::None && self.alternatives.is_empty() + } +} + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)] +#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] +pub enum SecurityRequirementsSource { + #[default] + None, + Document, + Operation, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)] +pub struct SecurityRequirementAlternative { + #[serde(default)] + pub schemes: Vec, + #[serde(default = "default_supported_security_alternative")] + pub supported: bool, + #[serde(default)] + pub findings: Vec, + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + pub source_location: Option, +} + +fn default_supported_security_alternative() -> bool { + true +} + #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)] pub struct NormalizedRequestBodyVariant { pub content_type: String, @@ -387,6 +471,8 @@ pub struct NormalizedIr { #[serde(default)] pub reference_graph: ResolvedReferenceGraph, pub source: ImportSourcePreview, + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeMap::is_empty")] + pub security_schemes: BTreeMap, #[serde(default)] pub operations: Vec, #[serde(default)] @@ -442,6 +528,13 @@ pub struct ImportOperationCandidate { pub key: String, pub method: HttpMethod, pub path: String, + #[serde( + default, + skip_serializing_if = "NormalizedSecurityRequirements::is_empty" + )] + pub security_requirements: NormalizedSecurityRequirements, + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeMap::is_empty")] + pub security_schemes: BTreeMap, #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] pub operation_id: Option, pub suggested_name: String, @@ -477,6 +570,8 @@ pub struct RestImportDocument { pub version: Option, pub title: String, pub servers: Vec, + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeMap::is_empty")] + pub security_schemes: BTreeMap, pub operations: Vec, pub findings: Vec, #[serde(skip)] @@ -488,6 +583,11 @@ pub struct RestImportOperation { pub key: String, pub method: HttpMethod, pub path: String, + #[serde( + default, + skip_serializing_if = "NormalizedSecurityRequirements::is_empty" + )] + pub security_requirements: NormalizedSecurityRequirements, pub operation_id: Option, pub summary: Option, pub description: Option, diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize.rs index 65c681f..e75729d 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize.rs @@ -6,15 +6,13 @@ use thiserror::Error; use crate::rest::{ model::{ CoverageDisposition, CoverageEntry, ExternalDocumentSnapshot, ImportFinding, - ImportFindingSeverity, ImportGroupPreview, ImportPreview, ImportSourcePreview, - NORMALIZER_VERSION, NormalizationConfig, NormalizedApiMetadata, NormalizedFinding, - NormalizedIr, NormalizedOperation, NormalizedParameter, NormalizedRequestBodyVariant, + ImportFindingSeverity, ImportPreview, ImportSourcePreview, NORMALIZER_VERSION, + NormalizationConfig, NormalizedApiMetadata, NormalizedFinding, NormalizedIr, + NormalizedOperation, NormalizedParameter, NormalizedRequestBodyVariant, NormalizedResponseVariant, NormalizedSchema, NormalizedSchemaKind, PROJECTION_VERSION, RestImportDocument, SourceDigest, SourceIdentity, SourceLocation, SourceSyntax, }, - openapi3, - payload::candidate_from_operation, - swagger2, + openapi3, swagger2, }; use super::normalize_coverage; @@ -105,6 +103,37 @@ pub fn normalize_verified_document( normalize_verified_bundle(document, digest, &[], config) } +/// Rejects source documents containing credential-like literals before a +/// caller persists their original bytes. Accepted source bytes remain verbatim. +pub fn validate_document_source_safe( + document: &str, + config: &NormalizationConfig, +) -> Result<(), ImportParseError> { + config + .validate_versions() + .map_err(|_| ImportParseError::UnsupportedDocument)?; + if document.len() > config.max_bytes + || normalize_limits::alias_count(document) > config.max_aliases + { + return Err(ImportParseError::LimitExceeded); + } + let mut root = decode(document)?; + validate_value_limits(&root, config)?; + let mut findings = Vec::new(); + let mut locations = Vec::new(); + super::metadata_findings::redact_secret_like_literals( + &mut root, + "", + &mut findings, + &mut locations, + ); + if findings.is_empty() { + Ok(()) + } else { + Err(ImportParseError::InvalidDocument) + } +} + /// Normalizes a verified primary document together with immutable external /// snapshots. This function is pure: callers must perform all URL policy, /// fetching, artifact persistence and digest verification beforehand. @@ -135,9 +164,18 @@ pub fn normalize_verified_bundle( } } let resolution = super::reference::resolve(root, digest.clone(), snapshots, config)?; - let root = resolution.root; + let mut root = resolution.root; validate_value_limits(&root, config)?; + let mut literal_findings = Vec::new(); + let mut literal_locations = Vec::new(); + super::metadata_findings::redact_secret_like_literals( + &mut root, + "", + &mut literal_findings, + &mut literal_locations, + ); + let mut parsed = match root.get("openapi").and_then(Value::as_str) { Some(version) if supported_oas_version(version) => openapi3::parse_document(&root)?, Some(_) => return Err(ImportParseError::UnsupportedDocument), @@ -146,14 +184,8 @@ pub fn normalize_verified_bundle( } None => return Err(ImportParseError::UnsupportedDocument), }; - super::normalize_security::append_security_requirement_findings(&mut parsed, &root); - super::metadata_findings::collect_secret_like_examples( - &root, - "", - false, - &mut parsed.findings, - &mut parsed.internal_finding_locations, - ); + parsed.findings.extend(literal_findings); + parsed.internal_finding_locations.extend(literal_locations); if parsed.operations.is_empty() && !parsed @@ -175,81 +207,14 @@ pub fn normalize_verified_bundle( } pub fn preview_from_ir(ir: &NormalizedIr) -> ImportPreview { - let operations = ir - .operations - .iter() - .map(super::normalize_projection::operation_from_normalized) - .collect::>(); - let findings = ir - .findings - .iter() - .map(|finding| ImportFinding { - code: finding.code.clone(), - severity: finding.severity.clone(), - message: finding.message.clone(), - operation_key: finding.operation_key.clone(), - }) - .collect(); - preview_from_operations(&ir.source, operations.iter(), findings, false) + super::normalize_projection::preview_from_ir(ir) } fn preview_from_document(document: RestImportDocument) -> ImportPreview { - let source = ImportSourcePreview { - format: document.format, - version: document.version, - title: document.title, - servers: document.servers, - }; - preview_from_operations(&source, document.operations.iter(), document.findings, true) + super::normalize_projection::preview_from_document(document) } -fn preview_from_operations<'a>( - source: &ImportSourcePreview, - operations: impl Iterator, - mut findings: Vec, - legacy: bool, -) -> ImportPreview { - let mut groups: BTreeMap = BTreeMap::new(); - let mut used_names = BTreeSet::new(); - - for operation in operations { - let candidate = if legacy { - super::legacy_payload::candidate_from_operation( - operation, - &source.servers, - &mut used_names, - ) - } else { - candidate_from_operation(operation, &source.servers, &mut used_names) - }; - let group_title = operation - .tags - .first() - .cloned() - .unwrap_or_else(|| "Без группы".to_owned()); - let group_key = crate::rest::naming::snake_name(&group_title); - groups - .entry(group_key.clone()) - .or_insert_with(|| ImportGroupPreview { - key: group_key, - title: group_title, - operations: Vec::new(), - }) - .operations - .push(candidate); - } - - super::normalize_security::attach_operation_findings(&mut groups, &findings); - - sort_findings(&mut findings); - ImportPreview { - source: source.clone(), - groups: groups.into_values().collect(), - findings, - } -} - -fn decode(document: &str) -> Result { +pub(super) fn decode(document: &str) -> Result { if let Ok(json) = serde_json::from_str(document) { return Ok(json); } @@ -584,6 +549,8 @@ fn canonicalize( request_body_variants, response_variants, servers: operation.servers, + security_requirements: operation.security_requirements, + security_schemes: document.security_schemes.clone(), findings: operation_findings, }) }) @@ -765,6 +732,7 @@ fn canonicalize( unresolved_references, reference_graph, source, + security_schemes: document.security_schemes, operations, findings, coverage, @@ -774,7 +742,11 @@ fn canonicalize( } pub fn validate_normalized_ir(ir: &NormalizedIr) -> Result<(), ImportParseError> { - if ir.normalizer_version != NORMALIZER_VERSION || ir.projection_version != PROJECTION_VERSION { + if !((ir.normalizer_version == NORMALIZER_VERSION + && ir.projection_version == PROJECTION_VERSION) + || (ir.normalizer_version == crate::rest::model::HISTORICAL_NORMALIZER_VERSION + && ir.projection_version == crate::rest::model::HISTORICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION)) + { return Err(ImportParseError::InvalidDocument); } validate_reference_graph(ir)?; @@ -927,7 +899,7 @@ fn severity_rank(severity: &ImportFindingSeverity) -> u8 { } } -fn sort_findings(findings: &mut [ImportFinding]) { +pub(super) fn sort_findings(findings: &mut [ImportFinding]) { findings.sort_by(|left, right| { ( severity_rank(&left.severity), diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_coverage.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_coverage.rs index ff34f36..2cd8c7d 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_coverage.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_coverage.rs @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ use serde_json::Value; use crate::rest::model::{ CanonicalSourceNode, CanonicalSourceValue, CoverageDisposition, CoverageEntry, - ImportSourcePreview, NORMALIZER_VERSION, NormalizedIr, NormalizedOperation, NormalizedPath, - NormalizedReference, NormalizedSchema, NormalizedSchemaKind, PROJECTION_VERSION, - SourceLocation, + HISTORICAL_NORMALIZER_VERSION, HISTORICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION, ImportSourcePreview, + NORMALIZER_VERSION, NormalizedIr, NormalizedOperation, NormalizedPath, NormalizedReference, + NormalizedSchema, NormalizedSchemaKind, PROJECTION_VERSION, SourceLocation, }; use super::ImportParseError; @@ -16,7 +16,11 @@ pub(super) use super::normalize_schema::{ }; pub(super) fn validate_coverage(ir: &NormalizedIr) -> Result<(), ImportParseError> { - if ir.normalizer_version != NORMALIZER_VERSION || ir.projection_version != PROJECTION_VERSION { + if !((ir.normalizer_version == NORMALIZER_VERSION + && ir.projection_version == PROJECTION_VERSION) + || (ir.normalizer_version == HISTORICAL_NORMALIZER_VERSION + && ir.projection_version == HISTORICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION)) + { return Err(ImportParseError::InvalidDocument); } let mut source_nodes = BTreeMap::new(); diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_finding_validation.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_finding_validation.rs index 39174ae..448dd05 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_finding_validation.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_finding_validation.rs @@ -54,17 +54,101 @@ pub(super) fn matches_source( && matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Array(items) if items.iter().any(|item| !matches!(item.value, CanonicalSourceValue::String(_)))) } "secret_like_example" if finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning => { - pointer.contains("/example") && matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::String(value) if secret_like(pointer, value)) + matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::String(value) + if secret_like(pointer, value) + || super::metadata_findings::url_has_secret(value) + || (pointer.ends_with("/url") && !value.contains('@')) + || value == super::metadata_findings::REDACTED_LITERAL + || sanitized_secret_url(value)) } "invalid_server" if is_error => invalid_server(pointer, node), "unsupported_security_requirement" if is_error => { matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Object(fields) if !fields.is_empty()) || invalid_security_requirement(pointer, node) } + "invalid_security_requirements" if is_error => { + !matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Array(_)) + || matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Array(items) if items.iter().any(|item| !matches!(item.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Object(_)))) + } + "invalid_security_requirement" if finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning => { + !matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Object(_)) + } + "unsupported_security_requirements" if is_error => ir + .operations + .iter() + .find(|operation| finding.operation_key.as_deref() == Some(operation.key.as_str())) + .is_some_and(|operation| { + !operation.security_requirements.alternatives.is_empty() + && operation + .security_requirements + .alternatives + .iter() + .all(|alternative| !alternative.supported) + }), + "unsupported_security_and_requirement" + if finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning => + { + matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Object(fields) if fields.len() > 1) + } + "unsupported_security_scheme" if finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning => { + let scheme_name = pointer + .rsplit('/') + .next() + .unwrap_or_default() + .replace("~1", "/") + .replace("~0", "~"); + ir.security_schemes.get(&scheme_name).is_some_and(|scheme| { + matches!(&scheme.kind, crate::rest::model::NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { .. }) + || matches!(&scheme.kind, crate::rest::model::NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { location: crate::rest::model::SecurityParameterLocation::Cookie, .. }) + }) && matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Array(_)) + } + "unsupported_security_scheme_definition" + if finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning => + { + let scheme_name = pointer + .rsplit('/') + .next() + .unwrap_or_default() + .replace("~1", "/") + .replace("~0", "~"); + ir.security_schemes.get(&scheme_name).is_some_and(|scheme| { + matches!(&scheme.kind, crate::rest::model::NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { .. }) + }) && matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Object(_)) + } + "unresolved_security_scheme" if finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning => { + let scheme_name = pointer + .rsplit('/') + .next() + .unwrap_or_default() + .replace("~1", "/") + .replace("~0", "~"); + !ir.security_schemes.contains_key(&scheme_name) + } + "invalid_security_scopes" if finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning => { + !matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Array(items) if items.iter().all(|item| matches!(item.value, CanonicalSourceValue::String(_)))) + } + "unexpected_security_scopes" if finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning => { + let scheme_name = pointer + .rsplit('/') + .next() + .unwrap_or_default() + .replace("~1", "/") + .replace("~0", "~"); + let supports_scopes = ir.security_schemes.get(&scheme_name).is_some_and(|scheme| { + matches!(&scheme.kind, crate::rest::model::NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { scheme_type: Some(kind) } if matches!(kind.as_str(), "oauth2" | "openIdConnect")) + }); + !supports_scopes + && matches!(&node.value, CanonicalSourceValue::Array(items) if !items.is_empty()) + } _ => false, } } +fn sanitized_secret_url(value: &str) -> bool { + value.contains("=[REDACTED]") + || ((value.contains("://") || value.starts_with("//")) && !value.contains('@')) +} + fn parameter_style( pointer: &str, node: &CanonicalSourceNode, diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_projection.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_projection.rs index 3807065..e99b7ad 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_projection.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_projection.rs @@ -1,18 +1,113 @@ -use std::collections::BTreeMap; +use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet}; use serde_json::Value; use crate::rest::model::{ - ImportFinding, NormalizedLiteral, NormalizedOperation, NormalizedScalarKind, NormalizedSchema, - NormalizedSchemaKind, RestImportOperation, RestImportParameter, RestRequestBodyVariant, - RestResponseVariant, + ImportFinding, ImportGroupPreview, ImportOperationCandidate, ImportPreview, + ImportSourcePreview, NormalizedLiteral, NormalizedOperation, NormalizedScalarKind, + NormalizedSchema, NormalizedSchemaKind, NormalizedSecurityScheme, RestImportDocument, + RestImportOperation, RestImportParameter, RestRequestBodyVariant, RestResponseVariant, }; +pub(super) fn preview_from_ir(ir: &crate::rest::model::NormalizedIr) -> ImportPreview { + let operations = ir + .operations + .iter() + .map(operation_from_normalized) + .collect::>(); + let findings = ir + .findings + .iter() + .map(|finding| ImportFinding { + code: finding.code.clone(), + severity: finding.severity.clone(), + message: finding.message.clone(), + operation_key: finding.operation_key.clone(), + }) + .collect(); + preview_from_operations( + &ir.source, + operations.iter(), + findings, + &ir.security_schemes, + false, + ) +} + +pub(super) fn preview_from_document(document: RestImportDocument) -> ImportPreview { + let security_schemes = document.security_schemes.clone(); + let source = ImportSourcePreview { + format: document.format, + version: document.version, + title: document.title, + servers: document.servers, + }; + preview_from_operations( + &source, + document.operations.iter(), + document.findings, + &security_schemes, + true, + ) +} + +fn preview_from_operations<'a>( + source: &ImportSourcePreview, + operations: impl Iterator, + mut findings: Vec, + security_schemes: &BTreeMap, + legacy: bool, +) -> ImportPreview { + let mut groups: BTreeMap = BTreeMap::new(); + let mut used_names = BTreeSet::new(); + + for operation in operations { + let candidate = if legacy { + super::legacy_payload::candidate_from_operation( + operation, + &source.servers, + &mut used_names, + ) + } else { + crate::rest::payload::candidate_from_operation( + operation, + security_schemes, + &source.servers, + &mut used_names, + ) + }; + let group_title = operation + .tags + .first() + .cloned() + .unwrap_or_else(|| "Без группы".to_owned()); + let group_key = crate::rest::naming::snake_name(&group_title); + groups + .entry(group_key.clone()) + .or_insert_with(|| ImportGroupPreview { + key: group_key, + title: group_title, + operations: Vec::::new(), + }) + .operations + .push(candidate); + } + + super::normalize_security::attach_operation_findings(&mut groups, &findings); + super::normalize::sort_findings(&mut findings); + ImportPreview { + source: source.clone(), + groups: groups.into_values().collect(), + findings, + } +} + pub(super) fn operation_from_normalized(operation: &NormalizedOperation) -> RestImportOperation { RestImportOperation { key: operation.key.clone(), method: operation.method, path: operation.path.clone(), + security_requirements: operation.security_requirements.clone(), operation_id: operation.operation_id.clone(), summary: operation.summary.clone(), description: operation.description.clone(), diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_security.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_security.rs index 2e47e27..738bb92 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_security.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/normalize_security.rs @@ -1,13 +1,6 @@ -//! Effective per-operation security scopes for the OpenAPI importer. -use serde_json::Value; +//! Attaches document-level findings to their affected operation candidates. -use super::{ - model::{ - ImportFinding, ImportFindingSeverity, ImportGroupPreview, RestImportDocument, - RestImportOperation, SourceLocation, - }, - normalize_coverage, -}; +use super::model::{ImportFinding, ImportFindingSeverity, ImportGroupPreview}; pub(super) fn attach_operation_findings( groups: &mut std::collections::BTreeMap, @@ -32,135 +25,3 @@ pub(super) fn attach_operation_findings( } } } - -/// Computes the effective security requirements for every candidate operation -/// and attaches source-located blockers to precisely the affected candidates. -/// -/// Effective requirements follow the OpenAPI semantics: an operation that -/// declares its own `security` member wins over the document root; an empty -/// array (`security: []`) explicitly disables inheritance. Within a -/// requirement array the items are alternatives (OR): an empty requirement -/// object `{}` is the public alternative and makes the whole operation -/// public, so no blocker is produced for that operation. -/// -/// A malformed security shape — a non-array `security` value or a non-object -/// array item — must never be discarded silently: the affected operation -/// receives one blocker with the exact source location. A supported non-empty -/// requirement remains a blocker until an administrator binds a compatible -/// Auth Profile. -pub(super) fn append_security_requirement_findings(parsed: &mut RestImportDocument, root: &Value) { - let operations = &parsed.operations; - let findings = &mut parsed.findings; - let locations = &mut parsed.internal_finding_locations; - let root_security = root.get("security"); - for operation in operations { - let Some(path_item) = root - .pointer(&format!( - "/paths/{}", - normalize_coverage::escape_pointer(&operation.path) - )) - .and_then(|item| item.get(method_as_lower(operation))) - else { - continue; - }; - let Some(security) = path_item - .get("security") - .or_else(|| root_security.filter(|_| path_item.get("security").is_none())) - else { - continue; - }; - let base_pointer = if path_item.get("security").is_some() { - format!( - "/paths/{}/{}/security", - normalize_coverage::escape_pointer(&operation.path), - method_as_lower(operation) - ) - } else { - "/security".to_owned() - }; - let alternatives = match security.as_array() { - Some(alternatives) => alternatives, - None => { - push_security_blocker( - findings, - locations, - operation, - &base_pointer, - "security имеет некорректный формат: ожидается массив требований; операции с незапакованным блоком безопасности не публикуются.", - ); - continue; - } - }; - // Validate the item shapes first: only a fully well-formed array may - // use the empty requirement object `{}` as its public OR alternative. - if !alternatives - .iter() - .all(|requirement| requirement.as_object().is_some()) - { - for (index, requirement) in alternatives.iter().enumerate() { - let pointer = format!("{base_pointer}/{index}"); - match requirement.as_object() { - Some(schemes) if schemes.is_empty() => { - // In a malformed array the empty alternative does - // not make the operation public, but it also cannot - // block on its own. - continue; - } - Some(_) => push_security_blocker( - findings, - locations, - operation, - &pointer, - "Требование безопасности должно быть привязано к настроенному Auth Profile перед публикацией этой операции; остальные операции не блокируются.", - ), - None => push_security_blocker( - findings, - locations, - operation, - &pointer, - "security содержит альтернативу без объекта требований: формат не поддерживается, операция не публикуется.", - ), - } - } - continue; - } - if alternatives.iter().any(|requirement| { - requirement - .as_object() - .is_some_and(serde_json::Map::is_empty) - }) { - continue; - } - for (index, _) in alternatives.iter().enumerate() { - push_security_blocker( - findings, - locations, - operation, - &format!("{base_pointer}/{index}"), - "Требование безопасности должно быть привязано к настроенному Auth Profile перед публикацией этой операции; остальные операции не блокируются.", - ); - } - } -} - -fn push_security_blocker( - findings: &mut Vec, - locations: &mut Vec>, - operation: &RestImportOperation, - pointer: &str, - message: &str, -) { - findings.push(ImportFinding { - code: "unsupported_security_requirement".to_owned(), - severity: ImportFindingSeverity::Error, - message: message.to_owned(), - operation_key: Some(operation.key.clone()), - }); - locations.push(Some(SourceLocation { - pointer: pointer.to_owned(), - })); -} - -fn method_as_lower(operation: &RestImportOperation) -> String { - format!("{:?}", operation.method).to_ascii_lowercase() -} diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/openapi3.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/openapi3.rs index 758e2cd..ca837f2 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/openapi3.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/openapi3.rs @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ use crank_core::HttpMethod; use serde_json::Value; +use super::parser_findings::append_unused_security_scheme_findings as append_unused; use crate::rest::{ model::{ ImportFinding, RestImportDocument, RestImportOperation, RestImportParameter, @@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ pub fn parse_document(root: &Value) -> Result Result { + let security_schemes = super::security::schemes(root, false); let version = root .get("openapi") .and_then(Value::as_str) @@ -25,20 +27,16 @@ fn parse_document_v2(root: &Value) -> Result 1 { @@ -46,7 +44,7 @@ fn parse_document_v2(root: &Value) -> Result Result Result Result Result Result Result Result Result Result Result Result, - locations: &mut Vec>, - parameter_findings: Vec<(ImportFinding, crate::rest::model::SourceLocation)>, -) { - for (finding, location) in parameter_findings { - findings.push(finding); - locations.push(Some(location)); - } -} - fn request_body_schema( operation: &Value, operation_pointer: &str, diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/parser_findings.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/parser_findings.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01ce0f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/parser_findings.rs @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +use crate::rest::model::NormalizedSecurityScheme; +use crate::rest::model::{ImportFinding, SourceLocation}; +use serde_json::Value; +use std::collections::BTreeMap; + +pub(super) fn append_located( + findings: &mut Vec, + locations: &mut Vec>, + entries: Vec<(ImportFinding, SourceLocation)>, +) { + for (finding, location) in entries { + findings.push(finding); + locations.push(Some(location)); + } +} + +pub(super) fn append_unused_security_scheme_findings( + root: &Value, + schemes: &BTreeMap, + findings: &mut Vec, + locations: &mut Vec>, +) { + append_located( + findings, + locations, + super::security::unused_unsupported_scheme_findings(root, schemes), + ); +} diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/payload.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/payload.rs index cd51b54..06ee88b 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/payload.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/payload.rs @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use crate::rest::{ pub fn candidate_from_operation( operation: &RestImportOperation, + security_schemes: &BTreeMap, document_servers: &[String], used_names: &mut BTreeSet, ) -> ImportOperationCandidate { @@ -154,6 +155,8 @@ pub fn candidate_from_operation( key: operation.key.clone(), method: operation.method, path: operation.path.clone(), + security_requirements: operation.security_requirements.clone(), + security_schemes: security_schemes.clone(), operation_id: operation.operation_id.clone(), suggested_name: name, suggested_display_name: display_name, diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/security.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/security.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f261af3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/security.rs @@ -0,0 +1,462 @@ +//! Typed security scheme extraction and effective requirement +//! classification for OpenAPI 3.x and Swagger 2.0 documents. +//! +//! The module is pure: it never reads Auth Profiles or Secrets and never +//! captures credential values. Requirements are classified alternative by +//! alternative (OR semantics preserved): a supported single-scheme +//! alternative stays resolvable via a compatible Auth Profile; malformed +//! requirements, unresolvable schemes and AND combinations mark the +//! affected alternative as unsupported; an operation is blocked only when +//! none of its alternatives is selectable. +use std::collections::BTreeMap; + +use serde_json::Value; + +use super::model::{ + ImportFinding, NormalizedSecurityRequirements, NormalizedSecurityScheme, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind, SecurityParameterLocation, SecurityRequirementAlternative, + SecurityRequirementsSource, SourceLocation, +}; +use super::recommendations::{document_blocker, document_finding}; + +/// Extracts typed schema metadata from `components.securitySchemes` +/// (OpenAPI) or `securityDefinitions` (Swagger 2.0). Only scheme names, +/// kinds, locations and safe format hints are preserved; credential values +/// are never captured. +pub(super) fn schemes(root: &Value, swagger: bool) -> BTreeMap { + let (container, prefix) = if swagger { + (root.get("securityDefinitions"), "/securityDefinitions") + } else { + ( + root.pointer("/components/securitySchemes"), + "/components/securitySchemes", + ) + }; + let Some(definitions) = container.and_then(Value::as_object) else { + return BTreeMap::new(); + }; + definitions + .iter() + .map(|(name, definition)| { + let location = SourceLocation { + pointer: format!( + "{prefix}/{}", + super::normalize_coverage::escape_pointer(name) + ), + }; + let kind = if swagger { + match definition.get("type").and_then(Value::as_str) { + Some("basic") => NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { + scheme: "basic".to_owned(), + format_hint: None, + }, + Some("apiKey") => api_key(definition, false), + other => NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { + scheme_type: other.map(ToOwned::to_owned), + }, + } + } else { + match definition.get("type").and_then(Value::as_str) { + Some("http") => { + let scheme = definition + .get("scheme") + .and_then(Value::as_str) + .unwrap_or("") + .to_owned(); + if matches!(scheme.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(), "basic" | "bearer") { + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { + scheme, + format_hint: definition + .get("bearerFormat") + .and_then(Value::as_str) + .filter(|value| { + safe_format_hint(value) && !looks_secret_hint(value) + }) + .map(ToOwned::to_owned), + } + } else { + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { + scheme_type: Some(format!("http:{}", scheme)), + } + } + } + Some("apiKey") => api_key(definition, true), + other => NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { + scheme_type: other.map(ToOwned::to_owned), + }, + } + }; + ( + name.clone(), + NormalizedSecurityScheme { + name: name.clone(), + kind, + source_location: location, + }, + ) + }) + .collect() +} + +/// Reports unsupported scheme definitions that are never used by a security +/// requirement. They still need manual configuration, but cannot affect an +/// operation that does not select them. +pub(super) fn unused_unsupported_scheme_findings( + root: &Value, + schemes: &BTreeMap, +) -> Vec<(ImportFinding, SourceLocation)> { + let mut used = std::collections::BTreeSet::new(); + collect_requirement_names(root.get("security"), &mut used); + if let Some(paths) = root.get("paths").and_then(Value::as_object) { + for path_item in paths.values().filter_map(Value::as_object) { + for operation in path_item.values().filter_map(Value::as_object) { + collect_requirement_names(operation.get("security"), &mut used); + } + } + } + + schemes + .iter() + .filter_map(|(name, scheme)| { + if used.contains(name) + || !matches!( + &scheme.kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { .. } + ) + { + return None; + } + Some(( + document_finding( + "unsupported_security_scheme_definition", + format!( + "Объявленная схема {name} пока не поддерживается и не используется операциями; настройте authentication вручную, если она потребуется." + ), + ), + scheme.source_location.clone(), + )) + }) + .collect() +} + +fn collect_requirement_names(value: Option<&Value>, used: &mut std::collections::BTreeSet) { + let Some(alternatives) = value.and_then(Value::as_array) else { + return; + }; + for alternative in alternatives.iter().filter_map(Value::as_object) { + used.extend(alternative.keys().cloned()); + } +} + +fn api_key(definition: &Value, allow_cookie: bool) -> NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind { + let location = match definition.get("in").and_then(Value::as_str) { + Some("header") => Some(SecurityParameterLocation::Header), + Some("query") => Some(SecurityParameterLocation::Query), + Some("cookie") if allow_cookie => Some(SecurityParameterLocation::Cookie), + _ => None, + }; + match (location, definition.get("name").and_then(Value::as_str)) { + (Some(location), Some(parameter_name)) if !parameter_name.is_empty() => { + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + location, + parameter_name: parameter_name.to_owned(), + format_hint: definition + .get("x-format-hint") + .and_then(Value::as_str) + .filter(|value| safe_format_hint(value) && !looks_secret_hint(value)) + .map(ToOwned::to_owned), + } + } + _ => NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { + scheme_type: Some("apiKey".to_owned()), + }, + } +} + +fn safe_format_hint(value: &str) -> bool { + !value.is_empty() + && value.len() <= 64 + && value + .bytes() + .all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(byte, b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'+')) +} + +fn looks_secret_hint(value: &str) -> bool { + let value = value.to_ascii_lowercase(); + ["token", "secret", "password", "credential", "authorization"] + .iter() + .any(|marker| value.contains(marker)) + || value.starts_with("sk-") + || value.starts_with("bearer ") +} + +/// Computes the effective requirement for one operation: the operation +/// `security` member wins over the document root; a missing member means no +/// requirement. Every array item is one OR alternative and is classified +/// independently, so a single unsupported alternative never collapses +/// supported siblings into a false AND. +pub(super) fn effective_requirements( + root: &Value, + operation: &Value, + operation_pointer: &str, + schemes: &BTreeMap, +) -> ( + NormalizedSecurityRequirements, + Vec<(super::model::ImportFinding, SourceLocation)>, +) { + let (value, source, pointer) = if let Some(value) = operation.get("security") { + ( + Some(value), + SecurityRequirementsSource::Operation, + format!("{operation_pointer}/security"), + ) + } else if let Some(value) = root.get("security") { + ( + Some(value), + SecurityRequirementsSource::Document, + "/security".to_owned(), + ) + } else { + return ( + NormalizedSecurityRequirements { + source: SecurityRequirementsSource::None, + alternatives: Vec::new(), + }, + Vec::new(), + ); + }; + let mut findings = Vec::new(); + let Some(alternatives) = value.and_then(Value::as_array) else { + findings.push(( + document_blocker( + "invalid_security_requirements", + "Security requirements имеют неверную структуру и блокируют импорт операции.", + ), + SourceLocation { pointer }, + )); + return ( + NormalizedSecurityRequirements { + source, + alternatives: Vec::new(), + }, + findings, + ); + }; + let mut projected = Vec::new(); + let mut supported_alternatives = 0usize; + let mut has_malformed_alternative = false; + for (alternative_index, alternative) in alternatives.iter().enumerate() { + let alternative_pointer = format!("{pointer}/{alternative_index}"); + let Some(requirement) = alternative.as_object() else { + has_malformed_alternative = true; + findings.push(( + document_finding( + "invalid_security_requirement", + "Security alternative имеет неверную структуру и недоступна для выбора.", + ), + SourceLocation { + pointer: alternative_pointer.clone(), + }, + )); + projected.push(SecurityRequirementAlternative { + schemes: Vec::new(), + supported: false, + findings: vec!["invalid_security_requirement".to_owned()], + source_location: Some(SourceLocation { + pointer: alternative_pointer, + }), + }); + continue; + }; + let mut names = requirement.keys().cloned().collect::>(); + names.sort(); + let mut alternative_findings = Vec::new(); + for name in &names { + let scopes = requirement.get(name).and_then(Value::as_array); + let valid_scope_array = + scopes.is_some_and(|scopes| scopes.iter().all(Value::is_string)); + if !valid_scope_array { + alternative_findings.push("invalid_security_scopes".to_owned()); + findings.push(( + document_finding( + "invalid_security_scopes", + "Security scopes должны быть массивом строк; эта альтернатива недоступна для выбора.", + ), + SourceLocation { + pointer: format!( + "{alternative_pointer}/{}", + super::normalize_coverage::escape_pointer(name) + ), + }, + )); + } else if scopes.is_some_and(|scopes| !scopes.is_empty()) + && !schemes.get(name).is_some_and(supports_named_scopes) + { + alternative_findings.push("unexpected_security_scopes".to_owned()); + findings.push(( + document_finding( + "unexpected_security_scopes", + format!("Схема {name} не поддерживает OAuth scopes; непустой список блокирует эту alternative."), + ), + SourceLocation { + pointer: format!( + "{alternative_pointer}/{}", + super::normalize_coverage::escape_pointer(name) + ), + }, + )); + } + if !schemes.contains_key(name) { + alternative_findings.push("unresolved_security_scheme".to_owned()); + findings.push(( + document_finding( + "unresolved_security_scheme", + format!( + "Альтернатива требует неизвестную схему {name} и недоступна для выбора." + ), + ), + SourceLocation { + pointer: format!( + "{alternative_pointer}/{}", + super::normalize_coverage::escape_pointer(name) + ), + }, + )); + } + } + if names.len() > 1 { + alternative_findings.push("unsupported_security_and_requirement".to_owned()); + findings.push(( + document_finding( + "unsupported_security_and_requirement", + format!("Альтернатива требует AND-сочетание схем {}; текущий импорт поддерживает только одну Auth Profile и не сохраняет это сочетание.", names.join(", ")), + ), + SourceLocation { + pointer: alternative_pointer.clone(), + }, + )); + } + if let Some((unsupported, message)) = names.iter().find_map(|name| { + schemes.get(name).and_then(|scheme| match &scheme.kind { + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { .. } => Some(( + name, + format!("Альтернатива использует неподдерживаемую схему {name} и недоступна для выбора."), + )), + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + location: SecurityParameterLocation::Cookie, + .. + } => Some(( + name, + format!("Схема {name} передаёт ключ через cookie, чего текущий Auth Profile runtime не поддерживает; настройте authentication вручную."), + )), + _ => None, + }) + }) { + alternative_findings.push("unsupported_security_scheme".to_owned()); + findings.push(( + document_finding("unsupported_security_scheme", message), + SourceLocation { + pointer: format!( + "{alternative_pointer}/{}", + super::normalize_coverage::escape_pointer(unsupported) + ), + }, + )); + } + alternative_findings.sort(); + alternative_findings.dedup(); + let supported = alternative_findings.is_empty(); + supported_alternatives += usize::from(supported); + projected.push(SecurityRequirementAlternative { + schemes: names, + supported, + findings: alternative_findings, + source_location: Some(SourceLocation { + pointer: alternative_pointer, + }), + }); + } + if has_malformed_alternative || (!projected.is_empty() && supported_alternatives == 0) { + findings.push(( + document_blocker( + if has_malformed_alternative { + "invalid_security_requirements" + } else { + "unsupported_security_requirements" + }, + if has_malformed_alternative { + "Security requirements содержат malformed alternative и блокируют импорт операции." + } else { + "Ни одну authentication alternative нельзя безопасно выбрать; импорт операции заблокирован." + }, + ), + SourceLocation { pointer }, + )); + } + ( + NormalizedSecurityRequirements { + source, + alternatives: projected, + }, + findings, + ) +} + +/// Convenience wrapper keeping the parser call site short. The operation +/// value must be the method object (`paths.{path}.{method}`); pointers use +/// the same JSON-pointer escaping as the rest of the importer. +pub(super) fn collect_operation_requirements( + root: &Value, + operation: &Value, + operation_pointer: &str, + schemes: &BTreeMap, +) -> ( + NormalizedSecurityRequirements, + Vec<(super::model::ImportFinding, SourceLocation)>, +) { + effective_requirements(root, operation, operation_pointer, schemes) +} + +fn supports_named_scopes(scheme: &NormalizedSecurityScheme) -> bool { + matches!( + &scheme.kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { + scheme_type: Some(scheme_type) + } if matches!(scheme_type.as_str(), "oauth2" | "openIdConnect") + ) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use serde_json::json; + + #[test] + fn empty_api_key_parameter_name_is_unsupported() { + for swagger in [false, true] { + let definition = json!({ "type": "apiKey", "in": "header", "name": "" }); + let root = if swagger { + json!({ "securityDefinitions": { "Key": definition } }) + } else { + json!({ "components": { "securitySchemes": { "Key": definition } } }) + }; + let schemes = schemes(&root, swagger); + assert!(matches!( + schemes["Key"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { .. } + )); + let (requirements, findings) = effective_requirements( + &root, + &json!({ "security": [{ "Key": [] }] }), + "/paths/~1secure/get", + &schemes, + ); + assert!(!requirements.alternatives[0].supported); + assert!( + findings + .iter() + .any(|(finding, _)| { finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirements" }) + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/source_safety.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/source_safety.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5caf3b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/source_safety.rs @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +use crate::rest::model::{ExternalDocumentSnapshot, SourceDigest}; + +use super::model::NormalizationConfig; +use super::{ + metadata_findings, + normalize::{ImportParseError, decode, validate_value_limits}, + normalize_limits, reference, +}; + +/// Rejects a source bundle containing credential-like literals before any +/// primary or dependency bytes are persisted. Credential names are collected +/// across all raw documents so split `$ref` targets receive the same checks. +pub fn validate_document_bundle_source_safe( + documents: &[&str], + config: &NormalizationConfig, +) -> Result<(), ImportParseError> { + config + .validate_versions() + .map_err(|_| ImportParseError::UnsupportedDocument)?; + let mut roots = Vec::with_capacity(documents.len()); + for document in documents { + if document.len() > config.max_bytes + || normalize_limits::alias_count(document) > config.max_aliases + { + return Err(ImportParseError::LimitExceeded); + } + let root = decode(document)?; + validate_value_limits(&root, config)?; + roots.push(root); + } + let declared_names = metadata_findings::credential_names(roots.iter()); + for mut root in roots { + let mut findings = Vec::new(); + let mut locations = Vec::new(); + metadata_findings::redact_secret_like_literals_with_names( + &mut root, + "", + &declared_names, + &mut findings, + &mut locations, + ); + if !findings.is_empty() { + return Err(ImportParseError::InvalidDocument); + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +/// Validates the resolved source tree with the same security-aware traversal +/// used by normalization, before a caller persists any bytes in the bundle. +pub fn validate_resolved_bundle_source_safe( + document: &str, + digest: SourceDigest, + snapshots: &[ExternalDocumentSnapshot], + config: &NormalizationConfig, +) -> Result<(), ImportParseError> { + config + .validate_versions() + .map_err(|_| ImportParseError::UnsupportedDocument)?; + if document.len() > config.max_bytes + || normalize_limits::alias_count(document) > config.max_aliases + { + return Err(ImportParseError::LimitExceeded); + } + let root = decode(document)?; + validate_value_limits(&root, config)?; + for snapshot in snapshots { + if snapshot.document.len() > config.max_external_document_bytes { + return Err(ImportParseError::LimitExceeded); + } + } + let resolution = reference::resolve(root, digest, snapshots, config)?; + let mut root = resolution.root; + validate_value_limits(&root, config)?; + let mut findings = Vec::new(); + let mut locations = Vec::new(); + metadata_findings::redact_secret_like_literals(&mut root, "", &mut findings, &mut locations); + if !findings.is_empty() { + return Err(ImportParseError::InvalidDocument); + } + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/swagger2.rs b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/swagger2.rs index db510e0..bc70a2f 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/src/rest/swagger2.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/src/rest/swagger2.rs @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ pub fn parse_document(root: &Value) -> Result Result { + let security_schemes = super::security::schemes(root, true); let title = root .pointer("/info/title") .and_then(Value::as_str) @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ fn parse_document_v2(root: &Value) -> Result Result Result Result Result Result Result Result, - locations: &mut Vec>, - parameter_findings: Vec<(ImportFinding, crate::rest::model::SourceLocation)>, -) { - for (finding, location) in parameter_findings { - findings.push(finding); - locations.push(Some(location)); - } -} - fn swagger_parameter_schema(_root: &Value, parameter: &Value) -> Option { if let Some(schema) = parameter.get("schema") { return Some(schema.clone()); diff --git a/crates/crank-import/target/openapi-corpus/evidence-089a330a8055dc50b96a4ac39ae8c364d08610171b952f1a2f2e942cfbb94c49.json b/crates/crank-import/target/openapi-corpus/evidence-089a330a8055dc50b96a4ac39ae8c364d08610171b952f1a2f2e942cfbb94c49.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..14dd47c --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/crank-import/target/openapi-corpus/evidence-089a330a8055dc50b96a4ac39ae8c364d08610171b952f1a2f2e942cfbb94c49.json @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +{ + "actionable_count": 50, + "content_digest": "a5c4d3c1da8ce9bcc820a97b3260bcef0fa2bd321493c35f03a4949541ec5462", + "content_digest_algorithm": "sha256", + "content_digest_definition": "SHA-256 of compact key-sorted JSON before the content_digest field is added.", + "corpus_version": "1.0.3", + "denominator": 50, + "evidence_identity": "089a330a8055dc50b96a4ac39ae8c364d08610171b952f1a2f2e942cfbb94c49", + "evidence_version": "1.0.0", + "exclusions": [], + "manifest_digest": "99ca69fb5ac10d637181a507d9e29d81888a9d4696a708ce6c3ac2b63eb61d57", + "matrix_contract": { + "construct_rows": 384, + "semantic_probes": "AC-1 runs a generated normalizer probe for every matrix row, including every 2xx status in all three formats." + }, + "matrix_digest": "bf6419574fe27e2244ba6ace51bbc8f8be5936be9e0884fd25b253ad3c8cd9b8", + "matrix_version": "1.0.2", + "method": "real normalize_verified_document + preview_from_ir; every NormalizedIr passed validate_normalized_ir", + "raw_counts": { + "covered_source_constructs": 1837, + "documents": 63, + "findings": 0, + "representative_operations": 50, + "semantic_coverage_entries": 514, + "source_constructs": 1837 + }, + "silent_loss_count": 0, + "uncovered_source_constructs": [] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus.rs b/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus.rs index d14c01c..c375175 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus.rs @@ -576,35 +576,13 @@ fn ac_2_manifest_covers_fifty_provenanced_specs_with_exact_expectations() { "security-scope fixture must keep both candidates explicit: {:?}", ir.operations.iter().map(|op| &op.key).collect::>() ); - let requirements = ir - .findings - .iter() - .filter(|finding| finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement") - .collect::>(); - assert_eq!( - requirements.len(), - 1, - "exactly the inherited requirement must produce a blocker: {:?}", - ir.findings - ); - let requirement = &requirements[0]; - assert_eq!( - requirement.severity, - crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error, - "security requirement must block its candidate: {:?}", - requirement - ); - assert_eq!( - requirement.operation_key.as_deref(), - Some("GET /secure"), - "blocker must belong only to the inherited secured candidate: {:?}", - requirement - ); - assert_eq!( - requirement.location.pointer, "/security/0", - "inherited requirement must point at the document root requirement: {:?}", - requirement - ); + let requirements = ir.findings.iter().filter(|finding| { + finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirements" + }).collect::>(); + assert!(requirements.is_empty(), "supported inherited basic requirement must remain selectable: {:?}", ir.findings); + let secured_operation = ir.operations.iter().find(|operation| operation.key == "GET /secure").unwrap(); + assert!(secured_operation.security_requirements.alternatives[0].supported); + assert_eq!(secured_operation.security_requirements.alternatives[0].source_location.as_ref().unwrap().pointer, "/security/0"); let mut by_key = std::collections::BTreeMap::new(); for group in &preview.groups { for candidate in &group.operations { @@ -618,18 +596,9 @@ fn ac_2_manifest_covers_fifty_provenanced_specs_with_exact_expectations() { "public operation with security: [] must stay actionable: {:?}", public.findings ); - assert!( - by_key - .get("GET /secure") - .expect("secured candidate present") - .findings - .iter() - .any(|finding| finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement" - && finding.severity - == crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error), - "inherited requirement must block the secured candidate: {:?}", - by_key.get("GET /secure").unwrap().findings - ); + assert!(by_key.get("GET /secure").expect("secured candidate present").findings.iter().all(|finding| { + finding.severity != crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error + }), "supported security must remain selectable before API binding: {:?}", by_key.get("GET /secure").unwrap().findings); assert!( preview .findings @@ -642,8 +611,8 @@ fn ac_2_manifest_covers_fifty_provenanced_specs_with_exact_expectations() { ir.coverage .iter() .any(|entry| entry.location.pointer == "/security/0" - && entry.disposition == CoverageDisposition::Finding), - "inherited requirement must stay in the source ledger bound to the finding: {:?}", + && entry.disposition == CoverageDisposition::Mapped), + "inherited requirement must stay mapped in the source ledger: {:?}", ir.coverage ); let mut actual_operation_keys = preview diff --git a/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/manifest.json b/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/manifest.json index 4e74716..0a82bb0 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/manifest.json +++ b/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/manifest.json @@ -14405,16 +14405,9 @@ "GET /secure" ], "warning_findings": [], - "blocker_findings": [ - { - "code": "unsupported_security_requirement", - "severity": "Error", - "operation_key": "GET /secure", - "location": "/security/0" - } - ] + "blocker_findings": [] } } ], - "compatibility_impact": "Corpus 1.0.3 adds hostile-security-scope.json: an effective-security-scope fixture showing that a document-level requirement blocks only the inherited candidate (GET /secure, location /security/0) while the public candidate with an explicit security: [] stays actionable and no document-global blocker is produced; all 50 representative previews and the previous hostile oracles are unchanged." + "compatibility_impact": "Corpus 1.0.3 adds hostile-security-scope.json: an effective-security-scope fixture showing that a document-level basic requirement remains selectable on the inherited candidate (GET /secure, location /security/0) while the public candidate with an explicit security: [] stays public; malformed or unsupported requirements retain scoped blockers." } diff --git a/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/matrix.rs b/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/matrix.rs index 754c9da..25d0fee 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/matrix.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/tests/corpus/matrix.rs @@ -172,53 +172,63 @@ fn ac_1_support_matrix_rows_have_exact_construct_contracts() { "paths":{"/probe":{"get":{"security":[{"probe":[]}],"operationId":"securityProbe","responses":{"200":{"description":"ok"}}}}} }) }; - assert_eq!( - row["status"], "unsupported", - "security is not yet persisted as Auth Profile semantics" - ); let source = serde_json::to_string(&probe).unwrap(); let ir = normalize(&source).unwrap(); validate_normalized_ir(&ir).unwrap(); let expected_finding = row["expected_finding"].as_str().unwrap(); - let requirement = ir - .findings - .iter() - .find(|finding| { - finding.code == expected_finding - && finding.severity == crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error - }) - .unwrap_or_else(|| { - panic!( - "{version} {construct} must be explicitly blocked: {:?}", - ir.findings - ) - }); - assert_eq!( - requirement.operation_key.as_deref(), - Some("GET /probe"), - "{version} {construct} blocker must belong to the affected candidate" - ); - assert_eq!( - requirement.location.pointer, "/paths/~1probe/get/security/0", - "{version} {construct} blocker must point at the local requirement" - ); let preview = preview_from_ir(&ir); let candidate = &preview.groups[0].operations[0]; - assert!( - candidate + let requirement = &ir.operations[0].security_requirements.alternatives[0]; + if expected_finding == "none" { + assert!( + requirement.supported, + "{version} {construct} is not selectable" + ); + assert!( + candidate.findings.iter().all(|finding| { + finding.severity != crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error + }), + "{version} {construct} unexpectedly blocked: {:?}", + candidate.findings + ); + assert!(ir.security_schemes.contains_key("probe")); + assert!( + ir.coverage.iter().any(|entry| { + entry.location.pointer == "/paths/~1probe/get/security/0" + && entry.disposition == CoverageDisposition::Mapped + }), + "{version} {construct} requirement has no mapped source coverage" + ); + } else { + let finding = ir .findings .iter() - .any(|finding| finding.code == expected_finding - && finding.severity == crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error), - "{version} {construct} candidate must be blocked: {:?}", - candidate.findings - ); - assert!( - ir.coverage.iter().any(|entry| entry.location.pointer - == "/paths/~1probe/get/security/0" - && entry.disposition == CoverageDisposition::Finding), - "{version} {construct} has no finding coverage" - ); + .chain( + ir.operations + .iter() + .flat_map(|operation| operation.findings.iter()), + ) + .find(|finding| { + finding.code == expected_finding + && finding.severity == crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error + }) + .unwrap_or_else(|| { + panic!("{version} {construct} missing blocker: {:?}", ir.findings) + }); + assert_eq!(finding.operation_key.as_deref(), Some("GET /probe")); + assert_eq!(finding.location.pointer, "/paths/~1probe/get/security"); + assert!( + candidate + .findings + .iter() + .any(|finding| finding.code == expected_finding + && finding.severity + == crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error) + ); + assert!(ir.coverage.iter().any(|entry| entry.location.pointer + == "/paths/~1probe/get/security" + && entry.disposition == CoverageDisposition::Finding)); + } probed(&construct); } { @@ -301,23 +311,21 @@ fn ac_1_support_matrix_rows_have_exact_construct_contracts() { .unwrap()["expected_finding"] .as_str() .unwrap(); - let requirements = ir - .findings + assert_eq!(expected_finding, "none"); + let secured_operation = ir + .operations .iter() - .filter(|finding| finding.code == expected_finding) - .collect::>(); + .find(|operation| operation.key == "GET /secured") + .unwrap(); + assert!(secured_operation.security_requirements.alternatives[0].supported); assert_eq!( - requirements.len(), - 1, - "exactly the inherited operation must be blocked: {:?}", - requirements + secured_operation.security_requirements.alternatives[0] + .source_location + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + .pointer, + "/security/0" ); - assert_eq!( - requirements[0].operation_key.as_deref(), - Some("GET /secured"), - "blocker must belong only to the affected candidate" - ); - assert_eq!(requirements[0].location.pointer, "/security/0"); let preview = preview_from_ir(&ir); let mut by_key = std::collections::BTreeMap::new(); for group in &preview.groups { @@ -342,17 +350,17 @@ fn ac_1_support_matrix_rows_have_exact_construct_contracts() { secured .findings .iter() - .any(|finding| finding.code == expected_finding - && finding.severity == crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error), - "secured operation must be blocked: {:?}", + .all(|finding| finding.severity + != crank_import::rest::ImportFindingSeverity::Error), + "supported secured operation must remain selectable before API binding: {:?}", secured.findings ); assert!( ir.coverage .iter() .any(|entry| entry.location.pointer == "/security/0" - && entry.disposition == CoverageDisposition::Finding), - "mixed probe has no finding coverage" + && entry.disposition == CoverageDisposition::Mapped), + "mixed probe has no mapped security coverage" ); probed(construct); } diff --git a/crates/crank-import/tests/security_schemes.rs b/crates/crank-import/tests/security_schemes.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e603441 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/crank-import/tests/security_schemes.rs @@ -0,0 +1,799 @@ +use crank_import::rest::{ + ImportFindingSeverity, ImportOperationCandidate, NormalizationConfig, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind, SecurityParameterLocation, SecurityRequirementsSource, + SourceDigest, normalize_verified_document, preview_from_ir, validate_normalized_ir, +}; +use serde_json::{Value, json}; + +fn normalize(document: &Value) -> crank_import::rest::NormalizedIr { + let text = serde_json::to_string(document).expect("fixture serializes"); + normalize_verified_document( + &text, + SourceDigest::parse("b".repeat(64)).expect("digest is valid"), + &NormalizationConfig::default(), + ) + .expect("security fixture normalizes") +} + +fn candidate<'a>( + candidates: &'a [ImportOperationCandidate], + key: &str, +) -> &'a ImportOperationCandidate { + candidates + .iter() + .find(|candidate| candidate.key == key) + .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("candidate {key} missing: {candidates:?}")) +} + +fn candidates(ir: &crank_import::rest::NormalizedIr) -> Vec { + preview_from_ir(ir) + .groups + .into_iter() + .flat_map(|group| group.operations) + .collect() +} + +fn operation<'a>( + ir: &'a crank_import::rest::NormalizedIr, + path: &str, +) -> &'a crank_import::rest::NormalizedOperation { + ir.operations + .iter() + .find(|operation| operation.path == path) + .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("operation {path} missing: {ir:?}")) +} + +#[test] +fn openapi_30_and_31_project_typed_schemes_and_safe_hints() { + for version in ["3.0.3", "3.1.0"] { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": version, + "info": { "title": "Security metadata", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "Bearer": { "type": "http", "scheme": "bearer", "bearerFormat": "JWT" }, + "Basic": { "type": "http", "scheme": "basic" }, + "HeaderKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "header", "name": "X-Api-Key" }, + "QueryKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "query", "name": "access_token" }, + "CookieKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "cookie", "name": "session" }, + "UnsafeHint": { "type": "http", "scheme": "bearer", "bearerFormat": "sk-private-value" } + }}, + "paths": { "/private": { "get": { + "security": [{ "Bearer": [] }], + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + assert!(matches!(ir.security_schemes["Bearer"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { ref scheme, ref format_hint } + if scheme == "bearer" && format_hint.as_deref() == Some("JWT"))); + assert!(matches!(ir.security_schemes["Basic"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { ref scheme, .. } if scheme == "basic")); + assert!(matches!(ir.security_schemes["HeaderKey"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { location: SecurityParameterLocation::Header, ref parameter_name, .. } + if parameter_name == "X-Api-Key")); + assert!(matches!(ir.security_schemes["QueryKey"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { location: SecurityParameterLocation::Query, ref parameter_name, .. } + if parameter_name == "access_token")); + assert!(matches!(ir.security_schemes["CookieKey"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { location: SecurityParameterLocation::Cookie, ref parameter_name, .. } + if parameter_name == "session")); + assert!(matches!( + ir.security_schemes["UnsafeHint"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { + format_hint: None, + .. + } + )); + let requirement = &operation(&ir, "/private") + .security_requirements + .alternatives[0]; + assert_eq!(requirement.schemes, ["Bearer"]); + assert!(requirement.supported); + } +} + +#[test] +fn swagger2_projects_basic_and_api_key_header_and_query() { + let document = json!({ + "swagger": "2.0", + "info": { "title": "Swagger security", "version": "1" }, + "host": "security.example.test", + "schemes": ["https"], + "securityDefinitions": { + "BasicAuth": { "type": "basic" }, + "HeaderKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "header", "name": "X-Api-Key" }, + "QueryKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "query", "name": "api_key" }, + "CookieKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "cookie", "name": "session" } + }, + "security": [{ "BasicAuth": [] }, { "HeaderKey": [] }, { "QueryKey": [] }], + "paths": { "/private": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + assert!(matches!(ir.security_schemes["BasicAuth"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { ref scheme, .. } if scheme == "basic")); + assert!(matches!( + ir.security_schemes["HeaderKey"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + location: SecurityParameterLocation::Header, + .. + } + )); + assert!(matches!( + ir.security_schemes["QueryKey"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + location: SecurityParameterLocation::Query, + .. + } + )); + assert!(matches!( + ir.security_schemes["CookieKey"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Unsupported { .. } + )); + assert_eq!( + operation(&ir, "/private") + .security_requirements + .alternatives + .len(), + 3 + ); +} + +#[test] +fn effective_requirements_inherit_override_and_allow_explicit_no_auth() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Requirements", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "Key": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "header", "name": "X-Key" }, + "Bearer": { "type": "http", "scheme": "bearer" } + }}, + "security": [{ "Key": [] }], + "paths": { + "/inherited": { "get": { "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } } }, + "/override": { "get": { "security": [{ "Bearer": [] }], "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } } }, + "/public": { "get": { "security": [], "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } } }, + "/unsecured": { "get": { "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } } } + } + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + let inherited = &operation(&ir, "/inherited").security_requirements; + assert_eq!(inherited.source, SecurityRequirementsSource::Document); + assert_eq!(inherited.alternatives[0].schemes, ["Key"]); + let overridden = &operation(&ir, "/override").security_requirements; + assert_eq!(overridden.source, SecurityRequirementsSource::Operation); + assert_eq!(overridden.alternatives[0].schemes, ["Bearer"]); + let public = &operation(&ir, "/public").security_requirements; + assert_eq!(public.source, SecurityRequirementsSource::Operation); + assert!(public.alternatives.is_empty()); + assert_eq!( + operation(&ir, "/unsecured").security_requirements.source, + SecurityRequirementsSource::Document + ); +} + +#[test] +fn or_alternatives_are_preserved_and_unsupported_and_is_scoped() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.1.0", + "info": { "title": "Alternatives", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "Bearer": { "type": "http", "scheme": "bearer" }, + "One": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "header", "name": "X-One" }, + "Two": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "query", "name": "two" } + }}, + "paths": { + "/mixed": { "get": { "security": [ + { "One": [], "Two": [] }, { "Bearer": [] } + ], "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } } }, + "/and-only": { "get": { "security": [ + { "One": [], "Two": [] } + ], "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } } }, + "/or": { "get": { "security": [ + { "Bearer": [] }, { "One": [] }, { "Two": [] } + ], "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } } } + } + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + let preview = preview_from_ir(&ir); + let candidates = preview + .groups + .iter() + .flat_map(|group| &group.operations) + .cloned() + .collect::>(); + + let mixed = candidate(&candidates, "GET /mixed"); + assert_eq!(mixed.security_requirements.alternatives.len(), 2); + assert!(!mixed.security_requirements.alternatives[0].supported); + assert!( + mixed.security_requirements.alternatives[0] + .findings + .contains(&"unsupported_security_and_requirement".to_owned()) + ); + assert_eq!( + mixed.security_requirements.alternatives[0].schemes, + ["One", "Two"] + ); + assert!(mixed.security_requirements.alternatives[1].supported); + assert_eq!( + mixed.security_requirements.alternatives[1].schemes, + ["Bearer"] + ); + assert!( + mixed + .findings + .iter() + .all(|finding| finding.severity != ImportFindingSeverity::Error) + ); + + let and_only = candidate(&candidates, "GET /and-only"); + assert!(and_only.findings.iter().any(|finding| { + finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirements" + && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error + })); + assert!(and_only.findings.iter().any(|finding| { + finding.code == "unsupported_security_and_requirement" + && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning + && finding.message.contains("One, Two") + })); + + let or = candidate(&candidates, "GET /or"); + assert_eq!(or.security_requirements.alternatives.len(), 3); + assert!( + or.security_requirements + .alternatives + .iter() + .all(|alternative| alternative.supported) + ); +} + +#[test] +fn unsupported_schemes_produce_manual_configuration_findings_without_typed_credentials() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Unsupported", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "OAuth": { "type": "oauth2", "flows": { "clientCredentials": { + "tokenUrl": "https://issuer.example/token?token=embedded", + "scopes": { "read": "read" }, + "x-client-secret": "never-copy-this" + }}, "x-example-token": "also-never-copy" }, + "Oidc": { "type": "openIdConnect", "openIdConnectUrl": "https://issuer.example" }, + "Mutual": { "type": "mutualTLS" }, + "Unknown": { "type": "vendorAuth", "x-api-key": "vendor-secret" } + }}, + "paths": { "/private": { "get": { + "security": [{ "OAuth": ["read"] }, { "Oidc": [] }, { "Mutual": [] }, { "Unknown": [] }], + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + let findings = &operation(&ir, "/private").findings; + assert!( + findings + .iter() + .any(|finding| finding.code == "unsupported_security_scheme") + ); + assert!( + findings + .iter() + .any(|finding| finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirements") + ); + assert!( + operation(&ir, "/private") + .security_requirements + .alternatives + .iter() + .all(|alternative| !alternative.supported) + ); + let typed = serde_json::to_string(&ir.security_schemes).unwrap(); + for secret_field in [ + "flows", + "tokenUrl", + "x-client-secret", + "x-example-token", + "x-api-key", + ] { + assert!( + !typed.contains(secret_field), + "typed metadata retained {secret_field}" + ); + } + assert!(!typed.contains("never-copy-this")); + assert!(!typed.contains("vendor-secret")); +} + +#[test] +fn normalized_ir_accepts_historical_v4_contract_without_security_fields() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Historical", "version": "1" }, + "paths": { "/health": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let mut ir = normalize(&document); + ir.normalizer_version = crank_import::rest::HISTORICAL_NORMALIZER_VERSION.to_owned(); + ir.projection_version = crank_import::rest::HISTORICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION.to_owned(); + ir.security_schemes.clear(); + ir.operations[0].security_schemes.clear(); + ir.operations[0].security_requirements = Default::default(); + validate_normalized_ir(&ir).expect("historical v4 shape remains valid"); + + let serialized = serde_json::to_value(&ir).unwrap(); + let operation = &serialized["operations"][0]; + assert!(operation.get("security_requirements").is_none()); + assert!(operation.get("security_schemes").is_none()); +} + +#[test] +fn non_array_security_is_rejected_as_an_import_error_surface() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Malformed", "version": "1" }, + "security": "Bearer", + "paths": { "/private": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + assert!(operation(&ir, "/private").findings.iter().any(|finding| { + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirements" + && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error + && finding.location.pointer == "/security" + })); + let candidates = candidates(&ir); + assert!( + candidate(&candidates, "GET /private") + .findings + .iter() + .any(|finding| { + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirements" + && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error + }) + ); +} + +#[test] +fn secret_like_literals_are_redacted_from_ir_preview_and_source_snapshot() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Redaction", "version": "1" }, + "servers": [{ "url": "https://user:secret-canary@api.example.test" }], + "paths": { "/private": { "get": { + "parameters": [{ + "name": "Authorization", + "in": "header", + "example": "Bearer header-canary" + }, { + "name": "X-Api-Key", + "in": "header", + "example": "opaque-canary-42", + "schema": { "type": "string" } + }, { + "name": "X-Trace", + "in": "header", + "example": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJjYW5hcnktNDIifQ.c2lnbmF0dXJlMTIzNDU2", + "schema": { "type": "string" } + }], + "requestBody": { "content": { "application/json": { "schema": { + "type": "object", + "properties": { + "password": { "type": "string", "default": "default-canary" }, + "token": { "type": "integer", "default": 4242 }, + "passwd": { "type": "boolean", "default": true }, + "ordinaryDefault": { "type": "string", "default": "Bearer default-literal-canary" }, + "ordinary": { "type": "string", "example": "token-example-canary" } + } + }}}}, + "parameters": [{ + "name": "X-Api-Key", "in": "header", + "schema": { "type": "string", "default": "opaque-header-default-canary" } + }, { + "name": "api_key", "in": "query", + "schema": { "type": "string", "default": "opaque-query-default-canary" } + }, { + "name": "session-token", "in": "cookie", + "schema": { "type": "string", "default": "opaque-cookie-default-canary" } + }], + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } }, + "x-api-key": "extension-canary", + "x-ciphertext": "opaque-ciphertext-canary", + "x-private-key": "private-key-canary" + }}} + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + let serialized_ir = serde_json::to_string(&ir).unwrap(); + let serialized_preview = serde_json::to_string(&preview_from_ir(&ir)).unwrap(); + for output in [&serialized_ir, &serialized_preview] { + for secret in [ + "secret-canary", + "header-canary", + "opaque-canary-42", + "default-canary", + "default-literal-canary", + "opaque-header-default-canary", + "opaque-query-default-canary", + "opaque-cookie-default-canary", + "token-example-canary", + "extension-canary", + "opaque-ciphertext-canary", + "private-key-canary", + "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJjYW5hcnktNDIifQ.c2lnbmF0dXJlMTIzNDU2", + "4242", + ] { + assert!( + !output.contains(secret), + "output retained {secret}: {output}" + ); + } + } + assert!(!serialized_ir.contains("\"default\":true")); + assert!(serialized_ir.contains("[REDACTED]")); + assert!( + ir.findings + .iter() + .any(|finding| finding.code == "secret_like_example") + ); +} + +#[test] +fn encoded_sensitive_url_query_names_are_detected_and_sanitized() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Encoded URL credentials", "version": "1" }, + "servers": [{ "url": "https://api.example.test/?%61pi%5Fkey=encoded-query-canary®ion=west" }], + "paths": { "/health": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let source = serde_json::to_string(&document).unwrap(); + assert!( + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe(&source, &NormalizationConfig::default()) + .is_err() + ); + + let ir = normalize(&document); + let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&ir).unwrap(); + assert!(!serialized.contains("encoded-query-canary")); + assert!(serialized.contains("%61pi%5Fkey=[REDACTED]")); + assert!(serialized.contains("region=west")); +} + +#[test] +fn declared_api_key_names_seed_parameter_and_url_redaction_context() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Declared API keys", "version": "1" }, + "servers": [{ "url": "https://api.example.test/?key=query-canary®ion=west" }], + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "ClientKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "header", "name": "X-Client" }, + "QueryKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "query", "name": "key" }, + "CookieKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "cookie", "name": "session" } + }}, + "paths": { "/public": { + "get": { + "parameters": [ + { "name": "X-Client", "in": "header", "schema": { "type": "string", "default": "header-canary" }, "example": "header-example-canary" }, + { "name": "session", "in": "cookie", "schema": { "type": "string", "default": "cookie-canary" } } + ], + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + } + }} + }); + let source = serde_json::to_string(&document).unwrap(); + assert!( + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe(&source, &NormalizationConfig::default()) + .is_err() + ); + + let ir = normalize(&document); + let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&ir).unwrap(); + for canary in [ + "query-canary", + "header-canary", + "header-example-canary", + "cookie-canary", + ] { + assert!(!serialized.contains(canary), "{canary} leaked into IR"); + } + assert!(serialized.contains("key=[REDACTED]")); + assert!(serialized.contains("region=west")); + + let mixed_containers = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Legacy security map", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": {} }, + "securityDefinitions": { + "QueryKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "query", "name": "key" } + }, + "servers": [{ "url": "https://api.example.test/?key=legacy-container-canary" }], + "paths": { "/public": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let source = serde_json::to_string(&mixed_containers).unwrap(); + assert!( + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe(&source, &NormalizationConfig::default()) + .is_err() + ); + let ir = normalize(&mixed_containers); + let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&ir).unwrap(); + assert!(!serialized.contains("legacy-container-canary")); + assert!(serialized.contains("key=[REDACTED]")); +} + +#[test] +fn credential_like_security_format_hints_are_redacted_but_jwt_is_safe() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Format hints", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "Bearer": { "type": "http", "scheme": "bearer", "bearerFormat": "sk-private-value" }, + "HeaderKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "header", "name": "X-Api-Key", "x-format-hint": "token-format-canary" }, + "SafeBearer": { "type": "http", "scheme": "bearer", "bearerFormat": "JWT" } + }, "headers": { + "X-Api-Key": { "schema": { "type": "string", "default": "opaque-component-header-canary" } } + }}, + "paths": { "/health": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let source = serde_json::to_string(&document).unwrap(); + assert!( + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe(&source, &NormalizationConfig::default()) + .is_err() + ); + + let ir = normalize(&document); + let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&ir).unwrap(); + assert!(!serialized.contains("sk-private-value")); + assert!(!serialized.contains("token-format-canary")); + assert!(!serialized.contains("opaque-component-header-canary")); + assert!(serialized.contains("X-Api-Key")); + let source_tree = serde_json::to_value(&ir.source_tree).unwrap(); + let schema = &source_tree["value"]["value"]["components"]["value"]["value"]["headers"]["value"] + ["value"]["X-Api-Key"]["value"]["value"]["schema"]["value"]["value"]; + assert_eq!(schema["type"]["value"]["value"], "string"); + assert_eq!(schema["default"]["value"]["value"], "[REDACTED]"); + assert!(matches!( + ir.security_schemes["Bearer"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { + format_hint: None, + .. + } + )); + assert!(matches!( + ir.security_schemes["HeaderKey"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::ApiKey { + format_hint: None, + .. + } + )); + assert!(matches!(ir.security_schemes["SafeBearer"].kind, + NormalizedSecuritySchemeKind::Http { ref format_hint, .. } + if format_hint.as_deref() == Some("JWT"))); +} + +#[test] +fn unused_unsupported_openapi_definitions_get_located_manual_warning_without_blocking_public() { + for version in ["3.0.3", "3.1.0"] { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": version, + "info": { "title": "Unused OAuth definition", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "OAuth": { "type": "oauth2", "flows": {} } + }}, + "paths": { "/public": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + let warning = ir + .findings + .iter() + .find(|finding| finding.code == "unsupported_security_scheme_definition") + .expect("unused unsupported definition needs a manual configuration warning"); + assert_eq!(warning.severity, ImportFindingSeverity::Warning); + assert_eq!( + warning.location.pointer, + "/components/securitySchemes/OAuth" + ); + assert!(warning.operation_key.is_none()); + assert!( + candidate(&candidates(&ir), "GET /public") + .findings + .iter() + .all(|finding| finding.severity != ImportFindingSeverity::Error) + ); + } +} + +#[test] +fn unused_unsupported_swagger_definition_gets_located_manual_warning_without_blocking_public() { + let document = json!({ + "swagger": "2.0", + "info": { "title": "Unused OAuth definition", "version": "1" }, + "host": "security.example.test", + "schemes": ["https"], + "securityDefinitions": { + "OAuth": { "type": "oauth2", "flow": "application", "tokenUrl": "https://issuer.example/token", "scopes": {} } + }, + "paths": { "/public": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let ir = normalize(&document); + let warning = ir + .findings + .iter() + .find(|finding| finding.code == "unsupported_security_scheme_definition") + .expect("unused unsupported definition needs a manual configuration warning"); + assert_eq!(warning.severity, ImportFindingSeverity::Warning); + assert_eq!(warning.location.pointer, "/securityDefinitions/OAuth"); + assert!(warning.operation_key.is_none()); + assert!( + candidate(&candidates(&ir), "GET /public") + .findings + .iter() + .all(|finding| finding.severity != ImportFindingSeverity::Error) + ); +} + +#[test] +fn url_credentials_are_redacted_without_discarding_safe_oauth_endpoints() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "URL redaction", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "OAuth": { "type": "oauth2", "flows": { "clientCredentials": { + "tokenUrl": "https://issuer.example/token", + "authorizationUrl": "https://issuer.example/authorize?client_id=public-client" + }} } + }}, + "servers": [ + { "url": "https://bare-canary@api.example.test/v1?api_key=query-canary®ion=west" }, + { "url": "//relative-userinfo-canary@api.example.test/v1" } + ], + "paths": { "/health": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let source = serde_json::to_string(&document).unwrap(); + assert!( + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe(&source, &NormalizationConfig::default()) + .is_err() + ); + let ir = normalize(&document); + let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&ir).unwrap(); + assert!(!serialized.contains("bare-canary")); + assert!(!serialized.contains("relative-userinfo-canary")); + assert!(!serialized.contains("query-canary")); + assert!(serialized.contains("api_key=[REDACTED]")); + assert!(serialized.contains("https://issuer.example/token")); + assert!(serialized.contains("https://issuer.example/authorize?client_id=public-client")); +} + +#[test] +fn sanitized_userinfo_examples_and_declared_query_urls_validate_after_redaction() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { + "title": "Sanitized URL contexts", + "version": "1", + "description": "Docs: https://api.example.test/?key=description-query-canary" + }, + "components": { "securitySchemes": { + "QueryKey": { "type": "apiKey", "in": "query", "name": "key" } + }}, + "paths": { "/health": { "get": { + "requestBody": { "content": { "application/json": { "schema": { + "type": "string", + "example": "https://example-user:example-password@api.example.test/path" + }}}}, + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } + }}}} + }); + let source = serde_json::to_string(&document).unwrap(); + assert!( + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe(&source, &NormalizationConfig::default()) + .is_err() + ); + let ir = normalize(&document); + let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&ir).unwrap(); + assert!(!serialized.contains("description-query-canary")); + assert!(!serialized.contains("example-user")); + assert!(!serialized.contains("example-password")); + assert!(serialized.contains("key=[REDACTED]")); + assert!(serialized.contains("https://api.example.test/path")); +} + +#[test] +fn credential_named_url_defaults_and_url_fragments_are_redacted() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Credential URLs", "version": "1" }, + "components": { "schemas": { + "Config": { "type": "object", "properties": { + "credentialUrl": { "type": "string", "default": "opaque-credential-url-canary" }, + "x-credential-url": "opaque-extension-url-canary", + "callback": { "type": "string", "default": "https://issuer.example/callback#access_token=fragment-canary&state=safe" }, + "reference": { "type": "string", "default": "https://issuer.example/#/components/securitySchemes/AccessToken" } + }} + }}, + "paths": { "/health": { "get": { + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let source = serde_json::to_string(&document).unwrap(); + assert!( + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe(&source, &NormalizationConfig::default()) + .is_err(), + "credentialUrl and URL fragment credentials must fail source preflight" + ); + let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&normalize(&document)).unwrap(); + assert!(!serialized.contains("opaque-credential-url-canary")); + assert!(!serialized.contains("opaque-extension-url-canary")); + assert!(!serialized.contains("fragment-canary")); + assert!(serialized.contains("[REDACTED]")); + assert!(serialized.contains("#access_token=[REDACTED]&state=safe")); + let safe_pointer = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "JSON pointer", "version": "1" }, + "paths": { "/health": { "get": { + "description": "#/components/securitySchemes/AccessToken", + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe( + &serde_json::to_string(&safe_pointer).unwrap(), + &NormalizationConfig::default(), + ) + .expect("JSON-pointer fragments are references, not credential parameters"); +} + +#[test] +fn sensitive_identifiers_preserve_schemes_requirements_and_schema_metadata() { + let document = json!({ + "openapi": "3.0.3", + "info": { "title": "Safe identifiers", "version": "1" }, + "components": { + "securitySchemes": { + "AccessToken": { "type": "http", "scheme": "bearer" } + }, + "schemas": { "Password": { "type": "string" } } + }, + "security": [{ "AccessToken": [] }], + "paths": { "/login": { "post": { + "requestBody": { "content": { "application/json": { "schema": { + "type": "object", "properties": { + "password": { "type": "string", "description": "Password input" } + } + }}}}, + "responses": { "200": { "description": "ok" } } + }}} + }); + let source = serde_json::to_string(&document).unwrap(); + crank_import::rest::validate_document_source_safe(&source, &NormalizationConfig::default()) + .expect("names and schema declarations contain no literal credentials"); + let ir = normalize(&document); + assert!(ir.security_schemes.contains_key("AccessToken")); + assert!(operation(&ir, "/login").security_requirements.alternatives[0].supported); + let schema = operation(&ir, "/login") + .request_body_schema + .as_ref() + .unwrap(); + let crank_import::rest::NormalizedSchemaKind::Object { properties, .. } = &schema.kind else { + panic!("request object schema must survive redaction"); + }; + assert_eq!( + properties["password"].description.as_deref(), + Some("Password input") + ); + assert!(matches!( + properties["password"].kind, + crank_import::rest::NormalizedSchemaKind::Scalar { .. } + )); +} diff --git a/crates/crank-import/tests/security_scope.rs b/crates/crank-import/tests/security_scope.rs index 77d46fc..d51f837 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/tests/security_scope.rs +++ b/crates/crank-import/tests/security_scope.rs @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ //! - an OR array with an empty requirement object `{}` exposes the public //! alternative and must keep the affected operation actionable, without //! touching other operations; -//! - a single non-empty requirement must remain a blocker (regression anchor); +//! - supported non-empty requirements remain resolvable for profile binding; //! - malformed security shapes (non-array value, non-object array item) must //! produce a source-located operation blocker instead of silently //! disappearing. @@ -50,19 +50,30 @@ fn candidate<'a>( } fn security_findings<'a>( - findings: &'a [NormalizedFinding], + ir: &'a crank_import::rest::NormalizedIr, key: &str, ) -> Vec<&'a NormalizedFinding> { - findings - .iter() + all_findings(ir) + .into_iter() .filter(|finding| { - finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement" + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirements" && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error && finding.operation_key.as_deref() == Some(key) }) .collect() } +fn all_findings(ir: &crank_import::rest::NormalizedIr) -> Vec<&NormalizedFinding> { + ir.findings + .iter() + .chain( + ir.operations + .iter() + .flat_map(|operation| &operation.findings), + ) + .collect() +} + #[test] fn empty_or_alternative_makes_the_operation_public() { // Document-level OR array: [{"probe": []}, {}] offers an explicit public @@ -91,7 +102,7 @@ fn empty_or_alternative_makes_the_operation_public() { public.findings ); assert!( - security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /public").is_empty(), + security_findings(&ir, "GET /public").is_empty(), "no security blocker may belong to the public operation: {:?}", ir.findings ); @@ -129,33 +140,28 @@ fn or_alternative_keeps_only_that_operation_public() { ); let closed = candidate(&preview, "GET /closed"); assert!( - closed.findings.iter().any(|finding| { - finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement" - && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error - }), - "non-empty requirement must still block the candidate: {:?}", + closed + .findings + .iter() + .all(|finding| finding.severity != ImportFindingSeverity::Error), + "well-formed supported requirement must remain resolvable: {:?}", closed.findings ); - let ir_blocker = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /closed")[0]; + assert!(security_findings(&ir, "GET /closed").is_empty()); + assert!(closed.security_requirements.alternatives[0].supported); assert_eq!( - ir_blocker.location.pointer, "/paths/~1closed/get/security/0", - "blocker must point at the local requirement: {:?}", - ir_blocker + closed.security_requirements.alternatives[0].schemes, + ["probe"] ); assert!( - security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /closed").len() == 1, - "exactly one blocker for the closed operation: {:?}", - ir.findings - ); - assert!( - security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /open").is_empty(), + security_findings(&ir, "GET /open").is_empty(), "the public alternative must not leak into the open operation: {:?}", ir.findings ); } #[test] -fn nonempty_requirement_still_blocks_with_auth_profile_contract() { +fn well_formed_requirement_stays_resolvable_for_auth_profile_binding() { let source = json!({ "openapi": "3.0.3", "info": { "title": "Security scope regression", "version": "1" }, @@ -170,25 +176,18 @@ fn nonempty_requirement_still_blocks_with_auth_profile_contract() { } }); let (ir, preview) = run(&source); - let blocker = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /secured") - .into_iter() - .next() - .cloned() - .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("non-empty requirement must block: {:?}", ir.findings)); - assert_eq!(blocker.location.pointer, "/security/0"); - assert_eq!( - blocker.message, - "Требование безопасности должно быть привязано к настроенному Auth Profile перед публикацией этой операции; остальные операции не блокируются.", - "Auth Profile contract message must be stable" - ); + assert!(security_findings(&ir, "GET /secured").is_empty()); let secured = candidate(&preview, "GET /secured"); assert!( - secured.findings.iter().any(|finding| { - finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement" - && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error - }), - "blocked candidate must expose the blocker: {:?}", - secured.findings + secured + .findings + .iter() + .all(|finding| finding.severity != ImportFindingSeverity::Error) + ); + assert!(secured.security_requirements.alternatives[0].supported); + assert_eq!( + secured.security_requirements.source, + crank_import::rest::SecurityRequirementsSource::Document ); } @@ -209,7 +208,7 @@ fn malformed_security_shapes_block_the_affected_operation() { }); let (ir, preview) = run(&source); for key in ["GET /one", "GET /two"] { - let blocker = security_findings(&ir.findings, key) + let blocker = security_findings(&ir, key) .into_iter() .next() .cloned() @@ -221,14 +220,15 @@ fn malformed_security_shapes_block_the_affected_operation() { ); assert!( candidate(&preview, key).findings.iter().any(|finding| { - finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement" + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirements" && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error }), "{key} candidate must be blocked" ); } - // Non-object array item: the item pointer must be preserved. + // Non-object array item: the array is fail-closed and the item has a + // source-located warning. let source = json!({ "openapi": "3.0.3", "info": { "title": "Security scope regression", "version": "1" }, @@ -240,16 +240,21 @@ fn malformed_security_shapes_block_the_affected_operation() { } }); let (ir, _) = run(&source); - let blocker = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /one") + let blocker = security_findings(&ir, "GET /one") .into_iter() .next() .cloned() .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("non-object security item must block: {:?}", ir.findings)); assert_eq!( - blocker.location.pointer, "/security/0", - "blocker must point at the malformed item: {:?}", + blocker.location.pointer, "/security", + "blocker must point at the malformed array: {:?}", blocker ); + assert!(all_findings(&ir).iter().any(|finding| { + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirement" + && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning + && finding.location.pointer == "/security/0" + })); // Malformed operation-level security must not affect the neighbour. let source = json!({ @@ -264,7 +269,7 @@ fn malformed_security_shapes_block_the_affected_operation() { } }); let (ir, preview) = run(&source); - let blocker = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /bad") + let blocker = security_findings(&ir, "GET /bad") .into_iter() .next() .cloned() @@ -275,7 +280,7 @@ fn malformed_security_shapes_block_the_affected_operation() { blocker ); assert!( - security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /fine").is_empty(), + security_findings(&ir, "GET /fine").is_empty(), "the neighbour operation must not inherit a local defect: {:?}", ir.findings ); @@ -307,25 +312,29 @@ fn empty_alternative_needs_a_well_formed_array() { } }); let (ir, preview) = run(&source); - let at_item = |pointer: &str| { - ir.findings - .iter() + let at_pointer = |pointer: &str, code: &str| { + all_findings(&ir) + .into_iter() .find(|finding| { - finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement" + finding.code == code && finding.operation_key.as_deref() == Some("GET /mixed") && finding.location.pointer == pointer }) - .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("blocker at {pointer} missing: {:?}", ir.findings)) + .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{code} finding at {pointer} missing: {:?}", ir.findings)) }; - let secured = at_item("/security/0"); assert_eq!( - secured.message, - "Требование безопасности должно быть привязано к настроенному Auth Profile перед публикацией этой операции; остальные операции не блокируются." + at_pointer("/security", "invalid_security_requirements").severity, + ImportFindingSeverity::Error ); - let malformed = at_item("/security/2"); assert_eq!( - malformed.message, - "security содержит альтернативу без объекта требований: формат не поддерживается, операция не публикуется." + at_pointer("/security/2", "invalid_security_requirement").severity, + ImportFindingSeverity::Warning + ); + assert!( + candidate(&preview, "GET /mixed") + .security_requirements + .alternatives[0] + .supported ); assert!( candidate(&preview, "GET /mixed") @@ -365,10 +374,10 @@ fn object_instead_of_security_array_has_scoped_coverage() { } else { "/security" }; - let blocker = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /bad"); + let blocker = security_findings(&ir, "GET /bad"); assert_eq!(blocker.len(), 1, "{version} {local}: {:?}", ir.findings); assert_eq!(blocker[0].location.pointer, expected); - assert!(security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /public").is_empty()); + assert!(security_findings(&ir, "GET /public").is_empty()); assert!( candidate(&preview, "GET /public") .findings @@ -435,7 +444,7 @@ fn openapi_31_non_array_root_security_blocks_inherited_operations() { ); let (ir, preview) = run(&Value::Object(fixture)); for key in ["GET /one", "GET /two"] { - let blockers = security_findings(&ir.findings, key); + let blockers = security_findings(&ir, key); assert_eq!( blockers.len(), 1, @@ -444,7 +453,7 @@ fn openapi_31_non_array_root_security_blocks_inherited_operations() { ); let blocker = &blockers[0]; assert_eq!( - blocker.code, "unsupported_security_requirement", + blocker.code, "invalid_security_requirements", "stable finding code: {blocker:?}" ); assert_eq!( @@ -458,7 +467,7 @@ fn openapi_31_non_array_root_security_blocks_inherited_operations() { ); assert!( candidate(&preview, key).findings.iter().any(|finding| { - finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement" + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirements" && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error }), "{key} candidate must be blocked" @@ -481,10 +490,10 @@ fn openapi_31_malformed_local_security_affects_only_that_operation() { }), ); let (ir, preview) = run(&Value::Object(fixture)); - let blockers = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /bad"); + let blockers = security_findings(&ir, "GET /bad"); assert_eq!(blockers.len(), 1, "exactly one blocker: {:?}", ir.findings); assert_eq!( - blockers[0].code, "unsupported_security_requirement", + blockers[0].code, "invalid_security_requirements", "stable finding code" ); assert_eq!( @@ -498,7 +507,7 @@ fn openapi_31_malformed_local_security_affects_only_that_operation() { blockers[0] ); assert!( - security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /public").is_empty(), + security_findings(&ir, "GET /public").is_empty(), "the public neighbour must not inherit a local defect: {:?}", ir.findings ); @@ -520,7 +529,7 @@ fn openapi_31_public_alternative_with_malformed_sibling_does_not_go_public() { json!({ "/mixed": get200("mixedOp31", None) }), ); let (ir, preview) = run(&Value::Object(fixture)); - let blockers = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /mixed"); + let blockers = security_findings(&ir, "GET /mixed"); assert_eq!( blockers.len(), 1, @@ -528,14 +537,15 @@ fn openapi_31_public_alternative_with_malformed_sibling_does_not_go_public() { ir.findings ); assert_eq!( - blockers[0].location.pointer, "/security/1", - "blocker must point at the non-object item: {:?}", + blockers[0].location.pointer, "/security", + "fail-closed blocker must point at the malformed array: {:?}", blockers[0] ); - assert_eq!( - blockers[0].message, - "security содержит альтернативу без объекта требований: формат не поддерживается, операция не публикуется." - ); + assert!(all_findings(&ir).iter().any(|finding| { + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirement" + && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning + && finding.location.pointer == "/security/1" + })); assert!( candidate(&preview, "GET /mixed") .findings @@ -558,7 +568,7 @@ fn swagger2_non_array_root_security_blocks_inherited_operations() { ); let (ir, preview) = run(&Value::Object(fixture)); for key in ["GET /one", "GET /two"] { - let blockers = security_findings(&ir.findings, key); + let blockers = security_findings(&ir, key); assert_eq!( blockers.len(), 1, @@ -567,7 +577,7 @@ fn swagger2_non_array_root_security_blocks_inherited_operations() { ); let blocker = &blockers[0]; assert_eq!( - blocker.code, "unsupported_security_requirement", + blocker.code, "invalid_security_requirements", "stable finding code: {blocker:?}" ); assert_eq!( @@ -581,7 +591,7 @@ fn swagger2_non_array_root_security_blocks_inherited_operations() { ); assert!( candidate(&preview, key).findings.iter().any(|finding| { - finding.code == "unsupported_security_requirement" + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirements" && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Error }), "{key} candidate must be blocked" @@ -604,9 +614,9 @@ fn swagger2_malformed_local_security_affects_only_that_operation() { }), ); let (ir, preview) = run(&Value::Object(fixture)); - let blockers = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /bad"); + let blockers = security_findings(&ir, "GET /bad"); assert_eq!(blockers.len(), 1, "exactly one blocker: {:?}", ir.findings); - assert_eq!(blockers[0].code, "unsupported_security_requirement"); + assert_eq!(blockers[0].code, "invalid_security_requirements"); assert_eq!(blockers[0].severity, ImportFindingSeverity::Error); assert_eq!( blockers[0].location.pointer, "/paths/~1bad/get/security", @@ -614,7 +624,7 @@ fn swagger2_malformed_local_security_affects_only_that_operation() { blockers[0] ); assert!( - security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /public").is_empty(), + security_findings(&ir, "GET /public").is_empty(), "the public neighbour must not inherit a local defect: {:?}", ir.findings ); @@ -636,7 +646,7 @@ fn swagger2_public_alternative_with_malformed_sibling_does_not_go_public() { json!({ "/mixed": get200("mixedOpS2", None) }), ); let (ir, preview) = run(&Value::Object(fixture)); - let blockers = security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /mixed"); + let blockers = security_findings(&ir, "GET /mixed"); assert_eq!( blockers.len(), 1, @@ -644,14 +654,15 @@ fn swagger2_public_alternative_with_malformed_sibling_does_not_go_public() { ir.findings ); assert_eq!( - blockers[0].location.pointer, "/security/1", - "blocker must point at the non-object item: {:?}", + blockers[0].location.pointer, "/security", + "fail-closed blocker must point at the malformed array: {:?}", blockers[0] ); - assert_eq!( - blockers[0].message, - "security содержит альтернативу без объекта требований: формат не поддерживается, операция не публикуется." - ); + assert!(all_findings(&ir).iter().any(|finding| { + finding.code == "invalid_security_requirement" + && finding.severity == ImportFindingSeverity::Warning + && finding.location.pointer == "/security/1" + })); assert!( candidate(&preview, "GET /mixed") .findings @@ -675,7 +686,7 @@ fn empty_security_array_stays_public() { }); let (ir, preview) = run(&source); assert!( - security_findings(&ir.findings, "GET /public").is_empty(), + security_findings(&ir, "GET /public").is_empty(), "explicit empty override must stay public: {:?}", ir.findings ); diff --git a/crates/crank-import/tests/support-matrix.yaml b/crates/crank-import/tests/support-matrix.yaml index abd7d36..fa95f44 100644 --- a/crates/crank-import/tests/support-matrix.yaml +++ b/crates/crank-import/tests/support-matrix.yaml @@ -598,19 +598,19 @@ constructs: expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.0" construct_id: "security.bearer" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "Bearer scheme metadata and OR alternatives are retained without credentials; the import API resolves an Auth Profile binding." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.0" construct_id: "security.basic" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "Basic scheme metadata and OR alternatives are retained without credentials; the import API resolves an Auth Profile binding." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.0" construct_id: "security.api_key" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "API key location/name and OR alternatives are retained without credentials; the import API resolves an Auth Profile binding." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.0" construct_id: "security.override_empty" status: supported @@ -618,9 +618,9 @@ constructs: expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.0" construct_id: "security.mixed_operations" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "Only the operation carrying an effective security requirement receives the source-located blocker; operations overriding it with an empty security array remain actionable." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "Effective security metadata is retained on the inherited operation; explicit empty overrides remain public and actionable." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.0" construct_id: "media_type.application_xml.request" status: unsupported @@ -1238,19 +1238,19 @@ constructs: expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.1" construct_id: "security.bearer" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "Bearer scheme metadata and OR alternatives are retained without credentials; the import API resolves an Auth Profile binding." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.1" construct_id: "security.basic" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "Basic scheme metadata and OR alternatives are retained without credentials; the import API resolves an Auth Profile binding." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.1" construct_id: "security.api_key" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "API key location/name and OR alternatives are retained without credentials; the import API resolves an Auth Profile binding." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.1" construct_id: "security.override_empty" status: supported @@ -1258,9 +1258,9 @@ constructs: expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.1" construct_id: "security.mixed_operations" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "Only the operation carrying an effective security requirement receives the source-located blocker; operations overriding it with an empty security array remain actionable." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "Effective security metadata is retained on the inherited operation; explicit empty overrides remain public and actionable." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "OpenAPI 3.1" construct_id: "media_type.application_xml.request" status: unsupported @@ -1879,18 +1879,18 @@ constructs: - specification_version: "Swagger 2.0" construct_id: "security.bearer" status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + preserved_semantics: "Swagger OAuth2 semantics require manual setup; OAuth credentials are never copied into the import preview." + expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirements" - specification_version: "Swagger 2.0" construct_id: "security.basic" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "Basic scheme metadata and OR alternatives are retained without credentials; the import API resolves an Auth Profile binding." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "Swagger 2.0" construct_id: "security.api_key" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "The source security requirement is retained as a blocker until an administrator selects a compatible Auth Profile; credentials are never copied into the import preview." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "API key location/name and OR alternatives are retained without credentials; the import API resolves an Auth Profile binding." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "Swagger 2.0" construct_id: "security.override_empty" status: supported @@ -1898,9 +1898,9 @@ constructs: expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "Swagger 2.0" construct_id: "security.mixed_operations" - status: unsupported - preserved_semantics: "Only the operation carrying an effective security requirement receives the source-located blocker; operations overriding it with an empty security array remain actionable." - expected_finding: "unsupported_security_requirement" + status: supported + preserved_semantics: "Effective basic security metadata is retained on the inherited operation; explicit empty overrides remain public and actionable." + expected_finding: "none" - specification_version: "Swagger 2.0" construct_id: "media_type.application_xml.request" status: unsupported diff --git a/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job.rs b/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job.rs index a5a8e8a..4250f49 100644 --- a/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job.rs +++ b/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job.rs @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ +mod legacy_auth; mod plan_apply; use super::*; use crate::{ - ArtifactSourceId, CreateImportPlanRequest, ImportJobKind, ImportJobSourceEnvelope, ImportPlan, - ImportPlanId, + ArtifactSourceId, CreateImportPlanRequest, ImportJobKind, ImportJobSourceEnvelope, + ImportOperationDraft, ImportPlan, ImportPlanId, }; use crank_artifacts::ArtifactRef; use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; @@ -577,6 +578,8 @@ async fn apply_import_job_transaction( } } + legacy_auth::verify_legacy_import_auth(tx, request.workspace_id, request.operations).await?; + let mut result = ImportJobApplyResult { application_key: request.application_key.to_owned(), skipped: request.pre_skipped.to_vec(), diff --git a/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/legacy_auth.rs b/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/legacy_auth.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9910aca --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/legacy_auth.rs @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +use super::*; + +/// Legacy Apply has no plan-time auth snapshot, but it still must not create +/// operations from a stale or cross-workspace profile reference. Lock and +/// validate every referenced profile and its secret rows before inserting +/// any operation; ImportPlan Apply performs the stricter snapshot comparison. +pub(super) async fn verify_legacy_import_auth( + tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>, + workspace_id: &WorkspaceId, + operations: &[ImportOperationDraft], +) -> Result<(), RegistryError> { + let mut profiles = std::collections::BTreeMap::>::new(); + let mut profile_snapshots = std::collections::BTreeMap::::new(); + for draft in operations { + if let Some(profile_id) = draft.operation.execution_config.auth_profile_ref.as_ref() { + profiles.entry(profile_id.as_str().to_owned()).or_default(); + } + } + if profiles.is_empty() { + return Ok(()); + } + + let unavailable = |id: &str| RegistryError::ImportPlanAuthUnavailable { + auth_profile_id: id.to_owned(), + }; + let profile_ids: Vec = profiles.keys().cloned().collect(); + for profile_id in &profile_ids { + let row = sqlx::query( + "select id, name, kind, config_json, created_at, updated_at + from auth_profiles + where workspace_id = $1 and id = $2", + ) + .bind(workspace_id.as_str()) + .bind(profile_id) + .fetch_optional(&mut **tx) + .await? + .ok_or_else(|| unavailable(profile_id))?; + let profile_id_value = row.try_get::("id")?; + let profile_kind = row.try_get::("kind")?; + let config_json = row.try_get::("config_json")?; + let profile = build_auth_profile( + profile_id_value, + workspace_id.as_str().to_owned(), + row.try_get::("name")?, + profile_kind.clone(), + config_json.clone(), + row.try_get::("created_at")?, + row.try_get::("updated_at")?, + ) + .map_err(|_| unavailable(profile_id))?; + if profile.kind != profile.config.kind() { + return Err(unavailable(profile_id)); + } + let mut secret_ids = profile + .config + .secret_ids() + .into_iter() + .map(|secret| secret.as_str().to_owned()) + .collect::>(); + secret_ids.sort(); + secret_ids.dedup(); + profiles.insert(profile_id.clone(), secret_ids); + profile_snapshots.insert(row.try_get::("id")?, (profile_kind, config_json)); + } + + let secret_ids: std::collections::BTreeSet = + profiles.values().flatten().cloned().collect(); + for secret_id in secret_ids { + let owner = profiles + .iter() + .find_map(|(profile_id, ids)| ids.contains(&secret_id).then_some(profile_id.as_str())) + .unwrap_or_default(); + let row = sqlx::query( + "select status, current_version + from secrets + where workspace_id = $1 and id = $2 + for update", + ) + .bind(workspace_id.as_str()) + .bind(&secret_id) + .fetch_optional(&mut **tx) + .await? + .ok_or_else(|| unavailable(owner))?; + let status: String = row.try_get("status")?; + let version: i32 = row.try_get("current_version")?; + let version_present = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, bool>( + "select exists(select 1 from secret_versions where secret_id = $1 and version = $2)", + ) + .bind(&secret_id) + .bind(version) + .fetch_one(&mut **tx) + .await?; + if status != "active" || !version_present { + return Err(unavailable(owner)); + } + } + + // Keep the established secret-then-profile lock order. The profile may + // have changed while secret rows were locked; compare its live config and + // secret set with the initial read before Apply mutates any operation. + for profile_id in profile_ids { + let row = sqlx::query( + "select id, name, kind, config_json, created_at, updated_at + from auth_profiles + where workspace_id = $1 and id = $2 + for update", + ) + .bind(workspace_id.as_str()) + .bind(&profile_id) + .fetch_optional(&mut **tx) + .await? + .ok_or_else(|| unavailable(&profile_id))?; + let kind: String = row.try_get("kind")?; + let config: Value = row.try_get("config_json")?; + let Some((expected_kind, expected_config)) = profile_snapshots.get(&profile_id) else { + return Err(unavailable(&profile_id)); + }; + if &kind != expected_kind || &config != expected_config { + return Err(unavailable(&profile_id)); + } + let profile = build_auth_profile( + row.try_get::("id")?, + workspace_id.as_str().to_owned(), + row.try_get::("name")?, + kind, + config, + row.try_get::("created_at")?, + row.try_get::("updated_at")?, + ) + .map_err(|_| unavailable(&profile_id))?; + let mut live_secret_ids = profile + .config + .secret_ids() + .into_iter() + .map(|secret| secret.as_str().to_owned()) + .collect::>(); + live_secret_ids.sort(); + live_secret_ids.dedup(); + if profiles.get(&profile_id) != Some(&live_secret_ids) { + return Err(unavailable(&profile_id)); + } + } + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/plan_apply/material.rs b/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/plan_apply/material.rs index 6ce34d8..aa0fd39 100644 --- a/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/plan_apply/material.rs +++ b/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/plan_apply/material.rs @@ -60,6 +60,18 @@ pub(super) struct StoredPlanCandidate { /// ids/status/versions. #[serde(default)] pub(crate) auth_snapshot: Option, + /// Source-derived selected scheme requirement. Apply checks the live + /// profile against this independently of the captured profile snapshot, + /// closing a profile-change race between compatibility lookup and capture. + #[serde(default)] + pub(crate) auth_requirement: Option, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub(super) struct StoredAuthRequirement { + pub(crate) kind: String, + #[serde(default)] + pub(crate) parameter_name: Option, } /// Plan-time snapshot of one auth profile's redacted metadata. @@ -391,6 +403,24 @@ pub(super) fn read_and_validate_plan_material( return Err(corrupt()); } } + match (&candidate.auth_requirement, &auth_ref, actionable) { + (Some(requirement), Some(_), true) + if requirement.kind == "unconstrained" + && requirement.parameter_name.is_none() + && decision.action == "new_version" => {} + (Some(requirement), Some(_), true) + if matches!(requirement.kind.as_str(), "bearer" | "basic") + && requirement.parameter_name.is_none() + || matches!( + requirement.kind.as_str(), + "api_key_header" | "api_key_query" + ) && requirement + .parameter_name + .as_deref() + .is_some_and(|name| !name.is_empty() && name.len() <= 256) => {} + (None, None, _) | (None, Some(_), false) => {} + _ => return Err(corrupt()), + } match decision.action.as_str() { "create" => { if target.is_some() diff --git a/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/plan_apply/verify.rs b/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/plan_apply/verify.rs index fbdcb2e..bf7cca6 100644 --- a/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/plan_apply/verify.rs +++ b/crates/crank-registry/src/postgres/import_job/plan_apply/verify.rs @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ pub(super) async fn lock_and_verify_auth( workspace_id: &WorkspaceId, candidates: &[StoredPlanCandidate], ) -> Result<(), RegistryError> { - use material::StoredAuthSnapshot; + use material::{StoredAuthRequirement, StoredAuthSnapshot}; let unavailable = |auth_profile_id: &str| RegistryError::ImportPlanAuthUnavailable { auth_profile_id: auth_profile_id.to_owned(), @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ pub(super) async fn lock_and_verify_auth( // snapshot; a disagreement means the profile drifted during CreatePlan // and the whole apply must be re-previewed before any mutation. let mut snapshots: BTreeMap = BTreeMap::new(); + let mut requirements: BTreeMap> = BTreeMap::new(); { use std::collections::btree_map::Entry; for candidate in candidates { @@ -95,6 +96,14 @@ pub(super) async fn lock_and_verify_auth( .auth_snapshot .as_ref() .ok_or_else(|| unavailable(ref_id.as_str()))?; + let requirement = candidate + .auth_requirement + .as_ref() + .ok_or_else(|| unavailable(ref_id.as_str()))?; + requirements + .entry(ref_id.as_str().to_owned()) + .or_default() + .push(requirement); match snapshots.entry(ref_id.as_str().to_owned()) { Entry::Vacant(vacant) => { vacant.insert(snapshot); @@ -132,6 +141,13 @@ pub(super) async fn lock_and_verify_auth( if profile.kind != profile.config.kind() { return Err(unavailable(profile_id)); } + if requirements.get(profile_id).is_none_or(|expected| { + expected + .iter() + .any(|requirement| !auth_config_satisfies_requirement(&profile.config, requirement)) + }) { + return Err(unavailable(profile_id)); + } // Drift since the plan was confirmed (config, name, kind or // updated_at) means the re-preview contract: typed conflict, no // mutation. @@ -263,3 +279,57 @@ pub(super) async fn lock_and_verify_auth( } Ok(()) } + +fn auth_config_satisfies_requirement( + config: &crank_core::AuthConfig, + requirement: &material::StoredAuthRequirement, +) -> bool { + use crank_core::AuthConfig; + match (config, requirement.kind.as_str()) { + (_, "unconstrained") => requirement.parameter_name.is_none(), + (AuthConfig::Bearer(_), "bearer") | (AuthConfig::Basic(_), "basic") => { + requirement.parameter_name.is_none() + } + (AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(config), "api_key_header") => requirement + .parameter_name + .as_deref() + .is_some_and(|name| config.header_name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name)), + (AuthConfig::ApiKeyQuery(config), "api_key_query") => requirement + .parameter_name + .as_deref() + .is_some_and(|name| config.param_name == name), + _ => false, + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::auth_config_satisfies_requirement; + use crate::postgres::import_job::plan_apply::material::StoredAuthRequirement; + use crank_core::{ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig, AuthConfig, SecretId}; + + #[test] + fn source_selected_header_name_is_rechecked_against_live_profile_config() { + let source_requirement = StoredAuthRequirement { + kind: "api_key_header".to_owned(), + parameter_name: Some("X-A".to_owned()), + }; + let compatible = AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig { + header_name: "x-a".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new("secret_a"), + }); + let changed_after_resolution = AuthConfig::ApiKeyHeader(ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig { + header_name: "X-B".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new("secret_a"), + }); + + assert!(auth_config_satisfies_requirement( + &compatible, + &source_requirement + )); + assert!(!auth_config_satisfies_requirement( + &changed_after_resolution, + &source_requirement + )); + } +} diff --git a/crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs b/crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs index 860d6bf..6401865 100644 --- a/crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs +++ b/crates/crank-registry/tests/integration/import_plan/apply/auth.rs @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ use super::*; use crank_core::{ - ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig, AuthConfig, AuthKind, AuthProfile, Secret, SecretId, SecretKind, - SecretStatus, + ApiKeyHeaderAuthConfig, ApiKeyQueryAuthConfig, AuthConfig, AuthKind, AuthProfile, + BasicAuthConfig, Secret, SecretId, SecretKind, SecretStatus, }; use crank_registry::MASTER_KEY_CIPHER_CONTRACT; use crank_registry::{ @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ fn auth_plan_payload( "name": operation.name, "state": "actionable", "decision": { "action": "create" }, + "auth_requirement": { "kind": "api_key_header", "parameter_name": "X-Apply-Key" }, "operation": operation }); if let Some(snapshot) = snapshot { @@ -133,6 +134,136 @@ fn auth_plan_payload( }) } +fn typed_auth_plan_payload( + plan_id: &str, + job_id: &str, + fingerprint: &Value, + auth_profile_id: &str, + requirement_kind: &str, + parameter_name: Option<&str>, + snapshot: Value, +) -> Value { + let mut operation = plan_operation("op_typed_auth"); + operation.execution_config.auth_profile_ref = Some(auth_profile_id.into()); + let mut requirement = json!({ "kind": requirement_kind }); + if let Some(parameter_name) = parameter_name { + requirement["parameter_name"] = json!(parameter_name); + } + json!({ + "schema_version": "import-plan-v1", + "plan_reference": plan_id, + "job_id": job_id, + "fingerprint": fingerprint, + "source": { "source_id": SOURCE_ID, "digest": source_ref() }, + "dependencies": [], + "selection": { + "mode": "full", "all": ["typed"], "selected": ["typed"], "excluded": [] + }, + "counts": { "selected": 1, "excluded": 0, "actionable": 1, "blocked": 0 }, + "candidates": [{ + "key": "typed", + "name": operation.name, + "state": "actionable", + "decision": { "action": "create" }, + "auth_requirement": requirement, + "operation": operation, + "auth_snapshot": snapshot + }] + }) +} + +async fn typed_auth_base( + database: &TestDatabase, + workspace_tag: &str, + profile_id: &str, + config: AuthConfig, +) -> ( + PostgresRegistry, + WorkspaceId, + ImportJobId, + Value, + AuthProfile, + Value, +) { + let registry = database.registry().await; + registry + .verify_or_register_master_key_identity(MasterKeyIdentityCandidate { + epoch: 1, + fingerprint: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", + cipher_contract: MASTER_KEY_CIPHER_CONTRACT, + observed_at: &ts(), + }) + .await + .unwrap(); + let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc(); + let ws = create_workspace(®istry, workspace_tag).await; + let job = create_pending_openapi_job( + ®istry, + &ws, + &format!("job_typed_auth_{workspace_tag}"), + now, + now + Duration::hours(1), + ) + .await; + activate_source(&database.raw_pool().await, &ws, now).await; + + let mut secrets = Vec::new(); + for (index, secret_id) in config.secret_ids().into_iter().enumerate() { + let secret = Secret { + id: secret_id.clone(), + workspace_id: ws.clone(), + name: format!("Typed auth secret {index}"), + kind: SecretKind::Token, + status: SecretStatus::Active, + current_version: 1, + created_at: ts(), + updated_at: ts(), + last_used_at: None, + }; + registry + .create_secret(CreateSecretRequest { + secret: &secret, + ciphertext: "ciphertext", + key_version: "v1", + master_key_epoch: 1, + created_by: None, + }) + .await + .unwrap(); + secrets.push(secret); + } + let profile = AuthProfile { + id: profile_id.into(), + workspace_id: ws.clone(), + name: "Typed auth profile".to_owned(), + kind: config.kind(), + config, + created_at: ts(), + updated_at: ts(), + }; + registry + .save_auth_profile(SaveAuthProfileRequest { + workspace_id: &ws, + profile: &profile, + }) + .await + .unwrap(); + let snapshot = json!({ + "profile_id": profile.id.as_str(), + "name": profile.name, + "kind": profile.kind, + "config": profile.config, + "updated_at": profile.updated_at.format(&Rfc3339).unwrap(), + "secrets": secrets.iter().map(|secret| json!({ + "id": secret.id.as_str(), + "status": secret.status, + "current_version": secret.current_version, + "updated_at": secret.updated_at.format(&Rfc3339).unwrap() + })).collect::>() + }); + (registry, ws, job, fingerprint(), profile, snapshot) +} + async fn auth_base( database: &TestDatabase, workspace_tag: &str, @@ -268,6 +399,67 @@ async fn apply_rejects_auth_profile_config_drift() { database.cleanup().await; } +#[tokio::test] +async fn apply_rechecks_live_profile_against_source_requirement_even_when_snapshot_matches() { + let database = TestDatabase::new().await; + let (registry, raw_pool, ws, job, fp, _snapshot_a) = + auth_base(&database, "a_source_requirement").await; + + // Reproduce the race: source compatibility was resolved while the + // profile used X-Apply-Key, then the profile changed before the later + // snapshot capture, so the stored snapshot itself accurately says X-B. + sqlx::query( + "update auth_profiles + set config_json = jsonb_set(config_json, '{api_key_header,header_name}', '\"X-B\"'), + updated_at = now() + where workspace_id = $1 and id = $2", + ) + .bind(ws.as_str()) + .bind("auth_apply") + .execute(&raw_pool) + .await + .unwrap(); + let profile = capture_profile_fixture(®istry, &ws).await; + let secret = registry + .get_secret(&ws, &SecretId::new("sec_apply")) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap() + .secret; + let snapshot_b = capture_snapshot(&profile, &secret); + assert_eq!(snapshot_b["config"]["api_key_header"]["header_name"], "X-B"); + + // The source-derived requirement remains X-Apply-Key even though the + // plan-time snapshot now matches the live X-B profile exactly. + let payload = auth_plan_payload("plan_auth_source_req", job.as_str(), &fp, Some(snapshot_b)); + let (plan, digest) = + store_plan(®istry, &ws, &job, "plan_auth_source_req", &fp, payload).await; + let applied_at = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_800_000_000).unwrap(); + let result = registry + .apply_import_plan(&ApplyImportPlanRequest { + workspace_id: &ws, + plan_id: &plan, + plan_digest: &digest, + idempotency_key: "idem_auth_source_req", + verified_fingerprint: &fp, + applied_at: &applied_at, + }) + .await; + assert!(matches!( + result, + Err(RegistryError::ImportPlanAuthUnavailable { auth_profile_id }) + if auth_profile_id == "auth_apply" + )); + assert!( + registry + .get_operation_summary(&ws, &OperationId::new("op_apply_auth")) + .await + .unwrap() + .is_none() + ); + database.cleanup().await; +} + async fn capture_profile_fixture(registry: &PostgresRegistry, ws: &WorkspaceId) -> AuthProfile { registry .get_auth_profile(ws, &crank_core::AuthProfileId::new("auth_apply")) @@ -421,3 +613,149 @@ async fn apply_rejects_auth_candidates_missing_or_mismatched_snapshot() { ); database.cleanup().await; } + +#[tokio::test] +async fn apply_accepts_basic_auth_with_matching_snapshot_and_source_requirement() { + let database = TestDatabase::new().await; + let profile_id = "auth_basic_apply"; + let (registry, ws, job, fp, _profile, snapshot) = typed_auth_base( + &database, + "a_basic_ok", + profile_id, + AuthConfig::Basic(BasicAuthConfig { + username_secret_id: SecretId::new("sec_basic_user"), + password_secret_id: SecretId::new("sec_basic_password"), + }), + ) + .await; + let payload = typed_auth_plan_payload( + "plan_basic_ok", + job.as_str(), + &fp, + profile_id, + "basic", + None, + snapshot, + ); + let (plan, digest) = store_plan(®istry, &ws, &job, "plan_basic_ok", &fp, payload).await; + let applied_at = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_800_000_000).unwrap(); + let result = registry + .apply_import_plan(&ApplyImportPlanRequest { + workspace_id: &ws, + plan_id: &plan, + plan_digest: &digest, + idempotency_key: "idem_basic_ok", + verified_fingerprint: &fp, + applied_at: &applied_at, + }) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(result.report.status, ImportPlanApplyStatus::Applied); + assert_eq!(result.report.counts.created, 1); + let summary = registry + .get_operation_summary(&ws, &OperationId::new("op_typed_auth")) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(summary.current_draft_version, 1); + database.cleanup().await; +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn apply_accepts_query_key_with_matching_snapshot_and_source_requirement() { + let database = TestDatabase::new().await; + let profile_id = "auth_query_apply"; + let (registry, ws, job, fp, _profile, snapshot) = typed_auth_base( + &database, + "a_query_ok", + profile_id, + AuthConfig::ApiKeyQuery(ApiKeyQueryAuthConfig { + param_name: "access_token".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new("sec_query_key"), + }), + ) + .await; + let payload = typed_auth_plan_payload( + "plan_query_ok", + job.as_str(), + &fp, + profile_id, + "api_key_query", + Some("access_token"), + snapshot, + ); + let (plan, digest) = store_plan(®istry, &ws, &job, "plan_query_ok", &fp, payload).await; + let applied_at = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_800_000_000).unwrap(); + let result = registry + .apply_import_plan(&ApplyImportPlanRequest { + workspace_id: &ws, + plan_id: &plan, + plan_digest: &digest, + idempotency_key: "idem_query_ok", + verified_fingerprint: &fp, + applied_at: &applied_at, + }) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(result.report.status, ImportPlanApplyStatus::Applied); + assert_eq!(result.report.counts.created, 1); + let summary = registry + .get_operation_summary(&ws, &OperationId::new("op_typed_auth")) + .await + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(summary.current_draft_version, 1); + database.cleanup().await; +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn apply_rejects_query_key_source_mismatch_with_matching_live_snapshot() { + let database = TestDatabase::new().await; + let profile_id = "auth_query_mismatch"; + let (registry, ws, job, fp, _profile, snapshot) = typed_auth_base( + &database, + "a_query_mismatch", + profile_id, + AuthConfig::ApiKeyQuery(ApiKeyQueryAuthConfig { + param_name: "access_token".to_owned(), + secret_id: SecretId::new("sec_query_mismatch"), + }), + ) + .await; + let payload = typed_auth_plan_payload( + "plan_query_mismatch", + job.as_str(), + &fp, + profile_id, + "api_key_query", + Some("other_token"), + snapshot, + ); + let (plan, digest) = + store_plan(®istry, &ws, &job, "plan_query_mismatch", &fp, payload).await; + let applied_at = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_800_000_000).unwrap(); + let result = registry + .apply_import_plan(&ApplyImportPlanRequest { + workspace_id: &ws, + plan_id: &plan, + plan_digest: &digest, + idempotency_key: "idem_query_mismatch", + verified_fingerprint: &fp, + applied_at: &applied_at, + }) + .await; + assert!(matches!( + result, + Err(RegistryError::ImportPlanAuthUnavailable { auth_profile_id }) + if auth_profile_id == profile_id + )); + assert!( + registry + .get_operation_summary(&ws, &OperationId::new("op_typed_auth")) + .await + .unwrap() + .is_none(), + "query source mismatch must fail before creating an operation" + ); + database.cleanup().await; +} diff --git a/docs/openapi-import.md b/docs/openapi-import.md index da3a008..c86ec9c 100644 --- a/docs/openapi-import.md +++ b/docs/openapi-import.md @@ -8,17 +8,20 @@ Crank умеет импортировать REST API из OpenAPI 3.x и Swagger 2. Нажмите **Импорт OpenAPI** рядом с кнопкой **Новая операция**. 3. Загрузите ровно один UTF-8 `.yaml`, `.yml` или `.json` файл размером от 1 B до 256 KiB. Вставка текста не поддерживается. 4. Нажмите **Разобрать документ**. -5. Проверьте preview: сгенерированный contract сохраняет parameter locations, body formats и варианты успешного ответа. +5. Проверьте preview: сгенерированный contract сохраняет parameter locations, body formats, варианты успешного ответа и effective security requirements. 6. Выберите нужные группы и методы. 7. Проверьте `Base URL`. Если в документе нет `servers`, укажите URL вручную. 8. Для уже существующей операции подтвердите решение отдельно: пропустить точную операцию, создать отдельную операцию с указанным вами свободным именем или добавить новую черновую версию к выбранной REST-операции. Автоматический подбор имени при применении плана не выполняется. 9. Создайте план и проверьте число выбранных, исключённых, доступных и заблокированных методов. По умолчанию полный план требует, чтобы каждый метод можно было применить; для частичного импорта явно оставьте только нужные методы. -10. Подтвердите план и примените его. Создание плана не меняет операции. Применение выполняет все выбранные изменения одной транзакцией и показывает результат для каждого метода. +10. Для защищённых методов задайте совместимый Auth Profile через import API, выбрав конкретную security alternative из вариантов preview. Незакрытое обязательное требование оставляет метод заблокированным; выбор этих привязок в UI пока недоступен. +11. Подтвердите план и примените его. Создание плана не меняет операции. Применение выполняет все выбранные изменения одной транзакцией и показывает результат для каждого метода. ## Загрузка и восстановление Браузер отправляет выбранный файл как `multipart/form-data`; границу multipart формирует сам браузер. Файл остаётся только в памяти текущего окна импорта. При замене файла, сбросе, закрытии окна, смене workspace/языка или уходе со страницы текущий запрос отменяется, а поздний ответ игнорируется. При `pagehide` (включая BFCache) выбранный файл и Base URL очищаются: после возврата нужно выбрать файл заново, повтор старой загрузки не предлагается. +До сохранения source snapshot импорт проверяет основной документ и загруженные allowlisted `$ref`-документы вместе, включая разрешённые ссылки. Если такая проверка находит literal credential, загрузка отклоняется; значение не попадает в artifact storage, preview или текст ошибки. Безопасные внешние ссылки сохраняются как digest-проверенные immutable snapshots и не загружаются заново при Apply. + Для ошибки можно выбрать файл заново или нажать **Повторить**. Диагностика загрузки показывает только ограниченные имя/размер файла и, если backend их вернул, `Request ID`/`Trace ID`; содержимое спецификации и внутренние пути не выводятся. Подтверждение плана показывает счётчики и решения по кандидатам, но не исходный документ и не учётные данные. Digest плана передаётся в Apply автоматически. При неизвестном результате Apply, например после разрыва соединения, повторите запрос с теми же ссылкой на план, digest и ключом идемпотентности. Повтор после commit возвращает сохранённый отчёт и не создаёт ещё одну версию; тот же ключ с другим digest даёт конфликт. Пока Apply выполняется, повторное нажатие кнопки не отправляет вторую логическую операцию. @@ -78,7 +81,7 @@ Semantic loss получает blocker с source location: такой candidate Один endpoint с несколькими request formats остаётся одним Tool. Поля `content_type` и `body` выбирают одну schema и соответствующую сериализацию; неизвестный selector или body другой ветви отклоняются до отправки запроса. Для единственного формата selector не нужен. Подробный inline-file contract описан в [REST](protocols/rest.md). -Новые imports используют `normalized-ir-v4` / `preview-v4`. Сохранённые v2/v3 jobs воспроизводят сохранённый preview, а legacy-v1 использует отдельную историческую projection. Обновление importer не меняет inputs существующих jobs. +Новые imports используют `normalized-ir-v5` / `preview-v5`. Исторические v2/v3/v4 jobs воспроизводят сохранённый preview, а legacy-v1 использует отдельную историческую projection. Обновление importer не меняет inputs существующих jobs. Другие форматы спецификаций и протоколов в Community-импорт не входят. @@ -94,7 +97,10 @@ Semantic loss получает blocker с source location: такой candidate | Успешные `2xx`, включая `204` | Поддерживается | Поддерживается | Каждая строка 200–299 проверяется отдельным probe; status сохраняется, а 204/205 остаются bodyless | | Локальные и allowlisted external `$ref` | Поддерживается | Поддерживается | Разрешение только из загруженного документа или digest-проверенного snapshot; тесты не загружают fixture по сети | | `allOf`, `oneOf`, `anyOf` | Поддерживается | Поддерживается | Совместимые `allOf` ветви объединяются; `oneOf` и `anyOf` остаются вариантами schema | -| bearer/basic/API key security requirements | Blocker до выбора Auth Profile | Blocker до выбора Auth Profile | `unsupported_security_requirement`; requirement вычисляется per-operation с наследованием document-уровня; credentials не импортируются и не попадают в preview | +| bearer/basic/API key security schemes | Поддерживается | Поддерживается для basic и API key header/query | Схемы типизируются без credential values; preview предлагает только совместимые workspace Auth Profiles с активными current secrets | +| Security requirements с несколькими alternatives | Поддерживается | Поддерживается | Каждая OR alternative сохраняется отдельно и получает собственный список совместимых Auth Profiles; unsupported alternative не блокирует доступную соседнюю alternative | +| Несколько schemes в одной security alternative (AND) | Blocker для этой alternative | Blocker для этой alternative | Составное требование сохраняет имена схем в finding; оно не становится actionable через single-scheme Auth Profile | +| OAuth2, OpenID Connect, mutual TLS и неизвестные схемы | Manual configuration | Manual configuration | Явный unsupported finding; схема не извлекает token/client secret и не становится actionable автоматически | | security override: operation-level `security: []` | Поддерживается | Поддерживается | Явный пустой массив отключает наследование: только operations с эффективным requirement получают source-located blocker, связанные операции остаются actionable | | Микс public/secured operations | Поддерживается | Подвергается проверке | Blocker принадлежит только затронутому candidate; global blocker не создаётся для требований одного operation | | XML, `TRACE`, `CONNECT` | Unsupported | Unsupported | Source-located finding; blocker не становится actionable Draft |